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Résumé en français 
 
Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois essais traitant de différents sujets dans le 
domaine de l’économie monétaire et de la macroéconomie ouverte. Trois brefs résumés 
de ces articles sont présentés ci-après. 
 
Chapitre 1 
 
Dans le premier chapitre (“The Backing of Government Debt and the Price 
Level”), j’étudie l’interdépendance existant entre les politiques fiscale et monétaire, et 
leurs rôles joints dans la détermination du niveau des prix. Le gouvernement est 
caractérisé par une règle de politique fiscale à long terme, dont une fraction δ de la dette 
courante a comme contrepartie la valeur présente escomptée des surplus primaires 
courants et futurs. Le reste de la dette doit être financé par des recettes de seigniorage. 
Avec cette règle de politique le niveau des prix ne dépend pas seulement du stock de 
monnaie, mais aussi de la proportion de la dette qui est financée par la création de 
monnaie. Des estimations empiriques du paramètre δ, qui caractérise l’interdépendance 
entre les autorités fiscale et monétaire, sont obtenues pour les pays de l’OCDE. Les 
résultats indiquent que la dette n’a pas d’importance décisive dans la détermination du 
niveau des prix dans ces économies. De plus, d’après les résultats, ces économies 
semblent avoir des banques centrales indépendantes Les estimations de δ sont 
positivement, mais faiblement, corrélées avec des mesures d’indépendance 
institutionnelle des banques centrales. 
 
Mots-clés : régime Ricardien, règles de politiques, indépendance des banques centrales. 
 
 
Chapitre 2 
 
Dans le deuxième chapitre (“Endogenous Borrowing Constraints and 
Consumption Volatility in a Small Open Economy”), je démontre l’évidence empirique de 
la volatilité relative de la consommation par rapport à celle de l’output dans un 
échantillon de 41 pays. Je montre que cette volatilité est plus grande dans les économies 
émergentes en comparaison avec les pays plus développés. Une explication possible est 
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que les économies émergentes font face à des contraintes d’endettement qui limitent 
l’utilisation des marchés internationaux de capitaux par une petite économie ouverte qui 
cherche à lisser sa consommation face à des chocs défavorables. Avec un modèle 
d’équilibre général stochastique simple, j’étudie les implications d’une contrainte 
d’endettement endogène à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) sur la volatilité de la 
consommation dans une petite économie ouverte. Le modèle est calibré pour les donnés 
du Brésil pour la période 1980-2001, et les résultats suggèrent qu’il est capable 
d’expliquer plus que la moitié de la différence de volatilité relative de la consommation 
entre les économies émergentes et développées. 
 
Mots-clés : dette souveraine, volatilité de la consommation, petite économie ouverte. 
 
 
Chapitre 3 
 
Dans le troisième chapitre (“IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs : Welfare 
Implications and the Catalytic Effect”), j’étudie le gain de bien-être associé aux 
programmes d’ajustement du Fond Monétaire International (FMI). Le modèle utilise une 
contrainte d’endettement similaire à celle discutée dans le contexte du chapitre 2 ci-
dessus. La décision de signer un programme du FMI est endogène. Le coût de signer un 
accord ave le Fond est donné par la conditionnalité des prêts du FMI (IMF conditionality) 
- pour emprunter de l’argent du FMI, le pays doit accepter des limites imposées sur sa 
consommation de biens publiques. Le bénéfice vient de la possibilité d’avoir des fonds 
additionnels du FMI (à un taux d’intérêt plus faible) et/ou de “l’effet catalytique” sur des 
prêts privés, ce qui peut faciliter la lissage de la consommation. Des simulations du 
modèle sous deux contextes institutionnels différents – avec et sans le FMI- sont 
comparées. Les résultats indiquent que lorsque la conditionnalité force le pays à épargner 
plus, à un coût qui ne l’empêche pas de signer un programme avec le FMI, cela réduit la 
probabilité de défaut, permettant les prêteurs privés de relaxer leurs contraintes de crédit 
envers le pays. D’après une calibration du modèle pour les donnés du Brésil, le gain de 
bien-être associé aux programmes du IMF est relativement faible.  
 
Mots-clés : FMI, effet catalytique, analyse de bien-être.  
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English Summary 
 
This Ph.D. thesis consists of three essays in which different issues in monetary 
economics and open macroeconomics are examined. The papers are summarized below. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
In “The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level,” the interdependence 
between fiscal and monetary policies is studied, specially their joint role in the 
determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal 
policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say δ, is backed by the 
present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is 
backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter δ characterizes the interdependence 
between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary 
economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money 
stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates 
of δ are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary 
base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of 
the price level in these economies, which tend to have independent central banks. 
Estimates of δ are weakly correlated with institutional measures of central bank 
independence. 
 
Key Words: Ricardian/Non-Ricardian regimes, policy rules, central bank independence 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In “Endogenous Borrowing Constraints and Consumption Volatility in a Small 
Open Economy,” it is presented empirical evidence that consumption volatility relative to 
output volatility is consistently higher in emerging economies than in developed 
economies. One natural explanation is that, emerging economies are more likely to face 
borrowing constraints and, consequently, find it more difficult to use international capital 
markets to smooth consumption. This chapter investigates how much this mechanism 
alone can account for the relative consumption volatility differential between emerging 
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and developed economies. The theoretical approach relies on a standard dynamic general 
equilibrium model of a small open endowment economy that is subject to an endogenous 
borrowing constraint. The borrowing constraint makes the small economy exactly 
indifferent between two options: i) repaying its external debt or ii) defaulting and having 
to live in financial autarky in the future. The model for the constrained economy is 
calibrated to match Brazilian data during the period 1980-2001. The findings suggest that 
the model is capable of accounting for more than half of the observed relative 
consumption volatility differential. 
 
Key Words: sovereign debt, consumption volatility, business cycles, small open economy 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The welfare implications of adjustment programs supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) are studied in “IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare 
Implications and the Catalytic Effect.” The model features an endogenous borrowing 
constraint set up by international lenders who will never lend more than a debt ceiling 
that forces the borrowing economy always choose repayment over default. The decision 
about joining an IMF program is endogenous. The immediate potential welfare cost of 
joining a program is driven by IMF conditionality - in order to be able to borrow from the 
IMF, the country has to submit to limits on the consumption of public goods. The 
benefits come from the additional borrowing both from the IMF (at a lower interest rate) 
and /or through a "catalytic effect" on private loans, which facilitates consumption 
smoothing over time. Simulations of the dynamic model in two institutional 
environments -- with and without the IMF -- are compared. Results indicate that when 
conditionality forces the country to save more, at a cost that does not prevent it from 
signing an IMF program, then the resulting lower probability of default can induce 
private lenders to relax their borrowing constraint. Based on a calibration of the model 
for the Brazilian economy, the overall welfare gains associated with IMF programs are 
relatively small.  
 
Key Words: IMF, catalytic effect, emerging economies, welfare analysis. 
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Introduction
Cette thèse de doctorat est composée de trois chapitres examinant diﬀérents sujets en économie
monétaire et macroéconomie ouverte. Dans le premier chapitre (The Backing of Government Debt
and the Price Level), j’étudie l’interdépendance entre les politiques fiscale et monétaire, notamment
leur rôle joint dans la détermination du niveau des prix, avec un modèle d’équilibre général pour une
économie monétaire. Le modèle considère un gouvernement caractérisé par une règle de politique
fiscal à long terme selon laquelle une fraction δ de la dette courante a comme contrepartie la valeur
présente escomptée des flous de surplus primaires, courants et futures. La partie qui reste doit
être financée par les recettes de seigniorage. Le paramètre δ est interprété comme un indice du
dégré d’interdépendance entre les autorités fiscale et monétaire. Dans le modèle, le niveau des
prix est déterminé par l’équilibre du marché monétaire. Avec la règle de politique proposée dans
le modèle, je démontre que le niveau des prix ne dépend non seulement du stock de monnaie,
mais aussi de la proportion de la dette ayant comme contrepartie la création de monnaie. Une
fois caractérisée la solution du modèle, particulièrement l’équation d’équilibre pour le niveau des
prix, des estimations empiriques du paramètre δ ont été obtenues pour les pays de l’OCDE, en
utilisant des techiniques de cointegration. Les résultats indiquent que la dette joue un rôle mineur
dans la détermination du niveau des prix dans ces économies, où les banques centrales sont plus
indépendantes. Les estimations du paramètre δ sont positivement, mais faiblement, corrélées avec
des mesures d’indépendance institutionnelle des banques centrales.
Dans le chapitre 2 (Endogenous Borrowing Constraints and Consumption Volatility in a Small
Open Economy), je démontre que la volatilité relative de la consommation par rapport à celle de la
production est plus élevée dans les économies émergentes que dans les petites économies dévelop-
pées. Une explication possible est que les économies émergentes ont plus de probabilité de faire
face à des contraintes d’endettement et, par conséquent, ont plus de diﬃculté à utiliser le marché
international des capitaux pour lisser leur consommation. J’étudie l’importance quantitative de
ce mécanisme, à lui seule, pour expliquer la diﬀérence de volatilité relative de la consommation
entre les économies émergentes et développées. L’approche théorique est basée sur un modèle
d’équilibre général dynamique appliqué à une petite économie ouverte assujettie à une contrainte
d’endettement. Cette contrainte est définie de sorte que l’économie est indiﬀérente entre deux op-
tions: (i) repayer sa dette, ou (ii) faire un défaut et être obligée de vivre en autarchie financière
dans l’avenir. Le modèle pour l’économie contrainte a été calibré pour les données brésiliennes
pendant la période 1980−2001. Les résultats suggèrent que le modèle explique plus que la moitié
de la diﬀérence de volatilité relative de la consommation observée entre les pays émergents et les
petites économies développées.
Dans le chapitre 3 (IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Cat-
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alytic Eﬀect), j’étudie les implications des programmes d’ajustement du Fond Monétaire Interna-
tional (FMI) sur le bien-être. Le modèle considère une contrainte d’endettement endogène, similaire
à celle mentionnée au paragraphe précèdent. La decision de signer un programme du FMI est aussi
endogène. En termes de bien-être, le coût potentiel immédiat d’entrer dans un programme du
FMI est donné par les clauses de conditionalité — pour être éligible à un prêt du FMI,le pays doit
limiter sa consommation de biens publiques. Les bénéfices sont dérivés des prêts du FMI à des taux
d’intérêts plus faibles, et/ou d’un "eﬀet catalytique" sur les prêts privés. Ces prêts additionnels
permettent un lissage plus facile de la consommation au travers le temps. Des simulations du mod-
èle dynamique dans deux contextes institutionnels — avec et sans le FMI — sont comparés. Lorsque
la conditionnalité force le pays à épargner plus, à un coût qui ne l’empêche tout de même pas de
signer un programme avec le FMI, cela réduit la probabilité de défaut, permettant les prêteurs
privés de relaxer leurs contraintes de crédit envers le pays. D’après la calibration du modèle pour
l’économie du Brésil, les gains de bien-être associés aux programmes d’ajustement du FMI ne sont
pas très importantes.
2
Chapitre 1 
 
 
The Backing of Government Debt 
and the Price Level 
1 The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role
in the determination of the aggregate price level. In general, fiscal and monetary policies are linked
through the consolidated government budget constraint. A combination of taxes, new debt issue,
and seigniorage revenue must finance government expenditures in every period. Or, expressed in
terms of the intertemporal budget constraint, outstanding debt must be backed by a combination
of the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses and seigniorage revenues.
More precisely, this paper examines the proposition that how debt is backed aﬀects the manner
in which the aggregate price level is determined. The theoretical analysis is carried out in a standard
competitive monetary economy. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule
whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say δ, is backed by the present discounted value
of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue.
The parameter δ is structural and summarizes the degree of interdependence between fiscal and
monetary authorities in a given institutional setup. It is shown that in a standard monetary
economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but
also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money.
We draw on earlier research by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) and extend their work in at least
three directions. First, we derive results using only the long-run fiscal policy rule without having to
specify a particular period-by-period rule. This long-run rule is compatible with the time-stationary
rule in Aiyagari and Gertler, but also with other (perhaps not time-stationary) period-by-period
rules. Second, we characterize the determination of the price level at all times, rather than only at
the steady state. Finally, we propose a simple empirical strategy to construct an estimate of the δ
parameter.
In order to understand the importance of the empirical analysis, note that in this model there
is a continuum of fiscal regimes indexed by δ. There are two polar cases. First, in the case where
δ = 1, the fiscal authority backs fully all government debt. Fiscal policy accommodates monetary
policy in the following sense: whenever the monetary authority sells government bonds in the open
market, the fiscal authority increases current or future taxes, and/or reduces current or future
expenditures, to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. The monetary
authority never responds to the increase in the stock of government debt associated with a budget
deficit. Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this case as a Ricardian regime.
Second, in the case where δ = 0, the monetary authority backs fully all government debt. In
particular, the monetary authority accommodates the fiscal authority whenever a budget deficit
is financed with debt. This accommodation takes the form of an increase in current or future
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seigniorage revenues to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. The
fiscal authority is insensitive to monetary policy in that neither taxes nor expenditure react (today
or in the future) to changes in stock of outstanding government debt. Sargent, and Aiyagari and
Gertler refer to this case as a polar Non-Ricardian regime.
Aiyagari and Gertler correctly argue that one cannot distinguish between Ricardian and Non-
Ricardian regimes on the basis of long-run correlations between nominal interest rates and money
growth. The reason is that there exists monetary policy rules for which the Non-Ricardian regimes
(0 ≤ δ < 1) generate the same correlation as the Ricardian regime (δ = 1). However, we show that
under certain conditions, the dynamics of money, debt, and private consumption allow the direct
estimation of δ and standard statistical inference can be used to draw conclusions regarding the
regime that better describes policy in a given economy. The estimation strategy is based on now
standard results in unit-root econometrics that were not well developed at the time Aiyagari and
Gertler wrote their contribution.
Using data from a sample of developed economies, we construct country-specific estimates of
δ. Although we find some heterogeneity, the null hypothesis that δ equals 1 cannot be rejected at
standard levels for most countries in the sample. This finding suggest that a Ricardian regime is
a reasonable approximation for these countries, and implies that (i) the fiscal authority backs all
outstanding debt, and (ii) debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level.
Additional empirical implications of the model are also examined. First, estimates of δ are
compared with measures of central bank independence proposed in the literature. Results indicate a
positive correlation between δ and the indices proposed Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman
(1992). Intuitively, the more independent the monetary authority, the larger the proportion of
debt that is backed by the fiscal authority. Second, results show a negative correlation between
δ and seigniorage revenue as proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and of government
spending. This finding does not imply a causal relationship, but it accords with the idea that
countries that back a larger proportion of their government debt with seigniorage would require
larger average seigniorage revenues. Third, impulse-response analysis is used to examine the eﬀect
of a government debt innovation on the future path of the primary surplus. Results indicate that
a positive debt innovation leads to a long-run increase in the primary surplus, as predicted by the
model when δ = 1.
In Sargent and Wallace (1981), the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities takes the
form of a coordination game. The central bank could move first, determine how much seigniorage
revenue can be raised, and force the fiscal authority to follow a policy that satisfies the government’s
consolidated intertemporal budget constraint. Then, a central bank that is committed to price
stability could indeed deliver price stability regardless of fiscal policy. Alternatively, the fiscal
authority could move first by defining the path of the primary surplus. Since higher seigniorage
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revenues would be necessary to avoid explosive debt paths, fiscal policy would have an eﬀect on
the price level. Given a predetermined path for the primary surplus, “tight” money today triggers
higher interest rates, increases interests rate payments on the government’s debt, and requires
“loose” money later. Rational agents anticipate the future increase in money creation and bid
the price level up today. This is Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Our
results imply that, for the countries in the sample, the central bank is the first mover. That is,
the monetary authority sets its policy in advance and imposes discipline on the fiscal authority.
Our work is related to, but conceptually diﬀerent from, the literature on the Fiscal Theory of
the Price Level (FTPL) [see, for example, Woodford (1995) and Cochrane (1998, 2001)]. Under
the FTPL, the price level is determined by the intertemporal budget constraint as the quotient
between the nominal value of the interest bearing debt and the present value of the surplus, that
might include seignorage revenues. The underlying assumption is that the government’s actions are
not constrained by budgetary issues. Consequently, the intertemporal budget constraint holds as
an equilibrium condition, rather than as a constraint, and only for equilibrium prices. Any change
in fiscal policy must impact the price level, regardless of how committed the monetary authority is
to price stability. Both our model and the FTPL predict a relationship between the price level and
fiscal variables. However, we assume that the intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied
for any arbitrary sequence of prices, whereas the FTPL assumes it is an equilibrium condition.
This modeling diﬀerence means that our econometric should not be interpreted as a formal test of
the FTPL.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 outlines
the estimation strategy and reports empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Private Sector
The economy is populated by identical, infinitely-lived consumers with perfect foresight.1 The
objective of the representative consumer is:
max
{ct,nt,mt,bt,kt}
∞X
t=0
βtu (ct,mt/pt, 1− nt) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and u is strictly increasing in all arguments,
strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions.
In each period, consumers choose consumption (ct), labor (nt), and next-period holdings of
1The assumption of perfect foresight is not crucial for the theoretical results, but it is analytically convenient.
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) allow uncertainty but focus on a steady state with constant asset prices. Leeper (1991)
permits shocks to the fiscal and monetary policy rules, but output, consumption, and government expenditure are
deterministic.
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capital (kt), money (mt) and nominal one-period government debt (bt). The variable pt is the
aggregate price level. The time endowment is normalized to one. The population size is constant
and normalized to one. Capital and labor services are rented each period to a representative
competitive firm that produces output according to a standard neoclassical production function.
The inclusion of real balances (mt/pt) as an argument of the utility function reflects the conve-
nience of using money in carrying out transactions. Feenstra (1986) shows the equivalence between
including real balances in the utility function, assuming liquidity costs that appear in the budget
constraint, and introducing a cash-in-advance constraint. In this sense, the approach followed here
to motivate money demand is not restrictive. Since our model is concerned with the composition
of government liabilities, we follow Woodford (1995) in interpreting mt as the consumer’s holdings
of the monetary base.
Because it is analytically very tractable and it allows us to exploit the linearity of the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint, we assume that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic and
separable:2
u (ct,mt/pt, 1− nt) = ln(ct) + γ ln(mt/pt) + θ ln(1− nt),
where γ and θ are positive constants that measure the relative importance of real money holdings
and leisure in utility.
The consumer’s optimization problem is subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition and to the se-
quence of budget constraints (expressed in real terms):
ct +
mt
pt
+
bt
pt
+ kt = wtnt + rtkt−1 +
mt−1
πtpt−1
+ it−1
bt−1
πtpt−1
− τ t, (2)
for all t, where τ t is a lump-sum tax, πt = pt/pt−1 is the gross inflation rate, it−1 is the gross
nominal interest rate on government debt which is set in period t − 1 and paid in period t, wt is
the wage rate, and rt is the gross return on capital between periods t − 1 and t. In equilibrium,
the absence of arbitrage profits will require rt to equal the real gross interest rate it−1/πt.
First-order necessary conditions for the representative consumer’s problem include:
1/ct = β(it/πt+1)(1/ct+1), (3)
mt/pt = γctit/(it − 1), (4)
Equation (3) is an Euler equation for consumption and equation (4) defines money demand as a
function of consumption and the return on money. We will see below that only these two conditions
are necessary to derive the model’s implications for the aggregate price level, without reference to
the remaining first-order conditions.
2All results of the paper follow through if agents derive utility from government expenditures, as long as they
enter separably in the utility function.
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1.2.2 Government
In every period, the government spends an exogenous amount of resources Gt. Government expen-
ditures may be financed by levying lump-sum taxes (τ t), by issuing money (Mt), and by increasing
public debt (Bt). The government is subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition and to a dynamic budget
constraint (expressed in real terms):
Gt + (it−1 − 1)
Bt−1
pt
= τ t +
(Mt −Mt−1)
pt
+
(Bt −Bt−1)
pt
. (5)
Forward iteration on (5) and the government’s no-Ponzi condition imply an intertemporal budget
constraint:
it−1
Bt−1
pt
=
∞X
j=0
τ t+j
R(j)t
+
∞X
j=0
Mt+j −Mt+j−1
pt+jR(j)t
−
∞X
j=0
Gt+j
R(j)t
,
= Tt + St − Gt,
where R(j)t =
Qj
h=1 rt+h is the j-periods-ahead market discount factor, and Tt, St and Gt are
the present value of tax receipts, seigniorage revenue, and government expenditure, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the government’s present value budget constraint holds
with equality.3
The government is assumed to follow a “long-run” fiscal policy rule whereby it commits itself
to raise large enough primary surpluses (in present value terms) to back a constant fraction of the
currently outstanding debt. More formally:
Definition (The δ-backing Fiscal Policy): Given a sequence of prices {it+j−1, pt+j}∞j=0 and an
initial stock of nominal debt Bt−1, a δ-backing fiscal policy is a sequence {Gt+j , τ t+j , Bt+j}∞j=0 such
that, for all t:
Tt − Gt = δit−1Bt−1pt , (6)
where δ ∈ [0, 1].
Put simply, this fiscal policy rule means that a constant fraction (δ) of the outstanding government
debt, including interest payments, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future
primary surpluses. Since the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied, it
follows that:
St = (1− δ)it−1Bt−1pt . (7)
3Note that we impose a no-Ponzi game condition on total government liabilities. Under the assumption that the
government does not waste revenues, this amounts to
lim
j→∞
(Mt+j +Bt+j) /pt+jR(j)t = 0.
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Hence, the policy (6) also implies that a fraction (1−δ) of the currently outstanding debt is backed
by the present discounted value of current and future seigniorage revenue.
The set of possible fiscal regimes is indexed by the fraction δ of the outstanding debt that is
backed by the primary surplus. Because δ ∈ [0, 1], this set is a continuum limited by the following
two polar cases:
(i) In the case where δ = 1, the fiscal authority backs fully all outstanding debt. It commits
itself to adjust the stream of future primary surpluses in order to match the current value of the
government’s bond obligations. There is complete accommodation of the fiscal policy to any open
market sale by the monetary authority. Whenever the monetary authority sells government bonds
in the open market, the fiscal authority increases current or future taxes (and/or reduces current or
future expenditures) to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. On the
other hand, the monetary authority never responds to the increase in the stock of government debt
associated with a budget deficit. Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this case
as a Ricardian regime.4 Because of the apparent leading role played by the monetary authority,
Leeper (1991) refers to this case as one of active monetary/passive fiscal policy.
(ii) In the case where δ = 0, all outstanding debt is backed by the monetary authority in the
form of current and future seigniorage revenues. The monetary authority fully accommodates the
fiscal authority whenever a budget deficit is financed with debt. This accommodation takes the form
of an increase in current or future seigniorage revenues to back the principal and interest payments
on the newly issued debt. The fiscal authority is insensitive to monetary policy in the sense that
neither taxes nor expenditure react (now or in the future) to changes in the stock of outstanding
government debt. Sargent, and Aiyagari and Gertler refer to this case as a polar Non-Ricardian
regime. Leeper refers to it as one of passive monetary/active fiscal policy.
The long-run rule (6) is consistent with multiple period-by-period fiscal policy rules. As an
example, consider the following version of the rule used by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985):
pt(τ t −Gt) = δ [(it−1 − 1)Bt−1 − (Bt −Bt−1)] . (8)
Under (8), the nominal primary surplus is adjusted in every period (increasing τ t or reducing Gt)
in the exact amount needed to finance a fixed fraction δ of the interest on the outstanding debt
(Bt−1) net of an adjustment for debt growth. To see that this stationary policy satisfies (6), simply
iterate forward on (8) and use the government’s no-Ponzi-game condition. In principle, there
might be other period-by-period policy rules (perhaps not time-stationary) that are consistent with
the rule (6). An advantage of our approach is that we are able to determine the price level and
construct empirical estimates of δ using the long-run policy rule (6) without having to assume that
a particular policy like (8) is satisfied in every period, for every country in the sample.
4Note that the term “Ricardian”, here, is not used in the standard context of ricardian equivalence.
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The parameter δ characterizes the degree of interdependence between fiscal and monetary au-
thorities. This parameter should not be interpreted narrowly, as capturing a publicly announced
policy commitment, or a commitment formally written in a country’s budget, constitution, or cen-
tral bank organic law. Instead, δ is a value that arises from the interaction of the fiscal and
monetary authorities given a stable institutional setup. This interpretation is reinforced by the ob-
servation that the price level is derived here using a long-run fiscal policy rule without any reference
to particular period-by-period fiscal or monetary policy rules.
Our specification of government behaviour follows earlier literature that describes monetary
and/or fiscal policies in terms of explicit rules. See, among others, Taylor (1993) and Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (2000) for monetary policy rules; and Sargent and Wallace (1981), Aiyagari and
Gertler (1985), Leeper (1991), and Bohn (1998) for fiscal policy rules. Leeper and Bohn point
out that fiscal rules relating taxes to debt can be consistent with an optimizing government that
minimizes the cost of tax collection by smoothing marginal tax rates over time [see Barro (1979)].
We view the δ-backing rule as a fairly unrestrictive way to parameterize government behaviour that
is convenient both analytically and empirically. It captures in a reduced-form way the idea that
in response to diﬀerent institutional settings, the monetary authority will face diﬀerent obligations
regarding fiscal policy. Whether this rule satisfies some optimality criterion, or whether it is a
realistic description of government behaviour beyond that just mentioned is an open question to
be addressed in future research.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for this economy may be defined in an entirely standard way. Specif-
ically, it corresponds to a price system, allocations for the representative consumer and the rep-
resentative firm, and a government policy, such that (i) the representative consumer and the rep-
resentative firm optimize given the government policy and the price system, (ii) the government
policy is budget-feasible given the price system and the choices of consumers and firms, and (iii)
markets clear.
In this model, the price level is determined by the clearing of the money market
Mt = mt. (9)
Money supply is determined by the combination of the fiscal rule and the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint [eq. (7)], while money demand is given by the consumer’s intratemporal
condition relating money and consumption [eq. (4)]. From equation (7), money supply can be
written after some manipulations as
Mt
pt
=
it
it − 1

(1− δ)it−1
Bt−1
pt
+
Mt−1
pt
−
∞X
j=1
Ã
Mt+j
pt+jR(j)t
it+j − 1
it+j
!
 . (10)
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Using the equilibrium condition (9) and money demand (4) in (10) yields
γct = (1− δ)it−1
Bt−1
pt
+
Mt−1
pt
−
∞X
j=1
Ã
mt+j
pt+jR(j)t
it+j − 1
it+j
!
.
Exploiting the recursive nature of the Euler equation [eq. (3)] to find an expression for the infi-
nite sum,
P∞
j=1(mt+j/pt+jR
(j)
t )((it+j − 1)/it+j), in terms of current consumption, and after some
algebra:
pt =
(1− β)(Mt−1 + (1− δ)it−1Bt−1)
γct
. (11)
This equation describes the aggregate price level as a function of consumption and of the beginning-
of-period stocks of money and debt. Aiyagari and Gertler obtain an expression for the price level
similar to the one above, but assuming a specific period-by-period rule and focusing on a stationary
solution with constant asset prices.
As an alternative, one can use the fact that Mt−1+(1− δ)it−1Bt−1 =Mt+(1− δ)Bt,5 to write
the price level in terms of the end-of-period stocks of money and debt:
pt =
(1− β)[Mt + (1− δ)Bt]
γct
. (12)
Note that equations (11) and (12) are equivalent, but the empirical analysis of (12) would not
require data on the gross nominal interest rate. Regardless of whether one focuses on (11) or
(12), this model implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the
proportion of the outstanding debt that is backed by money. In this sense, the proportion of the
outstanding debt that is backed by money behaves like money itself.
Notice that the derivation of the price level does not involve the production side of the economy.
In particular, it does not involve the consumer’s first-order conditions for their choice of capital and
labor, the firm’s first-order conditions, or the market clearing in goods and factors markets. Since
this model displays the property of money superneutrality, the production side of the economy is
solved in a completely independent set of equations that do not include nominal variables.6 The
consumption level, ct, that appears in the denominator of (12) is determined in that subsystem as
well. Thus, the aggregate price level is the outcome of monetary policy (reflected in the sequence
5The proof goes as follows. Write equation (7) as:
(Mt −Mt−1) /pt − (1− δ)it−1Bt−1/pt = −St+1/rt+1,
= −(1− δ)itBt/pt+1rt+1,
= −(1− δ)Bt/pt,
where the last line follows from multiplying and dividing the right-hand side by pt, and using the definitions of gross
inflation and gross real interest rate.
6 In general, the Sidrauski model can exhibit nonsuperneutrality outside the steady state. Fischer (1979) shows
that for the CRRA utility function, the rate of capital accumulation is positively related to the rate of money growth,
except for the case of log-separable utility used here.
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of Mt) and how government debt is backed (summarized by the parameter δ).7
In order to develop further the reader’s intuition, consider a long run situation where all real
variables are constant. By dividing and multiplying the right-hand side of (12) by y, we obtain
pt =
MtV
y +
(1− δ)BtV
y ,
where V ≡ (1 − β)y/(γc) can be interpreted as a measure of velocity of the broad monetary
aggregate, Mt + (1 − δ)Bt, that consists of the sum of money and the monetized debt (i.e., the
proportion of debt that is backed by seigniorage). Note that only for the special case where δ = 1,
can the constant V be interpreted as money-velocity and the Quantity Theory of Money holds.
More generally, for any δ ∈ [0, 1), the stock of debt plays a role in the determination of the price
level. This point was made before by Aiyagari and Gertler.
Government debt also plays a crucial role in the determination of the price level under the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL assumes that the government does not have to satisfy
its intertemporal budget constraint for all possible paths of the price level. A particular path for
the price level that does not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint could be automatically
excluded as an equilibrium by the government because it would not satisfy market clearing nor
the consumer’s optimality conditions. As a result of this assumption, the aggregate price level
is determined as the quotient between the nominal value of interest-bearing debt and the present
value of the all government revenues (including seignorage) regardless of whether the government
debt is, or will be, monetized. In contrast, in our model, the no-Ponzi-game condition on the
government’s behaviour implies an intertemporal budget constraint that is satisfied for all price
sequences and the equilibrium sequence is determined by the clearing of the money market.
This conceptual diﬀerence between the FTPL and our model has both theoretical and empirical
implications. At the theoretical level, it implies that, under the FTPL, the stock of debt aﬀects
the price level even if it is never monetized while, in this model, only the proportion of debt that
is monetized (now or in the future) will aﬀect the price level. The eﬀect of debt on the price level
increases linearly with (1−δ), that is, with the proportion of debt that is backed by current or future
seignorage revenues. When δ = 1 and given a path of government expenditure, savings in the form
of government debt will be used to pay future lump-sum taxes. Consequently, debt has no eﬀect
on the current demand for goods or money and Ricardian equivalence holds. When δ ∈ [0, 1),
a proportion of debt does not require future lump-sum tax increases but implies an increase in
current and/or future seigniorage revenue. Anticipating future inflation, forward-looking agents
reduce their current money demand and bid the price level up today.
7Results are also robust to allowing distortionary taxation on capital and labor. The reason is that the Euler
equation (3) and the intratemporal condition (4) are unchanged when the model is generalized in this manner. All
that is required to make our results go through is to redefine Tt as the present discounted value of all lump-sum and
distortionary taxes on capital and labor income.
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At the empirical level, we show in the next section that, under certain conditions, the long-run
dynamics of money, debt, and private consumption permit the econometric estimation of δ in our
model. Statistical inference can then be used to draw conclusions regarding the policy regime
(whether Ricardian or not) in a given economy. However, since we assume that the intertemporal
budget constraint is always satisfied, our econometric results have no direct bearing on the impos-
sibility result in Cochrane (1998), whereby the FTPL cannot be falsified empirically because only
equilibrium prices are observable.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Econometric Strategy
This section describes a simple econometric strategy to obtain estimates of the parameter that
measures the degree of interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, δ. Rewrite equation
(12) as:
Mt =
γ
(1− β)Ct − (1− δ)Bt, (13)
where Ct ≡ ptct denotes nominal private consumption. Consider the empirical counterpart to this
relation:
Mt = α+ ρ1Ct + ρ2Bt + et, (14)
where α is an intercept, ρj for j = 1, 2 are constant coeﬃcients, and et is a disturbance term that
captures specification error. In terms of the structural parameters of the model, ρ1 = γ/(1 − β),
and ρ2 = −(1 − δ). Notice that although not all structural parameters could be identified from
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) projection of Mt on Ct and Bt, δ would be identified from
the coeﬃcient on the stock of debt. In principle, because all three variables are endogenous in
this model, the OLS regression would yield biased and inconsistent estimates if the variables were
covariance-stationary. However, if Mt, Ct, and Bt are I(1) variables (integrated of order one), and
equation (14) is a cointegrating relationship, then the same regression would yield superconsistent
parameter estimates [see Phillips and Durlauf (1986)].8
Our approach is not the only one that could deliver estimates of the parameter δ.We can think
of at least two other strategies. First, one could consider estimating δ directly from the fiscal rule
(6). An advantage of this strategy is that it would deliver a “theory-free” estimate without the need
to model the consumer’s behaviour or make assumptions about functional forms. However, this
strategy requires the computation of the present discounted values Tt and Gt that involve infinite
future values for taxes and government expenditure. Since we only have access to a finite number
8 In principle, the reduced-form (14) may be written with either Mt, Ct, or Bt on the left-hand side. In adopting
the formulation above, we are normalizing the coeﬃcient of Mt in the cointegrating vector to unity. Provided Mt
belongs to the cointegrating relation, results are robust to this normalization. The reason we choose to write the
reduced-form in this manner is that its estimation delivers δ directly without the need to use, for example, the Delta
method to compute its standard error.
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of observations, the implementation of this approach would necessarily involve truncation and the
loss of many degrees of freedom.
Second, one could follow the literature and construct inferences about government behaviour
on the basis of particular period-by-period rules [see, for example, Bohn (1998)]. This strategy
would overcome the problem created by the computation of infinite summations. However, it
seems unlikely that the same period-by-period rule describes government behaviour in a cross-
section of countries with diﬀerent institutional arrangements. Instead, the approach here makes
the hypothesis of similar consumer’s preferences across countries (at least in terms of functional
form if not of preference parameters) but avoids imposing a period-by-period common institutional
design for governments in diﬀerent countries.
Notice that we are able to identify δ, even if the theoretical model only assumes a long-run
fiscal policy rule and allows any period-by-period rule that satisfies (6). The reason is that
current money supply is derived directly from the implication of the long-run fiscal rule and the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint. We then use the money market equilibrium and the
agents’ first-order conditions to derive the price level. Thus, there is a sense in which we estimate
the long-run rule directly but use the restrictions from economic theory to solve out the infinite
sum.9 Hence, by developing a fully-specified model, we can construct econometric inferences about
the policy regime, even if we do not know the particular period-by-period rule followed by a given
government in a given country.
1.3.2 Data
The empirical analysis is based on annual, per-capita data on nominal monetary base, nominal
government debt, and nominal private consumption from 14 industrialized countries. All series
come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database compiled by the International
Monetary Fund. The only exceptions are government debt for the United States and Canada.
The data on monetary base corresponds to IFS series 14 (Reserve Money).10 For Canada,
government debt corresponds to the series D469409 (Net Federal Government Debt) in the CANSIM
database of Statistics Canada. For the United States, government debt is the series Gross Federal
Debt Held by the Public from the U.S. Department of Commerce and available from the web site
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (www.stls.frb.org). For all other countries, government
debt corresponds to the IFS series 88a (Government Debt on National Currency) or, when this
was not available, the series 88b (Government Domestic Debt). Private consumption corresponds
9Recall that we used the money market equilibrium to substitute M ’s (money supply) with m’s (money demand)
in (10). Then, we used the agents’ intratemporal condition (4) to express the infinite sum in terms of future
consumption and, finally, we used consumption smoothing to write the infinite consumption sum in terms of current
consumption alone.
10Whenever Reserve Money was not reported, we used the sum of series 14a, 14c and 14d. These series are the
disaggregated liabilities of the monetary authority.
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to the series 96F (Household Consumption Expenditures or Private Consumption). Population is
the mid-year estimate of the total population by the United Nation’s Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
and labeled as series 99Z..ZF in the IFS.
The countries in the sample were not randomly selected. Instead, we included in the sample
all member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for
which reasonably long time series of the variables were available. An advantage of using data from
OECD countries is that they are market economies with relatively few good prices under direct or
indirect government control.11
The countries in the sample (with the sample period in parenthesis) are: Austria (1970 to
1997), Belgium (1953 to 1997), Canada (1948 to 1999), Finland (1950 to 1997), France (1950 to
1998), Germany (1950 to 1990), Italy (1962 to 1998), the Netherlands (1951 to 1998), Norway
(1971 to 1997), Spain (1962 to 1998), Sweden (1950 to 1999), Switzerland (1960 to 1999), United
Kingdom (1970 to 1997) and United States (1951 to 1999). In addition to data availability, the
sample period for some countries was limited by substantial institutional changes. In particular,
sample for Germany ends before the reunification and the samples for member countries of the
European Monetary Union end before the introduction of the Euro in January 1999.
1.3.3 Results
The econometric strategy outlined above to estimate the structural parameters of the model is valid
only ifMt, Ct, and Bt are I(1) variables and the OLS regression (14) is not spurious, that is, if (14)
forms a cointegrating relation. Unit root and cointegration tests are used to assess both conditions.
Table 1.1 report results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests. The estimated
alternative is a covariance-stationary autoregression with both a constant and a deterministic trend.
For all ADF tests, the level of augmentation, (i.e., the number of lagged first diﬀerences included in
the OLS regression) was based on the Modified Information Criterion (MIC) proposed by Ng and
Perron (2001).12 In all cases, the null hypothesis of a unit root with drift cannot be rejected against
the alternative of a deterministic trend at the 5 per cent significance level. The only exceptions are
the per-capita nominal government debts of Norway and Italy. However, in the case of Norway the
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1 per cent level, and in both cases the hypothesis cannot be
rejected when we apply recursive t-tests to select the level of augmentation.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested using the residual-based method proposed by
Engle and Granger (1987) and Phillips and Ouliaris (1990). Gonzalo and Lee (1998) show that
11 In preliminary work, we considered using data from developing countries. Unfortunately, their government debt
series are usually too short and/or unreliable to allow a meaningful analysis, and a substantial proportion of goods
and services have or have had their prices subject to government control. For example, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel
used widespread price and wage controls during inflation stabilization programs in the 1980s.
12 In order to assess the robustness of the results to the lag-selection method, we also applied recursive t-tests with
similar conclusions to the ones reported. Two exceptions are noted below.
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this test is more robust than Johansen’s trace test to certain departures from unit root behaviour
like long memory and stochastic unit roots. The residual-based test requires running OLS on the
relation of interest and then testing the hypothesis that the regression residuals have a unit root.
Nonstationarity of the residuals constitutes evidence against cointegration. These test results are
reported in the last column of Table 1.1. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level for
Austria, Canada, Spain and Sweden, and at the 10 per cent level for Belgium, Finland and the
United States. For France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom, the null cannot be rejected at
the 10 per cent level but the result is marginal in that the p-values are close the 0.10. Without
ambiguity, the null cannot be rejected for the Netherlands and Switzerland. Because, Mt, Bt, and
Ct were found to be I(1) for both countries, the absence of cointegration is interpreted as a rejection
of the theoretical model for these two countries.
Table 1.1
Unit Root and Cointegration Tests Results
ADF Unit Root Test Residual-Based
Country Mt Bt Ct Cointegration Test
Austria −2.20 −1.53 −1.25 −5.52∗
Belgium −1.45 −1.45 −2.67 −3.56†
Canada −0.59 −1.68 −1.93 −4.82∗
Finland −2.15 1.21 −2.22 −3.71†
France −3.16 −2.15 −2.37 −3.41
Germany −2.40 −2.24 −1.53 −4.50∗
Italy −0.54 −4.73∗ −2.38 −3.30
Netherlands −1.82 −1.85 −1.79 −2.09
Norway −0.07 −3.66∗ −2.45 −3.18
Spain −1.77 0.20 −1.66 −3.82∗
Sweden −2.13 −1.88 −1.11 −4.96∗
Switzerland −1.49 −1.64 −2.99 −2.07
United Kingdom −1.10 −3.29† −1.68 −3.02
United States 2.28 −2.64 −0.24 −3.76†
Note: the superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the null hypothesis
at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
The above results are important because they allow us to describe empirically the money mar-
ket equilibrium as a cointegrating relation. This means that even if the individual series can be
represented as nonstationary processes, the behavioral rules and constraints of the model economy
imply that a precise combination of these variables should be stationary. Hence, a simple Least
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Squares regression yields a superconsistent estimate of the parameter that characterizes the inter-
dependence between fiscal and monetary policies.13 Because not all conditions outlined above are
met for all countries in the sample, the analysis that follows focuses only on 12 of the 14 countries in
the original sample, namely Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
For the estimation of the cointegrating vector, we employ the DOLS method proposed by
Stock and Watson (1993). This method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood but
exploits the functional relationship predicted by the model. This approach involves running the
OLS regression:
Mt = α+ ρ1Ct + ρ2Bt +
kX
s=−k
ξ1,s∆Ct−s +
kX
s=−k
ξ2,s∆Bt−s + et, (15)
where ξj,s for j = 1, 2 and s = −k,−k + 1, . . . , k − 1, k are constant coeﬃcients. The appropriate
number of leads and lags was selected by the sequential application of recursive F -tests.14
Table 1.2
Estimates of Structural Parameters
Country ρˆ1 δˆ
Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
Austria 0.197∗ (0.012) 0.944∗ (0.011)
Belgium 0.145∗ (0.061) 0.959∗ (0.019)
Canada 0.128∗ (0.059) 0.956∗ (0.043)
Finland 0.292∗ (0.101) 0.997∗ (0.338)
France 0.163∗ (0.020) 0.939∗ (0.048)
Germany 0.179∗ (0.031) 0.928∗ (0.060)
Italy 0.360 (0.283) 0.903∗ (0.106)
Norway 0.089 (0.101) 0.946∗ (0.298)
Spain 0.467 (0.652) 0.905∗ (0.536)
Sweden 0.268∗ (0.064) 0.952∗ (0.062)
United Kingdom 0.046∗ (0.008) 0.994∗ (0.019)
United States 0.033 (0.046) 1.073∗ (0.049)
Notes: s.e. is the (rescaled) standard error. The superscript ∗ denotes the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coeﬃcient is zero at the 5 %
significance level.
13Elliot (1998) shows that even if the model variables have roots near but not exactly equal to one, the point
estimates of the cointegrating vector are consistent. However, hypothesis tests regarding the coeﬃcients that do not
have an exact unit root can be subject to size distortions.
14Results using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) are similar to the ones reported.
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Table 1.2 presents estimates of the structural parameters and their rescaled standard errors.
Standard errors are rescaled to take into account the serial correlation of the residuals that remains
after adding the k leads and lags [see, Hayashi (2000, pp. 654-657)]. In all cases the coeﬃcient on
nominal consumption, ρ1 = γ/(1−β) is positive and (except for Italy and Norway) statistically dif-
ferent from zero. However, the weight of real balances in the utility function (γ) and the subjective
discount rate (β) are not separately identified.15
An estimate of δ is identified from the reduced-form parameter ρ2 = −(1− δ). This estimate is
reported in Column 3. In all cases, this parameter is positive, statistically diﬀerent from zero, and
(except for Austria and Belgium) not statistically diﬀerent from one at the 5 per cent level.16 Recall
that δ is the proportion of current government debt that is backed by the present discounted value of
current and future primary surpluses. Hence the finding that δ is close to 1 means that outstanding
debt in developed economies is essentially backed by the fiscal authority. Backing takes the form
of a commitment to adjust the stream of future primary surpluses to match the current value of
its bond obligations. In the long-run, there is complete accommodation of fiscal policy to the open
market operations by the monetary authority. For example, when the monetary authority sells
government bonds, the fiscal authority increases current or future taxes, and/or reduces current or
future expenditures, to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt.
This finding suggests that the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities in de-
veloped economies is well described by what Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer
to as a Ricardian regime or, in the language of Leeper (1991), an active monetary/passive fiscal
policy regime. In this regime, the fiscal authority backs all outstanding debt, debt plays only a
minor role in the determination of the price level, and the Quantity Theory of Money holds as a
long-run proposition.
In terms of Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) coordination game between monetary and fiscal au-
thorities, our results imply that, for the countries in the sample, the central bank is the first mover.
That is, the monetary authority sets its policy in advance and imposes discipline on the fiscal
authority. By discipline, we mean that the fiscal authority has to select a sequence of primary sur-
pluses and debt that is consistent with the sequence ofMt supplied by the monetary authority, and
that insures that the intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied. In turn, this implies that
the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic might not be empirically relevant for developed economies
15All regressions include an intercept term (not reported). The theoretical model predicts that the intercept should
be zero [see eq. (13)]. However, for most countries in the sample, the intercept was found to be statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Strictly speaking, this constitutes a rejection of the theory. A more constructive interpretation of this
result is that the theoretical relation holds up to a constant term.
16The theoretical model implies that δ is bounded between zero and one. Rather than incorporating a nonlinear
restriction in a linear estimation framework, we follow the simpler approach of first estimating the cointegrating
vector and then verifying whether δˆ falls in the [0, 1] range. This is the case for all countries, except the U.S. For
the U.S., δˆ is slightly larger than one, but the hypothesis that its true value is one cannot be rejected at the 5 per
cent level.
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and that “tough” central banks can fight inflation with tight money.
Our empirical results are consistent with findings in Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002). These
authors use annual panel data from 133 market economies and report that the expected negative
relationship between fiscal balance and inflation is not verified for low-inflation, mostly developed,
countries. A possible explanation of their finding is that in a Ricardian regime, government debt
plays no role in the determination of the price level. This point is related to Sargent’s (1982)
observation that “one cannot necessarily prove that current deficits are not inflationary by run-
ning time-series regressions and finding a negligible eﬀect.” The reason is that the question of
whether budget deficits are inflationary is intimately related to the policy regime and institutional
arrangements.
1.3.4 Additional Implications
We now examine some additional empirical implications of the model. First, we compare δˆ with
measures of central bank independence and seigniorage revenue computed by other researchers.
The comparison with indices of central bank independence is motivated by the idea that δ sum-
marizes the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in a given institutional setup. By
institutional setup we mean not only the legal characteristics of the central bank’s organic law,
but also to the informal policy decision-making in practice. Hence, δ captures both formal and
informal behavioral elements. The comparison with seigniorage is not meant to capture a causal
relationship. However, it is plausible that countries where a smaller proportion of government
debt is backed with the primary surplus, would feature larger average seigniorage revenues as a
proportion of GDP and of government spending, for a given level of the public debt.
Second, we derive the joint implications of δˆ and the long-run policy rule regarding the response
of the primary surplus to an innovation in government debt. We then use a Vector Autoregression
to examine whether these implications are broadly consistent with the data.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 plot the relation between δˆ and measures of central bank independence.
The measure in Figure 1.1 is the index computed by Alesina and Summers (1993) as the arithmetic
average of the indices constructed by Bade and Parkin (1982) and by Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991). The measure in Figure 1.2 is the index constructed by Cukierman (1992). These
indices measure central bank independence by focusing primarily on legal characteristics like the
terms of oﬃce of the central bank director(s), restrictions on public sector borrowing from the
central bank, conflict resolution between the central bank and the executive branch, etc.
In both figures, we observe a positive relation between the empirical measure of interdependence
between fiscal and monetary policies (δˆ) and the indices of central bank independence. In general,
the larger the independence of the monetary authority, the larger the proportion of government debt
that is backed by the fiscal authority. This relationship can be quantified by means of correlation
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coeﬃcients and OLS regressions. The correlations between δˆ and the indices in Figures 1 and 2 are
0.45 and 0.23, respectively.
Fig 1.1 - Relationship between δ and Central Bank Independence (I)
Fig 1.2 - Relationship between δ and Central Bank Independence (II)
Results from regressions of δˆ on each index of central bank independence are reported in Table
1.3. First, consider results in Columns 1 and 3, where the regressors are an intercept term and
the independence index. In all cases, the coeﬃcient on the index is positive but not statistically
diﬀerent from zero at standard levels, and the R2’s are generally low. Second, consider results
in Columns 2 and 4, where the set of regressors is expanded to include the independence index
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squared. In all cases, the coeﬃcients on the index (index squared) are positive (negative), and
the R2’s are considerably larger than in the linear projections. These results indicate a nonlinear,
concave relation between δˆ and central bank independence.
Table 1.3
Relationship between δˆ and Central Bank Independence
Measure of Independence
Alesina and
Summers’ Cukierman’s
Intercept 0.89∗ 0.48∗ 0.94∗ 0.81
(0.06) (0.20) (0.03) (0.09)
Index 0.03 0.35∗ 0.06 0.83
(0.03) (0.15) (0.09) (0.49)
Index2 − −0.06∗ − −0.96
(0.03) (0.54)
R2 0.21 0.52 0.05 0.25
Notes: the figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. The
superscript ∗ denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis that the
true coeﬃcient is zero at the 5 per cent significance level.
A possible explanation of this result is that at lower levels of central bank independence (as
measured by the standard indices), the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities is largely
determined by formal considerations (e.g., the central bank’s organic law). Thus, our estimate of
δ and indices of formal central bank independence are closely related. However, at higher levels of
central bank independence, informal elements might play an important role in policy making and
the relation between our estimate of δ and these indices is not as tight.
Consider now the relation between δˆ and seigniorage revenue as a proportion of GDP and of
government expenditures. These relations are plotted in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. The
seigniorage measures are the annual averages between 1971 and 1990 reported by Click (1998, p.
155). In both cases there is a negative (possibly nonlinear) relation between δˆ and seigniorage. The
correlation coeﬃcients are, respectively, −0.61 and −0.53.
Although these results are suggestive, they must be interpreted with caution for two reasons.
First, the number of countries in the sample is relatively small and, consequently, outliers can have
a large eﬀect on the computed correlations. For example, when one excludes the United States
from the sample, the correlations between δˆ and the legal-based indices drop to 0.05 (Alesina and
Summers) and −0.02 (Cukierman). Second, a F-test of the restriction that δ is the same in all
countries in the sample yields a statistic of 0.003. Comparing this statistic with the 5 per cent
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critical value of the F distribution with (11, 259) degrees of freedom indicates that the restriction
cannot be rejected. This means that the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in
the sample countries is relatively similar, perhaps because institutional diﬀerences across these
countries are comparatively small.
Fig 1.3 - Relationship between δ and seigniorage (I)
Fig 1.4 - Relationship between δ and Seigniorage (II)
The assumed long-run policy rule in conjunction with the finding that δˆ is approximately equal
to one imply that innovations in government debt should provoke a positive long-run response
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in the primary surplus. In order to assess this implication, we construct a parsimonious Vector
Autoregression of order 1 with government debt and the primary surplus as per cent of GDP for
each country in the sample. The data on the primary surplus was also taken from the IFS database
of the International Monetary Fund.17
Fig 1.5 - Response of Primary Surplus to a Debt Innovation.
17For the United States, the primary surplus is available only since 1959. Consequently, the US sample for this
VAR is slightly shorter than the one used to obtain previous empirical results. For all countries, the surplus measure
includes interests payments on debt. This biases the results against the finding that an increase in current government
debt means future increases in the primary surplus. The reason is that an increase in current debt also entails an
increase in future interest payments and a proportional decrease in the government’s surplus as recorded by the IFS.
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The responses of the primary surplus following an innovation in government debt of 1 per
cent of GDP are plotted in Figures 1.5. The dotted lines are asymptotic 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The initial response of the primary surplus is usually negative and statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Thereafter, the primary surplus increases over time and becomes positive after 5 to 10
years following the debt shock. In most cases, this positive response becomes statistically diﬀerent
from zero at some point in the 10 to 20 year horizon. This result is consistent with view that the
fiscal authority increases future taxes and/or reduces future expenditures to back newly issued debt.
Exceptions are Austria, France, and Germany, where the point estimate of the impulse response is
still negative (though not statistically significant) after 30 years, and Norway, for which the response
is always positive. These results are in line with previous work by Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2001). Bohn finds for the United States that an increase in government debt by
$100 leads to an increase in the primary surplus by $5.40 in the following year. Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2001) use impulse-response analysis to examine the response of U.S. government debt to
a positive innovation in the primary surplus (including seigniorage revenue) and report a negative,
persistent, and statistically significant debt response that is explained as the government’s paying
oﬀ some of its previously accumulated debt.
1.4 Conclusions
This paper uses a simple infinite-horizon monetary economy to study how fiscal and monetary
policy interact to determine the aggregate price level. The government behaviour is summarized
by a long-run fiscal policy rule, where a fraction of the outstanding debt is backed by the present
discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by the
present discounted value of current and future seigniorage revenue. Economies may thus be indexed
by the fraction of the debt backed by the fiscal authority. Only in the polar Ricardian regime, where
the debt is fully backed by fiscal policy, the price level is determined by the stock of money alone.
More generally, the proportion of debt backed by money behaves like money itself for the purpose
of determining the price level.
Simple unit root econometrics techniques can be employed to identify the parameter that in-
dexes the policy regimes from the long-run dynamics of nominal money stock, consumption, and
government debt. Results from OECD economies suggest that a Ricardian regime is a reason-
able approximation for these countries. This finding implies that (i) the fiscal authority backs all
outstanding debt, and (ii) debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level.
Consistency checks based on impulse-response analysis are roughly in agreement with the main
empirical results.
24
References
[1] Alesina, A. and L.H. Summers. 1993. “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Per-
formance: Some Comparative Evidence.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25:.151−62.
[2] Aiyagari, S.R. and M. Gertler. 1985. “The Backing of Government Bonds and Monetarism.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 16: 19−44.
[3] Bade, R. and M. Parkin. 1982. “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy.” University of
Western Ontario. Photocopy.
[4] Barro, R. 1979. “On the Determination of the Public Debt.” Journal of Political Economy 87:
940−71.
[5] Bohn, H. 1998. “The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deficits.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 113: 949−64.
[6] Canzoneri, M. B., R.E. Cumby, and B.T. 2001. “Is the Price Level Determined by the Needs
of Fiscal Solvency?” American Economic Review 91: 1221−38.
[7] Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler. 2000. “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Sta-
bility: Evidence and Some Theory.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 147−80.
[8] Click, R. W., 1998. “Seigniorage in a Cross-section of Countries.” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 30: 154−71.
[9] Cochrane, J. H. 1998. “A Frictionless View of U.S. Inflation.” In NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 1998, edited by B. S. Bernanke and J. J. Rotemberg. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
[10] Cochrane, J.H. 2001. “Long-term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price
Level.” Econometrica 69: 69−116.
[11] Cukierman, A. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evi-
dence. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
[12] Elliot, G. 1998. ”On the Robustness of Cointegration Methods When Regressors Almost Have
Unit Roots.” Econometrica 66: 149−58.
[13] Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J., (1987), “Cointegration and Error Correction: Represen-
tation, Estimation and Testing,” Econometrica, 55, pp. 251-276.
[14] Feenstra, R. C., (1986), “Functional Equivalence Between Liquidity Costs and the Utility of
Money,” Journal of Monetary Economics 17, pp. 271-291.
25
[15] Fischer, S., (1979), “Capital Accumulation on the Transition Path in a Monetary Optimizing
Model,” Econometrica 47, pp 1433-1439.
[16] Fischer, S., Sahay, R., and Vegh, C. A., (2002), “Moder Hyper- and High Inflations,” Journal
of Economic Literature 40, pp. 837-880.
[17] Gonzalo, J. and Lee, T.-H. (1998), ”Pitfalls in Testing for Long Run Relationships,” Journal
of Econometrics 86, pp. 129-154.
[18] Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., and Tabellini, G., (1991), “Political and Monetary Institutions
and Public Finance Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy 13, pp. 341-392.
[19] Hayashi, F., (2000), Econometrics, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
[20] Leeper, E. M., (1991), “Equilibria Under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and Fiscal Policies,”
Journal of Monetary Economics 12, pp. 129-148.
[21] Ng, S. and Perron, P., (2001), “Lag Length Selection and the Construction of Unit Root Tests
with Good Size and Power,” Econometrica 69, pp. 1519-1554.
[22] Phillips, P. C. B., and Durlauf, S., (1986), “Multiple Time Series Regression with Integrated
Processes,” Review of Economic Studies 53, pp. 473-495.
[23] Phillips, P. C. B., and Ouliaris, S., (1990), “Asymptotic Properties of Residual Based Tests
for Cointegration,” Econometrica 58, pp. 165-193.
[24] Sargent, T. J., (1982), “Beyond Demand and Supply Curves in Macroeconomics,” American
Economic Review 72, pp. 382-389.
[25] Sargent, T. J. and Wallace, N., (1981) “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5, pp. 1-17.
[26] Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W., (1993) “A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in
Higher Order Integrated Systems,” Econometrica 61, pp. 783-820.
[27] Taylor, J. B., (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 195-214.
[28] Woodford, M., (1995), “Price-Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 43, pp. 1-46.
26
Chapitre 2 
 
 
Endogenous Borrowing 
Constraints and Consumption 
Volatility in a Small open Economy 
2 Endogenous Borrowing Constraints and Consump-
tion Volatility in a Small open Economy
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the diﬀerences in consumption volatility observed in the
data from emerging and developed small open economies. As a general rule, empirical evidence
from business cycle statistics across countries suggests that economic activity is more volatile in
emerging economies than in developed ones. In particular, the data show that output volatility is
higher in the former than in the latter. Considering that output volatility may be interpreted as
the underlying volatility of the economy, it is not a surprise that most macroeconomic variables,
including private consumption, also tend to be more volatile in emerging economies. However, and
more importantly for the purposes of this paper, standard business cycle statistics show that, even
if one controls for the output volatility, the (relative) volatility of consumption is still higher in
emerging economies than in small open developed economies.
Section 2 of this paper presents empirical evidence of consumption and output volatilities for
two groups of small open economies. For a sample of 24 emerging economies, and 17 small open
developed economies, the volatility of consumption relative to output volatility is, on average, 30%
higher in the emerging economies’ subsample. These findings are robust to the sample period as
well as to the data frequency, and confirm the results implied by studies containing business cycle
statistics for developed economies [Cooley and Prescott (1995), for the United States; Mendoza
(1991), for Canada; Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995), for Portugal] and emerging economies
[Mendoza (2001), for Mexico; Neumeyer and Perri (2004), and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004), for
Argentina].
It has been shown [Neumeyer and Perri (2004); Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993)] that
the excess volatility of business cycles in emerging economies may have a lot to do with a possible
dominant role played by external shocks that aﬀect these economies.1 However, in the context of
a small open economy model, one natural theoretical explanation for the diﬀerences in volatility
is that, perhaps, the two groups of countries, emerging and developed economies, are subject to
diﬀerent external constraints in terms of their ability to borrow in the international capital markets.
The obvious intuition on the relationship between borrowing constraints, including the type of
constraint discussed here, and the volatility of consumption, is that they may limit consumption
smoothing by risk-averse agents and produce a more volatile consumption path.
1Neumeyer and Perri (2004), using Argentina as a benchmark, stress the important role that shocks to the
idiosyncratic interest rate (international interest rate plus a country risk factor) may play on the business cycle
volatility in emerging economies. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), on the other hand, suggest that external
factors, such as macroeconomic variables in the United States, and capital flows in particular, may be very important
to account for macroeconomic developments in Latin America.
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If, in fact, emerging markets are diﬀerent from developed economies in that they have a lower
ability to use international credit markets to smooth consumption, then the data should reveal
noticeable diﬀerences in consumption volatility in those two groups of countries, as seems to be
the case.2 This empirical evidence has one important implication for the use of theoretical models
applied to the study of emerging economies. If one wants to explain the high volatility observed in
their business cycles, particularly in consumption, then this external borrowing constraint has to
be taken into consideration and the typical assumption of unlimited access to perfect world capital
markets, which is implausible in this context, must be abandoned. That is precisely the spirit of
the theoretical model discussed here.
The paper is concerned with answering the following question: how much of the observed
diﬀerences in relative consumption volatility in the data from small open emerging and developed
economies can be accounted for by a borrowing constraint alone?
More specifically, in order to account for the facts, the paper proposes a dynamic general-
equilibrium model featuring two goods (tradable and non-tradable goods) in an endowment econ-
omy that is subjected to two kinds of imperfections in international capital markets: (i) the lack
of any contingent assets (incomplete markets), and (ii) a financial friction that may restrict inter-
national borrowing. The financial friction considered here is an endogenous borrowing constraint
in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) [see also Kletzer (1984)], which has been recently
discussed in the international macroeconomics literature [Arellano (2004); Aguiar and Gopinath
(2004)]. In their paper, Eaton and Gersovitz are motivated by the apparent paradox of why sov-
ereign governments ever choose to repay their debt even when there is no credible enforcement
mechanism in the international markets. Although there is some controversy [Bulow and Rogoﬀ
(1989)], their answer to the “paradox” is that the threat of financial autarky induces sovereign
governments to make repayments on their foreign debt in order to preserve a “reputation collat-
eral” needed for future borrowing [see also Cole and Kehoe (1995, 1998); Cole, Dow, and English
(1995); Grossman and Han (1999)]. Borrower countries know that if they default, lenders will be
less willing to lend to them in the future. The potential exclusion from future borrowing is a cost
to a small open economy populated by risk-averse agents because, in financial autarky, their abil-
2The proposition that access to international capital and credit markets is more restricted for emerging economies
in comparison to, say, OECD countries does not seem very diﬃcult to accept. Although there is no direct evidence
of that, one could mention the lower credit ratings and the higher interest rates paid by emerging economies on their
sovereign debt as indirect evidence that they are more likely to be credit constrained than developed economies. Events
such as the Asian crisis during the late nineties, the frequent balance-of-payments crises experienced by emerging
economies that usually trigger bailouts from the IMF, and their not uncommon decisions to default on their external
debt (the most recent being Argentina’s default in 2002), in a sense, could also be thought of as indirect evidence
that emerging economies are diﬀerent in their access to international capital markets. Not surprisingly, those events
gave enough motivation for a growing literature that deals with the specificities of emerging markets in explaining,
among other things, how changes in their access to international credit may aﬀect the domestic economies in various
dimensions. This literature includes papers on currency crises [Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995); Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997); Frenkel and Rose (1996)], balance-of-payments crises [Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999);
Calvo and Vegh (1999); Edwards (2001)], and “sudden stops” [Calvo (1998a,b); Calvo and Reinhart (1999)].
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ity to smooth consumption over time and over diﬀerent states of nature is compromised. Default
occurs whenever the present value of the (instantaneous) benefits of not paying the due services
of the external debt outweighs the (intertemporal) losses in utility that will take place during an
autarky state. International lenders, aware of the potential for debt repudiation, will set in motion
a defensive rule to receive back the full amount of any conceded loans, including interests at the
international interest rate, in all states of nature, and will never lend funds in excess of the level
of credit that leaves the borrower country exactly indiﬀerent between defaulting and fully repaying
its debt.
Although some aspects of the more volatile economic fluctuations verified in emerging economies
have already been studied in the literature on emerging markets’ crises, a systematic attempt to
explain the diﬀerences in relative consumption volatility observed in the data from emerging and
developed small open economies, using a non-ad hoc, endogenous borrowing constraint, has not yet
been done. Using data for 1994Q1−2000Q2 from some emerging and developed countries, Neumeyer
and Perri (2004) present a broader set of facts about business cycle volatility, including information
on relative consumption volatility. They find the average relative consumption volatility for their
sample of emerging economies to be 78.2% higher than that of Canada, which is in line with
the evidence presented in section 2 of this paper. However, their explanation for the facts relies
on an exogenous stochastic process for the idiosyncratic international interest rate faced by the
small economy. The exogenous positive shocks on the interest rate could be interpreted as a more
stringent borrowing constraint that imposes additional costs to smoothing consumption through
borrowing in the international capital markets, but the mechanism does not result from optimizing
behaviour on the part of lenders or borrowers.
Mendoza (2001) uses an ad hoc borrowing constraint to explain “sudden stops” in capital flows
to emerging economies. The constraint takes the form of a collateral, whereby the country must
commit a constant (exogenous) proportion of its output before contracting any external credits.
Although his model is successful in explaining the abrupt swings in capital inflows to the small
emerging economy, it generates an insignificant diﬀerence in the relative volatility of consumption
between the economies with and without the financial constraint.
Borrowing constraints are a way to ration out the amount of credit available to a particular
economy through restriction in quantities. One could also think that, in reality, not only the
quantity of credit is to be directly rationed, but the prices (i.e., the idiosyncratic interest rate
that the country pays on its debt) must impose additional restrictions on the equilibrium amount
of debt. One approach that allows for the interest rate on the external debt to be endogenously
determined, along with the level of debt, in a model with the same kind of borrowing constraint
used in this paper, is pursued by Arellano (2004) and by Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). They
use the same insights that motivated this paper’s endogenous borrowing constraint (in their case,
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to generate a positively sloped “supply of debt”), in a model that allows for default to occur in
equilibrium. However, these papers do not discuss how the same model would behave without the
financial constraint, nor do they try to explain the potential diﬀerences in the relative consumption
volatility in constrained and unconstrained economies.
Economists have been trying to understand why emerging economies are so vulnerable to all
sorts of crises, from balance-of-payments’ crises and sudden stops to banking crises and currency
crashes. Although the profession’s explanations about the underlying mechanisms of these events
have improved over the past two decades, no definitive answer has yet been presented. It is likely
that the road map to a more complete understanding of these phenomena includes a clear identifi-
cation of the particularities, if any, that emerging economies have in comparison with the developed
world. In this sense, because it explicitly proposes an explanation to an important aspect of the
diﬀerences between emerging and developed economies, the paper makes a clear contribution to
the literature on emerging economies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses evidence of the diﬀerences
in output and consumption volatility in small open economies, divided into “emerging” and “de-
veloped” groups. Section 3 presents the theoretical model featuring the endogenous borrowing
constraint. Section 4 discusses of the numerical solution of the model, its calibration, and some
simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Consumption Volatility Across Emerging and Developed Economies
Table 2.1 displays evidence of the higher ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility, at
business cycle frequencies, in emerging economies vis-à-vis small open developed countries. The
table is constructed from quarterly data on real output and real private consumption (as deflated
by the consumer price index),3 for 24 emerging economies and 17 small open developed economies.
The sample of countries is selected according to data availability for a relatively long period (ending
in 2001Q4). All data, computed in per capita values at constant 1995 prices, come from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF/IFS) dataset, with the exception
of Brazilian and Argentinian data, which come from national sources.4 The series were transformed
previously to the computation of their second-moment statistics, as follows. First, all the variables
were expressed in logarithms. Second, a seasonal adjustment on the log variables was implemented
using the multiplicative ratio-to-moving-average method. Finally, a smooth trend was subtracted
3Typically, in the real business cycle literature, statistics on consumption exclude the consumption of durable
goods (since it behaves closely to investment, being more volatile). We could not yet find the required information to
do the same here. Probably, for the same reason, Neumeyer and Perri’s (2004) similar empirical exercise considered
only total consumption. A potential problem of this procedure would arise if, for instance, durable consumption
accounts for a higher proportion of the total consumption in emerging economies than in developed countries.
4Argentinian data come from the Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales (DNCN) and Brazilian data are
collected from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) at <http://www.ipeadata.gov.br> and from
the Central Bank of Brazil. Both datasets are consistent with IMF/IFS’s data, when they happen to overlap.
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using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly data.
Country σc (% )  σy (% ) σc / σy Data (Start) Country σc (% )  σy (% ) σc / σy Data (Start)
Bulgaria 15.17 12.42 1.221 1994Q1 Austria 2.51 2.05 1.219 1980Q1
Lithuania 6.97 4.20 1.657 1993Q1 Norway 2.38 1.75 1.366 1980Q1
Latvia 6.69 5.09 1.316 1992Q1 UK 1.90 1.56 1.219 1980Q1
Ecuador 6.16 2.45 2.503 1991Q1 Italy 1.50 1.02 1.470 1980Q1
Argentina 5.61 5.34 1.051 1980Q1 Netherlands 1.45 1.14 1.269 1980Q1
Malaysia 5.34 3.52 1.528 1991Q1 Spain 1.42 1.13 1.257 1980Q1
Indonesia 5.22 4.20 1.242 1990Q1 Finland 2.22 2.47 0.898 1980Q1
Turkey 5.14 4.41 1.166 1987Q1 Ireland 1.99 2.01 0.993 1997Q1
Thailand 4.96 4.63 1.071 1993Q1 Sweden 1.86 1.88 0.990 1980Q1
Mexico 4.92 2.66 1.847 1980Q1 Denmark 1.62 1.63 0.992 1987Q1
Brazil 3.86 2.95 1.308 1980Q1 Canada 1.46 2.17 0.671 1980Q1
Croatia 3.52 2.58 1.782 1997Q1 New Zealand 1.38 1.60 0.864 1987Q1
Estonia 3.13 2.74 1.143 1993Q1 Portugal 1.32 1.70 0.780 1988Q1
Slovak Rep. 3.00 1.45 2.061 1993Q1 Australia 1.03 1.46 0.705 1980Q1
Malta 2.81 2.40 1.170 1992Q1 Switzerland 0.99 1.37 0.722 1980Q1
Czech Rep. 2.68 2.45 1.097 1994Q1 France 0.98 1.23 0.905 1980Q1
Hungary 2.64 2.23 1.186 1995Q1 Belgium 0.97 1.37 0.705 1980Q1
South Africa 2.38 1.82 1.310 1980Q1
Colombia 2.34 2.03 1.153 1994Q1
Slovenia 2.12 1.11 1.908 1993Q1
Poland 1.45 1.21 1.203 1995Q1
Peru 6.33 6.38 0.993 1980Q1
South Korea 4.59 4.93 0.931 1980Q1
Phillipines 3.47 3.91 0.888 1981Q1
Emerging 4.60 3.63 1.27 Developed 1.59 1.62 0.98
Table 2.1
Emerging Economies Small Open Developed Economies
Output and Consumption Volatility: Cross-Country Differences
From Table 2.1 it seems clear that:
(i) The volatility of the gross domestic product (GDP), denoted as σy in Table 2.1, is more than
twice as high in emerging economies compared with the developed economies. The averages
are 3.6% and 1.6%, respectively.
(ii) The consumption volatility (σc) is also higher in emerging economies. On average, σc is
almost three times as high in emerging economies. Given the results for the output volatility,
this is not a surprise, since σy may be interpreted as the underlying volatility of the economy,
aﬀecting the volatility of all other variables.
(iii) The relative volatility of consumption tends to be higher than 1 in emerging economies (the
only three exceptions are Peru, South Korea, and the Philippines) and lower than 1 in de-
veloped economies (six exceptions in the sample). The ratio between the average σc and the
average σy is 30% higher in emerging economies in comparison with developed economies
(1.27 against 0.98).
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Table 2.2 displays the results of four tests of equality of means for X = σc, σy, and σc/σy,
between the two groups of countries. Columns 2 and 3 refer to the test of the null hypothesis
H0 : mean (Xemerging) = mean (Xdeveloped), against the alternative H1(a) : mean (Xemerging) 6=
mean (Xdeveloped), based on the ANOVA F -statistic.5 Columns 4 and 5 also refer to the test
of H0 against H1(a), but using a simple t-statistic. Columns 6 and 7 consider t-tests of H0
against the alternative hypotheses H1(b) : mean (Xemerging) > mean (Xdeveloped) and H1(c) :
mean (Xemerging) < mean (Xdeveloped), respectively.
First, consider the test of H0 against H1(a). Note that the null hypothesis of equal means can
be strongly rejected both according to the ANOVA F -test and the two-tailed t-test for all three
variables. Second, regarding the one-tailed t-test of H0 against H1(b), the null is also rejected for
all variables at standard significance levels. Finally, the null cannot be rejected in the one-tailed
t-test of H0 against H1(c). The results suggest that the lower absolute and relative volatilities in
emerging economies, as shown in Table 1, are statistically significant.
p -value
X Anova F -test H1(a) t -test H1(a) H1(b) H1(c)
σc 19.8493 0.0001 2.0855 0.0436 0.0218 0.9782
σy 12.1626 0.0012 1.9186 0.0624 0.0312 0.9688
σc / σy 10.8192 0.0021 9.4615 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
H0    : mean(Xemerging) = mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(b): mean(Xemerging) > mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(c): mean(Xemerging) < mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(a): mean(Xemerging) ≠ mean(Xdeveloped) 
p -value
Table 2.2
Test of Equality of Means 
The results shown above are also consistent with those obtained by Neumeyer and Perri (2004).
They use basically the same sample period in a comparison between Argentinian and Canadian
business cycles’ statistics6 and find similar qualitative results as those in Table 2.1. They also
compare Canada with five emerging countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and the
Philippines) for the period 1994Q1−2000Q2 and, again, their results are in the same direction.
Table 2.3 displays the volatilities of output and consumption, as well as their ratio, reported in
Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and in other selected studies. Note that the reported relative volatility
of consumption confirms the higher volatility in small open emerging economies. The information
in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 seems to indicate that the basic result−a higher relative consumption
5This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). The basic idea is that if
the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability between the sample means (between groups) should be the
same as the variability within any subgroup (within group).
6Although we both use basically the same data, Newmeyer and Perry adjust the series of total consumption to
include government consumption, changes in inventories, and a statistical discrepancy, in order to be consistent with
the only available quarterly data for Argentina previous to 1993. Here, I use the information on annual series for
Argentina to exclude these items from the total consumption previous to 1993, by assuming that the same proportions
observed in annual data are verified in all quarters of a given year.
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volatility in emerging economies in comparison with developed economies−is robust to the sample
of countries, frequency of the data, and sample period.
Table 2.3
Examples of Output and Consumption Volatility Statistics in the Literature
United States σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Cooley and Prescott (1995) 1.72 1.27 0.74 1954Q1-1991Q11
Small Open Developed Economies σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Canada: Mendoza (1991) 2.81 2.46 0.88 1945-1985
Portugal: Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995) 3.78 3.17 0.84 1958-1991
Canada: Neumeyer and Perri (2004) 1.17 1.02 0.87 1994Q1-2002Q2
Emerging Economies σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Mexico: Mendoza (2001) 2.73 3.35 1.23 1980Q1-1997Q4
Average of 5 EE: Neumeyer and Perri (2004) 2.94 4.62 1.57 1994Q1-2002Q2
Argentina: Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) 4.08 4.86 1.19 1983Q1-2000Q2
The next section discuss a possible theoretical explanation for this empirical evidence.
2.3 The Model
In this section, a dynamic general-equilibrium model of a small open economy is presented. The
model departs from traditional small open economy models with perfect capital mobility in that
it allows for the possibility that the economy can choose optimally between defaulting or repaying
its external debt. This feature introduces an endogenous borrowing constraint in the tradition of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984).
Consider a small open economy, where a central planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility of
a representative agent. The agent enjoys utility from a consumption index, ct, which is a composite
of the consumption of tradable
¡
cTt
¢
and non-tradable goods
¡
cNt
¢
. There is no production and the
agent receives an endowment of non-tradable goods
¡
Y N
¢
, assumed constant for simplicity, and an
endowment of tradable goods, Y Tt = Y T + zt, which randomly fluctuates around the average level,
Y T , according to a stochastic process for the production shock, zt.
International asset/capital markets are incomplete and no contingent contracts are signed.7 At
7Kehoe and Levine (1993) discuss endogenous borrowing constraints with complete markets. The assumption
of incomplete markets seems to better fit the evidence that countries tend to default during recessions. With the
insurance given by contingent assets, agents tend to leave the credit contract (that is, to default) during “good times,”
when they have to make payments, as opposed to the “bad times,” when they receive the insurance.
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the beginning of every period t, the economy inherits a one-period external debt, dt−1, expressed
in units of the tradable good, contracted at t − 1 at the exogenous foreign interest rate, r, and
realizes the levels of the endowments. Denote S (dt−1, zt) = {dt−1, zt} to be the current state
of the economy, at time t. Once S (dt−1, zt) is known, the central planner decides whether the
outstanding debt, including interest services, (1 + r) dt−1, is going to be paid or defaulted. The
central planner’s decision about the full repayment of the external debt is based on the relative
incentives to do so, as follows. The cost of defaulting at time t is to stay out of the international
capital markets from t onwards, renouncing the possibility of using international borrowing to
smooth consumption.8 Implicitly, we are assuming that default against one lender is taken as a
signal by all other international lenders and that they will not only exclude the defaulting country
from borrowing again, but will seize its assets if the country eventually tries to invest any assets
in another international financial institution. Given the current state, let V Dt and V Rt be the
indirect utility of defaulting at t (and having to consume the endowments Y N and Y Tt from this
time onwards), or of fully repaying the external debt and continuing to be able to borrow abroad.
Default at time t is chosen by the country whenever V Dt > V Rt .
The international capital market consists of lenders who want to receive back the full amount
of their loans in all possible states of nature. The directive proposed here is to find a borrowing
constraint that, at each date and state, will induce the country to participate in the asset market,
instead of defaulting. One could think of the international lenders as a representative international
investor, or an outside foreign agency, that has full information about the domestic economy (for
instance, its current state and the specification of the borrower/consumer’s preferences) and the
borrower’s optimization problem. The only role played by the foreign agents is to set up and enforce
the credit limits. Should the sovereign country default on its external debt, the “agency,” or the
pool of investors, would exclude it from intertemporal asset trading forever and, as a result, the
country would be deprived of the risk-sharing opportunities in the future. Aware of potential debt
repudiation, in order to prevent default, the foreign agents will impose a borrowing constraint to
the small economy, by not lending any amount of funds that makes the planner choose default
over repayment. That is, the external investors will set the credit limit such that the borrower’s
expected lifetime utility from participating in the asset market is at least as high as that of staying
in financial autarky, where the country consumes its exogenous endowment output.
If d is the maximal amount of funds that the domestic economy can borrow without triggering
the strategy of optimal default (that is, d is such that V Dt ≤ V Rt ), at every period t, then the
domestic economy is constrained to borrow dt ≤ d. In order to assure repayment in all states of
8The assumption that countries that default will stay out of the international capital markets forever is clearly at
odds with the evidence that shows many of defaulting countries are able to borrow again after some renegotiation
of their debts. In terms of the model presented in this paper, this assumption means, perhaps, a higher penalty for
defaulting countries than what actually occurs. The standard and simple way of dealing with this issue [Arellano
(2004)] is to introduce an exogenous probability of leaving the default state at each period.
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nature, Zhang’s (1997) approach is adopted by considering the worst-case scenario for the foreign
lenders to define the critical level of borrowing that triggers default, given the state S (dt−1,zt) .
We assume that the lifetime utility of the representative agent is given by:
V0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βtu (ct) , (1)
where u (·) is concave, strictly increasing, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable; β ∈ (0, 1) is the
subjective discount factor and ct is a consumption index, assumed to be a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) aggregator of the consumption of tradables and non-tradables, with elasticity
of substitution between cTt and cNt given by 1/ (1 + µ) > 0, and the weight of tradables in the index
equal to ω ∈ [0, 1]:
ct =
h
ω
¡
cTt
¢−µ
+ (1− ω)
¡
cNt
¢−µi− 1µ . (2)
The economy is subject to two resource constraints, one for each type of good. For the non-
tradable good, the constraint means that the economy has to consume the endowment:
cNt = Y N . (3)
In contrast to Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989), this paper accepts the notion that default on the
external debt precludes a sovereign government not only of borrowing internationally, but also
excludes the country from investing its accumulated assets in the international market in the form
of bank accounts, treasury bills, stocks, and other state-contingent assets, without the risk of having
those assets seized by international financial institutions or governments. This assumption assures
a support for a positive external debt in equilibrium.9 However, as shown by other empirical
studies that use the same type of borrowing constraint considered here [Arellano (2004); Aguiar
and Gopinath (2004)], for reasonable values of the structural parameters on a dynamic general-
equilibrium model applied to a small open economy, the threat of autarky, although capable of
producing a positive amount of debt in equilibrium, cannot generate the levels of debt-output ratio
observed in actual indebted economies. For this reason, the model imposes an extra penalty to
the defaulting country, which could be motivated by “the common view that after default there
is a disruption in the countries’ ability to engage international trade, and this reduces the value
9Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989, p. 43) have shown that “under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must
be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors, and cannot be supported by a country’s reputation for
repayment”; i.e., the penalty of no further borrowing would not deter repudiation and, consequently, a sovereign could
not issue any uncollateralized debt. Bulow and Rogoﬀ ’s result depends crucially on the controversial assumption that
repudiation of debt does not mean that the defaulting country is to be cut oﬀ from international capital markets
entirely and may keep on participating as a creditor without fearing that its assets would be seized by foreign financial
institutions or governments. However, as Cole and Kehoe (1995, 1998) point out, that result has the counterfactual
implication that the only explanation of why countries do not default is that there are large direct sanctions for doing
so. English (1996) shows historic evidence suggesting that direct sanctions cannot explain why sovereign governments
repay their debts.
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of output” [Cole and Kehoe (1998)]. We assume that, in the case of default, there is an output
loss factor of (1− λ), for λ ∈ [0, 1], that corresponds to the negative eﬀects that the default state
causes in the country’s international trade.10 Thus, in case of default, the resource constraint for
the non-tradable good is:
cNt = λY N . (4)
For the tradable good, the resource constraint, in case of full repayment, means that the economy
keeps the ability to borrow from international lenders, and it is given by:
cTt = Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r) dt−1. (5)
In case of default, the economy does not have to pay (1 + r) dt−1, but cannot contract dt and
must operate in financial autarky from t onwards. The resource constraint then implies that the
consumption of tradables is to be restricted to the stochastic tradable output minus the default-state
output loss:
cTt = λ
¡
Y T + zt
¢
. (6)
The process for the shock zt is assumed to follow a first-order Markov chain with transition proba-
bilities given by f (zt|zt−1) and compact support. The finite support for zt allows the use of Zhang’s
(1997) approach, as mentioned above:
zt ∈ ΩZ = [zmin, zmax] . (7)
The central planner’s problem is to maximize the objective function given by equation (1)
subject to (2)-(7), a standard no-Ponzi-game condition, and to the following borrowing constraint:
dt ≤ d,
where:
d = min
ΩZ
©
dt (zt) : V Rt
¡
dt (zt) , zt
¢
= V Dt (zt)
ª
.
The constraint described above represents a way of capturing the widespread notion that bor-
rowers face credit limits in reality and, as such, its use in economic models can mimic important
features of the real world. Borrowing constraints are typically needed to prevent default and
Ponzi schemes (a “natural” borrowing constraint), and to ensure the existence of equilibrium for
incomplete-markets economies. However, the borrowing constraints used in the literature are often
specified arbitrarily outside economic models. The borrowing constraints used in most studies take
the form of a lower bound on an investor’s bond holdings, which is a certain percentage of total
10Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003) find that the per cent contraction in output in Latin America, following the
default episodes in the 1990s, was 2 per cent.
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income that is independent of the investor’s individual characteristics and income streams that in
reality are important factors in determining the borrowing limit.11
Notice that the borrowing constraint defined above depends not only on the country’s rep-
resentative agent’s characteristics, such as time preference rate, risk aversion, and elasticity of
substitution between the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, but also on the repre-
sentative agent’s exogenous endowment income stream, here completely determined by the shock
zt. Because the constraint can be interpreted as the borrowing limit such that an investor will not
default and live in autarky, Zhang (1997) refers to it as the “no default borrowing constraint.” In
terms of this paper, it is assumed that emerging economies (given their history and, likely, their
experienced default episodes) face this type of borrowing constraint while developed economies do
not. Although it is not a feature of the model, one could think of “reputation” as an additional
state variable and consider that, at this particular point in time, developed economies have a higher
“stock of reputation” than emerging economies−higher enough to signal a very low propensity to
default.
One can explore the recursive form of the problem. In terms of notation, henceforth the time
subscript t is dropped from the (indirect) utility functions V D, V R, and V , which are going to
represent time-invariant value functions. Considering the CES consumption index in (2) and using
the resource constraints for the tradable and non-tradable goods, one can denote the instantaneous
utility function, u (ct) = u
¡
cTt , cNt
¢
, by:
u
¡
cTt , cNt
¢
= u
¡
λ
¡
Y T + zt
¢
;λY N
¢
,
in case of default, and
u
¡
cTt , cNt
¢
= u
¡
Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r) dt−1 ;Y N
¢
,
in case of full repayment.
Let zt and dt−1 be in ΩZ and D = {d : dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax}, respectively. Conditional on the state
variables in S (dt−1, zt), and given the Markov process governing the shock, the central planner’s
problem can be expressed in recursive form as:
V D (zt) = u
¡
λ
¡
Y T + zt
¢
;λY N
¢
+ βEzV D (zt+1)
11Examples of models with ad hoc borrowing constraints include Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), and
Lucas (1994), in the context of using incomplete markets with borrowing constraints in order to resolve the “equity
premium puzzle.” In the international macroeconomics literature, examples of the use of ad hoc borrowing constraints
include Mendoza (2001) and other papers in the “sudden stop” literature, as mentioned in footnote 2.
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in case of default, and as the solution to the following Bellman equation:
V R (dt−1, zt) = max
(dt)
©
u
¡
Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r) dt−1 ;Y N
¢
+ βEzV (dt, zt+1)
ª
st : dt ≤ d = min
ΩZ
©
d (zt) : V R
¡
d (zt) , zt
¢
= V D (zt)
ª
with V (dt−1, zt) = max
©
V R (dt−1, zt) , V D (zt)
ª
in case of full repayment.
The solution of the model consists of three objects: (i) a state-contingent optimal decision rule
for the level of next-period debt12 that depends on the current realization of the states, d (dt−1, zt);
(ii) a set of value functions V D (zt), V R (dt−1, zt), and V (dt−1, zt); and (ii) the level of the borrowing
constraint, d. Given the solution, the underlying probability distribution function of the production
shock, jointly with the decision rule, determines the transition and limiting distributions of all
endogenous variables in the model.
In the empirical application of the model, discussed in the next section, a constant relative
risk-aversion (CRRA) specification for the instantaneous utility function:
u (ct) =
c1−γt − 1
1− γ , if γ 6= 1
= log (ct) , if γ = 1
is used, where γ > 0 is the (reciprocal) of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the
consumption index (or the risk-aversion parameter).
The model also provides implications for the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative
price of non-tradable with respect to tradable goods. In the model, the sectorial (shadow) prices are
represented by the Lagrange multipliers on the respective resource constraints. At the optimum,
there is an implied equation that links the real exchange rate to the
¡
cT/cN
¢
ratio:
pt ≡
PNt
PTt
=
(1− ω)
ω
µ
cTt
cN
¶(1+µ)
, (8)
where PNt and PTt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-tradable and tradable
resource constraints, respectively.
2.4 Numerical Solution, Calibration, and Simulation Results
Because the model developed in this paper does not have an analytical solution, we explore the
recursive formulation of the central planner’s problem to solve it numerically. We use the value
function iteration method with discretization of the state-space [D ×ΩZ ], for which, given the
12Obviously, the decision rule for the dynamic path of dt implies another, cT (dt−1, zt), for the consumption of
tradable goods.
39
finite support ΩZ for the shock, the limits dmin and dmax of the set D = {d : dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax} are
appropriately chosen to include the ergodic space.
The algorithm used in the numeric solution is the following. For each iteration j of the algorithm,
given an initial guess for the borrowing constraint, d(j), the model is solved and the value functions
V D(j) (zt) and V R(j) (dt−1, zt) are computed. During this step, every point in the decision rule
d(j) (dt−1, zt) such that d(j) > d
(j)
is replaced by the critical level d(j). After computing V D(j) and
V R(j), an update of the borrowing constraint is obtained using
d(j+1) = min
ΩZ
n
d (zt) : V R(j)
¡
d (zt) , zt
¢
= V D(j) (zt)
o
.
The procedure is implemented until convergence with d(j+1) ' d(j).
The artificial economy is calibrated to match some aspects of the Brazilian economy during
the period 1980Q1−2001Q4, when the net external debt (total debt minus international reserves)
averaged θd = 28.34% and reached a peak of 47.02% of the GDP,13 which is roughly equivalent
to two standard deviations from the mean. It is assumed that Brazil is an economy subject to a
borrowing constraint like the one discussed in the previous section, and, as such, it could be used
as a benchmark for the simulation exercise.
In order to calibrate the exogenous sectorial outputs, the procedure used here considers the
tradable output share in total GDP observed in Brazil, θT = 29.05%, and normalizes the (deter-
ministic) steady-state values of the tradable output and the relative price of non-tradables in terms
of tradables to be Y T = 100 and pss = 1, respectively. These figures imply: (i) that the value of the
non-tradable output is Y N = 244.21 and, given a debt-to-output ratio equal to the average value θd,
(ii) that the level of debt (in units of tradable goods) at the steady state is dss = 97.56. In order to
capture the potential movements of the simulated series of external debt, an evenly spaced d−grid
of 800 points is constructed from the interval [−100, 700], with negative values being assets instead
of liabilities. Roughly, considering the total output at the steady state
¡
Y T + pssY N = 344.23
¢
as
reference, the grid implies debt-output ratios in the range [−0.29, 2.03].
For the discretization of the z−grid, the Markov chain is set to mimic a first-order autoregressive
process of the type zt = ρzt−1 + εt, with εt v N (0, σε) , using Tauchen’s (1986) procedure. The
z−grid has five points, evenly spaced in the interval [−17.11, 17.11] with an underlying matrix of
transition probabilities given by:
Π =


0.3423 0.5984 0.0591 0.0002 0.0000
0.0467 0.5669 0.3744 0.0120 0.0000
0.0016 0.1611 0.6746 0.1611 0.0016
0.0000 0.0120 0.3744 0.5669 0.0467
0.0000 0.0002 0.0591 0.5984 0.3423


.
13Actually, these figures refer to the period 1982Q4−2001Q4, since quarterly data on Brazilian external debt are
not available for the whole period of reference.
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Table 2.4 displays the values of the structural parameters used in the calibration exercise.
The value for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity substitution (or, equivalently, for the
CRRA case, the risk-aversion parameter) is set to γ = 1.5, which is standard.14 The exogenous
interest rate is taken from what the Brazilian government pays in the international capital markets
for its sovereign debt, as represented by the Federative Republic of Brazil’s C bonds. Here, the
idiosyncratic interest rate, r, is considered to be the quarterly equivalent of the average real annual
rate on the U.S government bonds (4% per year, using the inflation rate on the consumer price
index) plus the average spread paid on the C bonds (803.4 basis points).15 Following the traditional
hypothesis used in the small open economy literature, in order to avoid a unit root in the current
account, the subjective discount factor has to satisfy β (1 + r) = 1 and, thus, was set to β = 0.9713.
It is worth mentioning that this value of β is consistent with estimations by Issler and Piqueira
(2000) for the Brazilian economy.
Table 2.4
Summary of the Calibration Procedure
Parameter Values Target
1. Risk aversion γ = 1.5000 Standard
2. Idiosyncratic interest rate r = 0.0295 C bond spread over U.S. bonds
3. Subjective discount factor β = 0.9713 β (1 + r) = 1
4. Average tradable output Y T = 100.00 normalization
5. Constant non-tradable output Y N = 244.23 Y TY T+pssY N = θT = 29.05%
6. Elasticity of substitution between cT and cN µ = 1.8750 σy = 2.95%
7. Weight of tradables in CES c aggregator ω = 0.0659 pss = (1−ω)ω
³
Y T−rdss
Y N
´(1+µ)
= 1
8. Autocorrelation for z ρ = 0.6468 OLS estimation
9. Std. dev. of the production shock z σε = 4.3499 OLS estimation
10. Output loss in state of default λ = 0.9750 avg
³
dt
Y Tt +ptY N
´
' θd = 28.34%
The autocorrelation and volatility of the stochastic process of the z production shock is obtained
from an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the Hodrick-Prescott(HP)-detrended output of
tradables against its one-period lagged value. Assuming that the output of tradables
¡
Y Tt
¢
has
a trend component
¡
HPY Tt
¢
and a business cycle component with zero average (the production
shock z), the following regression:¡
Y Tt −HPY Tt
¢
= k + ρ
¡
Y Tt−1 −HPY Tt−1
¢
+ εt
14For instance, the value used here is the mid-range value of two very common alternatives, γ = 1.001 or γ = 2,
used by Greenwood, Hercovitz, and Huﬀman (1988) and Mendoza (1991), for example. Issler and Piqueira (2000)
estimate γ = 1.7, using Brazilian data and the same type of utility function used in this paper. The results of the
simulation of the model are virtually the same if one uses this value instead of γ = 1.5.
15For the average foreign real interest rate, the 10-year-maturity U.S. government bond is used, whose maturity
is comparable with that of the C bonds. The average spread for the C bonds refers to the period 1995Q1−2001Q4,
since data are not available before that.
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is estimated, resulting in ρ = 0.65. and σε = 4.35.16
The output loss in default states, (1− λ), is calibrated to approximate the average level of
debt-output ratio to the actual value (θd = 28.34%). Notice that the calibrated value λ = 0.975,
which implies output losses of 2.5% during default states, is not very diﬀerent from the empirical
findings by Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003), mentioned in footnote 10.
The less-straightforward parameters to calibrate are the weight of tradables in the CES con-
sumption aggregator (ω) and the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption of tradables and non-tradables (µ) . Given equation (8) and the calibration procedure
based on the deterministic steady state−at which the external debt-to-output ratio is constant at
the average level, θd, the share of tradable output in total output is θT , and the real exchange
rate is at the normalized level pss = 1− the following system of “steady-state” equations must be
satisfied:17
θT =
Y Tss
Y Tss + pssY N
θd =
dss
Y Tss + pssY N
cTss = Y Tss − rdss
pss =
(1− ω)
ω
µ
cTss
cNss
¶(1+µ)
= 1
cNss = Y N .
Given the above system of equations, the parameter ω can be expressed as a function of µ, as
follows:
ω =





³
1
θT − 1
´
³
1− rθdθT
´


(1+µ)
+ 1



−1
.
It should be noticed that, in principle, both parameters are important to the volatility of the
real exchange rate. However, since the business cycle statistics are usually computed on the log
variables, only µ will have an impact on the volatility of (the log of) p. For instance, by taking the
logarithm on both sides of equation (8), it is easy to see that V AR (log pt) = (1 + µ)2 V AR
¡
log cTt
¢
,
implying that the ratio between the volatilities of (the logs of) pt and cTt , as measured by their
standard deviations, must be constant and equal to (1 + µ). Because of its eﬀect on the volatility
16The estimated parameters (p-values in parentheses) are ek = 0.1240 (0.846), eρ = 0.6468 (0.000), and eσε = 4.3499.
17Technically, because of the non-linear nature of the model, which in principle should induce agents to react
asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks, a “deterministic steady state” may not be relevant to reflect the
long-run “average” state of the system. Ideally, in this case, a more precise method of calibration should be carried
out through the solution of the whole model for a given set of parameters (all of them), and successive improvements
should be made until the target average values are obtained. However, this non-linearity does not seem to be
important here and the calibration procedure used, based on a deterministic steady state, is able to generate the
target averages quite accurately.
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of p, the parameter µ has an influence in the volatilities of both total output, Y Tt + ptY N , and
total consumption, Ct = cTt + ptcN . Among the diﬀerent possible combinations of values for the
two parameters that satisfy the above system of stationary equations, ω = 0.0659 and µ = 1.875
(which implies an elasticity of substitution between cT and cN equal to 0.35) are chosen in order
to match the total output volatility, σy = 2.95%, observed in the data (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.5 shows the average results of 500 simulations of a time series of size 88, which is
the number of quarterly observations for the 1980Q1−2001Q4 period. The simulated series are
transformed according to the same procedure used in the actual data, as discussed in the previous
section. In terms of the model, σc represents the volatility of (the log of) total consumption
(in units of tradable goods) as given by Ct = cTt + ptcN . Notice that the comparison between
the models for the constrained and unconstrained (perfect capital mobility) economies shows that
the type of borrowing constraint used here has the eﬀect of increasing the relative consumption
volatility from 0.554 to 0.644, a 16% increase. Considering that the average figure implied by the
data from Table 2.1 is 30%, one could conclude that the borrowing constraint used here is capable
of accounting for 55% of the diﬀerence in relative consumption volatility between emerging and
developed economies.18
Table 2.5
Brazil - Output and Consumption Volatility Statistics
σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy
Brazil (1980Q1−2001Q4) 2.95 3.90 1.308
Model (constrained) 2.95 1.90 0.644
Model (unconstrained) 2.60 1.44 0.554
Although the model manages to increase the relative consumption volatility, it is not able
to reproduce both the actual absolute and relative levels of consumption volatility, and cannot
account for the fact that consumption is consistently more volatile than output. Neumeyer and
Perri (2004) attribute this excess volatility of consumption to the dominant role played by interest
rate shocks in these economies. In an economy that faces both income and interest rate volatility,
consumption will be smoother than income if the transitory production shocks are dominant, and
the opposite happens if, instead, the interest rate shocks are dominant. In this model, the absence
of shocks that aﬀect consumption independently of output, such as interest rate shocks, makes it
impossible for consumption to fluctuate more than output. For instance, interest rate shocks aﬀect
the intertemporal decisions of consumption/savings and act on the consumption growth rate, but
18The constrained economy is calibrated for Brazil, rather than for an “average” of emerging economies. However,
the observed values of σc/σy in Brazil and in the average of emerging economies are 1.30 and 1.27, respectively (see
Table 2.1). At least in terms of the relative volatility of consumption, Brazil can be considered a typical representative
of the group of emerging countries. In addition, as will become clear in the next subsection, the results are quite
robust to a sensitivity analysis that tests diﬀerent calibrations.
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have only second-order eﬀects on the production side (in a production economy, ceteris paribus, the
main eﬀect would be inducing a substitution of capital by labour). Aguiar and Gopinath (2004)
explain the fact that σc/σy > 1 in emerging economies by adding permanent shocks to the growth
rate of productivity. Since the model is not capable of accounting for the absolute volatility of
consumption observed in the data from emerging economies, other sources of consumption volatility
that should play a major role in emerging economies, while not playing much of a role in developed
economies, are clearly missing here.19
Fig. 2.1 - Simulated Series (unfiltered)
19These factors tend to be exogenously given. In order to properly assess the eﬀect of the constraint alone, one
would have to control for them anyway. The risk of not considering them is to miss some interactive eﬀect between
the exogenous factors and the endogenous borrowing constraint.
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The results of one particular simulation are shown in Figures 1 and 2, for the unfiltered and
HP-filtered simulated series. Notice that the model is capable of generating a pro-cyclical behaviour
for the consumption series (both tradable consumption and total consumption) as well as for the
real exchange rate, as observed in the actual data from emerging economies [Arellano (2004)]. Also
notice that the debt series in the constrained economy follows a similar path as in the unconstrained
one, but at a lower level. This feature implies that the borrowing constraint aﬀects the behaviour
of the economy even when it is not binding. In terms of the supply of credits, the simple possibility
of default means less credit to the small economy at all times. From the demand side, agents that
consider the possibility of being credit constrained in the future will save more now (hence, less
debt). The borrowing constraint will bind only when the cost of a bad production shock, in terms
of reducing consumption today, is high enough to induce the agents to borrow up to the limit.
Fig. 2.2 - Simulated Series (HP-filtered)
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the simulated average of the debt-output ratio for the
sample is 28.35% in the constrained economy, virtually identical to the actual average observed in
Brazilian data. In addition, the level of the debt limit is such that it corresponds to 80.7% of the
simulated average GDP. Notice that this level is well above the maximal level for the debt-output
ratio observed in Brazil, in the period 1980Q1−2001Q4 (47.02%).
2.4.1 Sensitivity analysis
Information displayed in Tables 2.6, 2.7(a), 2.8(a) and 2.9(a) shows how the model for a constrained
economy behaves under diﬀerent values of the structural parameters. The rows marked with a (∗)
refer to the baseline case. The columns in the tables, from left to right, provide information on the
value of the relevant parameter (column 1), on the volatilities of output and consumption (columns
2 and 3, respectively), their ratio (column 4), the average level of debt as a percentage of the GDP
(column 5), and the credit limit (column 6), both in level and as a percentage of the GDP (within
parentheses). The tables also show the frequency at which the constraint binds (column 7) and a
measure of the explaining power of the model (column 8). This measure of “success” is given by the
proportion of the observed percentage diﬀerence in σc/σy from the data of emerging and developed
economies (that is, the 30% gap between σc/σy = 1.27 in emerging countries, and σc/σy = 0.98 in
developed economies) that is accounted for by the percentage diﬀerence in the relative consumption
volatility obtained from the simulated model for the constrained and unconstrained economies.
Tables 2.7(b), 2.8(b), and 2.9(b), in the appendix, show the results for the unconstrained economy.
Table 2.6
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in λ
λ σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP ) d (% GDP ) % bind “success” (%)
0.9725 2.88 1.80 0.625 30.18 300.5 (88.08) 0.22 43.5
*0.9750 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
0.9775 3.03 1.99 0.657 26.14 255.4 (73.51) 0.40 62.9
0.9800 3.11 2.10 0.675 23.10 229.4 (65.73) 0.51 74.2
0.9825 3.19 2.20 0.690 19.41 203.4 (57.92) 0.61 83.0
0.9850 3.29 2.32 0.705 15.43 177.4 (50.13) 0.71 92.5
0.9900 3.54 2.64 0.746 5.78 123.3 (34.15) 0.88 117.3
1.0000 4.83 4.12 0.853 -12.53 9.14 ( 2.42) 1.85 182.9
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
Table 2.6 shows how the model for the constrained economy behaves under diﬀerent values of
the parameter λ, which represent the indirect costs of default. The economic principle at work is
based on changes in the cost/benefit of defaulting. Notice that the credit limit d falls with increases
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in the value of λ. In order to understand why this happens, one should recall that a higher value of
λ means that the output losses during default states are less important, which reduces the penalty
for staying out of international capital markets. Thus, the higher the parameter λ is, the more likely
are the domestic agents to default (because it costs less), ceteris paribus, and the more likely it is
to trigger a defensive response from the external creditors, who will have to reduce their maximal
level of conceded credits to avoid default. On the other hand, as λ decreases, it becomes more
costly for the country to default and foreign investors can relax the borrowing constraint without
fearing default.
Notice that as λ increases, and the constraint becomes more stringent, both output and con-
sumption become more volatile, although the eﬀect is more important on consumption, since the
ratio σc/σy consistently increases. The intuition behind this result is that a lower credit limit im-
poses additional diﬃculties to risk sharing and consumption smoothing, causing the consumption of
tradables to be more volatile. A more volatile cTt , in turn, reflects on a more volatile real exchange
rate through equation (8).20 Since total consumption is defined as Ct = cTt +ptcN , the more volatile
consumption of tradables increases total consumption volatility directly and indirectly, through its
eﬀect on pt (the eﬀects cannot cancel each other, since cTt and pt are positively correlated). The
same is not true for total output Yt = Y Tt + ptY N , which only suﬀers the eﬀect of the more volatile
real exchange rate.
Table 2.6 also shows that a higher λ induces a lower average level of debt-output ratio (which
eventually becomes negative for the extreme value λ = 1.0) and, at the same time, increases the
frequency at which the borrowing constraint binds, suggesting that the eﬀect of an increasing λ is
more important on reducing the credit limit d than on decreasing the domestic agents’ borrowing
motivation. One should expect that, as d is reduced, with incomplete markets, risk-averse agents
would save more (hold less debt), because the risk of being credit constrained in the future is higher
the lower the credit limit is.
Finally, notice that the explanatory power of the model would be improved if a higher value of
λ were used, although the target values for the output volatility and debt-output ratio would be
missed.
Table 2.7(a) shows that the results obtained for σy and σc in the benchmark (constrained
economy) are relatively robust to changes in the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, γ. In terms of the
volatilities, observe that the results barely change (for σy) or are completely unchanged (σc) from
the baseline case. The absolute value of the constraint, d, is also the same. In addition, in terms of
the “success”of the model in matching the data, no gain is possible by choosing alternative values
for γ. There are a few changes, though. For instance, notice that as γ increases and agents become
20Throughout the values of λ in Table 6, the volatilities of cT and p rise monotonically from 0.7 per cent to 1.7 per
cent and from 2.2 per cent to 5 per cent, respectively. This information is not displayed in the tables.
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more risk-averse, given that markets are incomplete, they tend to save more or, equivalently, hold
lower amounts of debt, since they become too scared of being credit constrained in the future.
That explains why the average level of debt held by domestic agents falls with γ and, given that d
remains unchanged, explains the reduction in the frequency at which the constraint is binding.
Table 2.7(a)
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in γ
γ σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP ) d (% GDP ) % bind “success” (%)
0.50 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.58 279.5 (80.70) 0.33 53.7
1.00 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.44 279.5 (80.68) 0.32 53.7
*1.50 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
2.00 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.26 279.5 (80.66) 0.30 52.5
2.50 2.96 1.90 0.642 28.17 279.5 (80.65) 0.29 51.1
3.00 2.96 1.90 0.642 28.11 279.5 (80.64) 0.29 51.1
4.00 2.96 1.90 0.642 27.87 279.5 (80.61) 0.26 51.1
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
On the other hand, one should also expect that more risk-averse agents would be less inclined to
default, ceteris paribus, since they tend to care more about risk sharing, and the cost of defaulting
and being deprived of risk sharing in the future becomes higher. In that case, agents do not want to
default unless they hold a large amount of debt and/or are hit by a bad enough production shock.
Since the cost of default increases for the country, the external investors may relax the credit limit
and still receive back the conceded loans. Conversely, if agents have low risk-aversion, then they do
not care very much about risk sharing in the future, which means that not paying back the debt
becomes relatively attractive, forcing the external investors to make the borrowing constraint more
stringent to avoid default. However, for the range of values of γ considered in Table 2.7(a), this
eﬀect is not quantitatively important and the level of d turns out to be constant. In terms of d
as a percentage of the average GDP, the observed reduction is explained as follows. A lower level
of (average) debt induces a higher level of average consumption of tradables, which can be fairly
approximated by avg
¡
cT
¢ ' Y T − r.avg (d), provided that avg (d) ' θd £Y T + avg (p)Y N¤ and
(µ, ω) satisfy avg (p) ' 1, as is the case. A higher average level of cT combined with an inelastic
(here, constant) level of cN , in turn, means a higher average relative price of non-tradable goods,
p (see equation (8)). The consequence of this appreciation of the real exchange rate is a higher
level of total GDP in units of tradable goods, which explains why the constant level of d falls as
a percentage of the average GDP as γ increases. The fact that the borrowing constraint is not
very sensitive to changes in γ while the average level of debt decreases explains why the borrowing
constraint binds less frequently as γ rises.
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Table 2.8(a) displays the sensitivity analysis to changes in the weight of the tradable good in
the CES consumption aggregator, ω. One could think of two opposite eﬀects of ω in terms of
the incitation to default. Since a higher ω increases the marginal utility of the consumption of
tradable goods at all times, first, there would be higher instantaneous gain from default because,
in that event, the country would be able to consume more of a good (tradables) that has a higher
weight on the consumption index. On the other hand, intertemporally, there would be a higher
cost of default by the same motive (one could also think that a higher ω makes the agent care
more about risk sharing, since the “insurable” part of the agent’s consumption becomes more
important for his utility). Again, higher benefits of default induce external agents to reduce the
level of maximal credit available to the country and higher costs of default make the constraint less
stringent. Thus, the first eﬀect would reduce the level of d, while the second eﬀect would increase
it. Notice that, since the level of d falls (although it increases as a percentage of the GDP because
of a real depreciation that more than proportionally reduces the level of the average GDP in units
of tradable goods) as ω increases, the quantitative relevance of the instantaneous benefits seems to
dominate the intertemporal costs of default.
Table 2.8(a)
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in ω
ω σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP ) d (% GDP ) % bind “success” (%)
0.0100 1.88 1.71 0.910 6.86 658.0 (36.38) 0.00 0.00
*0.0659 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
0.1000 3.42 1.98 0.579 28.63 215.4 (83.22) 0.56 99.2
0.2500 4.35 1.81 0.416 17.35 133.3 (86.04) 0.90 216.7
0.5000 4.97 1.53 0.308 6.27 104.3 (87.88) 0.98 297.4
0.7500 5.27 1.35 0.256 0.76 94.3 (88.69) 1.02 327.3
0.9900 5.44 1.24 0.228 -2.75 89.2 (89.05) 1.03 349.8
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
The eﬀects of the constraint are very clear if one compares the sensitivity of the model to
changes in ω in the constrained (Table 2.8(a)) and unconstrained (Table 2.8(b), in the appendix)
economies. Notice that, at the very low value ω = 0.01, the two economies are virtually identical,
since tradable consumption has a very small impact on the consumption index and the borrowing
constraint is set at a very high level, as discussed in the previous paragraph. The level of d is
high enough to imply a very low frequency at which the constraint is binding, which makes the
two models very close in behaviour. Numerically, in the simulations, this frequency is zero, for two
decimal places, although it is likely that a high-enough number of simulations would show some
cases in which the constraint binds, since, theoretically, the two models are still diﬀerent.
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However, as ω rises, interesting diﬀerences show up regarding the constrained and the uncon-
strained economies. First, notice that the volatility of output departs from the same value (1.88%)
and rises in both economies, but it increases more rapidly in the constrained case. The intuition
of this result is the following: since Yt = Y Tt + ptY N , the volatility of output depends on the (ex-
ogenous) volatility of Y Tt , as well as on the (endogenous) volatility of pt and the (also endogenous)
covariance between the two, cov
¡
Y Tt , pt
¢
> 0. In the unconstrained economy, the volatility of pt
(not shown in the tables) is almost insensitive to changes in ω (it goes from 1.76% to 1.75% as ω
changes from 0.01 to 0.99), and the volatility of Y Tt is exogenously given. Thus, the only way that
Yt can become more volatile is through increases in cov
¡
Y Tt , pt
¢
, possibly due to the fact that the
proportion of tradables in total consumption and total GDP increases with ω. In the constrained
economy, on the other hand, on top of the eﬀect described above, the volatility of pt rises (from
1.77% to 3.56% as ω goes from 0.01 to 0.99), rather than stay constant, which explains the sharper
increase in σy verified in Table 2.8(a) in comparison with Table 2.8(b).
The rising volatility of pt in the constrained economy in response to changes in ω, while constant
in the unconstrained economy, is certainly an eﬀect of the borrowing constraint that becomes even
more stringent with increases in ω, and it makes tradable consumption smoothing more diﬃcult.
Not surprisingly, the same happens with the volatility of cTt (constant at 0.61% in the unconstrained
economy and rising from 0.61% to 1.24% int the constrained economy, as ω changes in Table 2.8(a)).
Recall that, since the same standard procedure for business cycle statistics is being used here (in
particular, the variables are treated in logarithmic scale), the ratio between the volatilities of pt
and cTt has to be equal to (1 + µ) = 2.875.21
A second diﬀerence observed in Tables 2.8(a) and 2.8(b), for the constrained and unconstrained
economies, is that the volatilities of total consumption are identical in both economies for ω = 0.01,
but, similar to what happens with σy, they become diﬀerent as ω rises. In the unconstrained
economy, σc falls monotonically with increases in ω, while in the constrained economy there is an
initial phase in which σc rises. In the case of an unconstrained economy, the monotonic fall in
σc is purely mechanical, a consequence of the reduction of the term (1− ω) /ω. Note that, since
Ct = cTt + ptcN and pt is given by equation (8), one can write:
Ct = cTt +
·
(1− ω)
ω
¡
cN
¢−µ¸ ¡cTt ¢(1+µ) ,
and, as ω goes from 0 to 1, the term (1− ω) /ω goes from infinity to zero and the volatility of total
consumption converges (falls) to the volatility of tradable consumption, which does not change
with ω, as discussed above. That is also the reason for the more depreciated real exchange rate
21For instance, up to a rounding error eﬀect (the values are presented with only two decimal places):
1.76%
0.61% '
1.75%
0.61% '
1.77%
0.61% '
3.56%
1.24% ' 2.875.
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(lower pt) that follows from the increase in ω (see equation (8)). The same eﬀects occur in the
constrained case, with the important diﬀerence that, because the constraint becomes more stringent
with a rising value of ω, tradable consumption volatility increases sharply. The net eﬀect on σc
depends on the relative importance of these direct and indirect eﬀects (through increases in tradable
consumption volatility) induced by a rise in ω. The direct eﬀect makes σc fall, while the indirect
eﬀect acts in the opposite direction. It seems that the indirect eﬀect dominates for small values of
ω (up to 0.1 in Table 2.8(a)) and, as (1− ω) /ω converges to zero, for higher values of ω, the direct
eﬀect becomes more important and forces σc down.
In terms of the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of ω, a final diﬀerence between the constrained and
unconstrained economies is the behaviour of the average level of debt-to-output ratio. Since a
higher ω makes tradable consumption more important for the CES consumption aggregator index
and for utility, it makes the representative agent attach more importance to risk sharing at all
times. If markets were complete, this would probably not aﬀect the agent’s total savings, since
there would be complete risk sharing and a reallocation of contingent assets would occur without
important eﬀects on total savings. However, with no contingent assets, agents more concerned
with risk sharing will tend to save more for self-insurance. In fact, in both the constrained and
unconstrained economies, the average level (not shown in Table 2.8(a)) of debt falls.
In the unconstrained economy, where there is no risk of a shortage of credits, the average level
of debt falls by 11% (124 to 110.6), but in the constrained economy, where the risk of becoming
credit constrained is real, and increasing with ω, the average level of debt falls by 102.2% (from
the same 124 as in the unconstrained economy to −2.75), and the agent becomes a net creditor.
In terms of the debt-to-output ratio, in the constrained economy, the fall in the level of debt is
less than proportional to the fall in the value of the GDP for lower values of ω, and the debt-to-
output ratio actually rises. But for ω ≥ 0.1, the higher motivation for savings dominates the real
depreciation, debt falls quicker than GDP, and the opposite occurs. In the unconstrained economy,
since there is no risk of being credit constrained, the fall in debt is smoother and the eﬀects of
the real depreciation on total GDP always dominate, which makes the debt-to-output ratio grow
monotonically with ω.
Table 2.9(a) displays the sensitivity of the model to changes in the elasticity of substitution
between cT and cN . The most obvious eﬀect of an increase in µ,22 which means that cT and cN tend
to work more as complements than as substitutes, is a rise in the volatility of pt for a given volatility
22The results for µ = 1.0 and µ = −0.25 are particularly important, because they represent a possible alternative
for the calibration procedure, if one wants to consider values of µ close to those implied by the estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between cT and cN used in Arellano (2004) and Mendoza and Uribe (1999). Arellano relied
on estimation of the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consumption for Argentina by
Gonzales-Rosada and Neumeyer (2003), who find it to be 0.48, implying µ = 1.0833. Mendoza and Uribe (1999) use
µ = −0.218, the same value as used in Mendoza (1995), which implies an elasticity of substitution of 1.28. Needless
to say, the existence of empirical studies that provide estimations of µ that are lower than the value used in the
baseline case is an important caveat for the results of this paper.
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of tradable consumption, according to equation (8). For a given volatility of tradable consumption,
a lower elasticity of substitution between cT and cN implies a lower percentage variation in cN/cT
for a given percentage change in p, or, alternatively, that a higher proportional change in p is
required for a given change in the consumption of tradable, relative to the consumption of non-
tradable, goods. Notice that, as µ rises, both σy and σc increase as a consequence of the higher
volatility of the real exchange rate. At first, for lower values of µ, the eﬀect on σc is stronger than
that on σy, and σc/σy rises, but the inverse occurs after µ ≥ 0.01.23
Table 2.9(a)
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in µ
µ σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP ) d (% GDP ) % bind “success” (%)
-0.750 0.31 0.17 0.548 3.89 641.9 (22.66) 0.00 0.0
-0.250 0.67 0.47 0.701 6.17 641.9 (35.23) 0.00 0.0
0.010 0.86 0.62 0.721 7.81 641.9 (43.93) 0.00 0.0
0.250 1.06 0.75 0.708 9.67 651.9 (54.74) 0.00 0.0
0.500 1.26 0.88 0.698 12.02 670.9 (69.42) 0.00 0.0
1.000 1.73 1.16 0.671 18.18 493.7 (76.35) 0.00 5.0
1.500 2.37 1.53 0.646 25.02 351.6 (78.89) 0.09 23.0
*1.875 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
2.000 3.14 2.00 0.637 28.87 260.5 (81.26) 0.37 61.9
3.000 4.39 2.47 0.563 24.35 163.3 (84.91) 0.78 140.9
4.000 5.12 2.37 0.463 14.78 121.3 (87.33) 0.95 222.1
5.000 5.42 2.02 0.373 6.82 102.3 (89.72) 1.02 283.9
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
As in the case of changes in ω, there are two eﬀects caused by variations in µ, one instantaneous
and the other intertemporal. The relative importance of how the changing µ aﬀects the two
eﬀects will ultimately determine what happens with the level of the borrowing constraint. For
instance, if the two goods are substitutes (low µ), then risk sharing is relatively less important at
all times because, when facing a bad tradable output shock, agents can always substitute away
their tradable consumption for non-tradable consumption. Thus, the instantaneous gain in terms
23Notice that, since:
Ct = cTt +

(1− ω)
ω

cN
−µ
cTt
(1+µ)
,
and
Yt = Y Tt +

(1− ω)
ω

cN
−µ
cTt
(1+µ)
,
the absolute eﬀects of µ are the same in both σc and σy, given the volatilities of cTt and Y Tt . However, the percentage
increase depends on the relative share of the volatilities of cTt and Y Tt , respectively, on σc and σy.
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of a higher tradable consumption in case of default is reduced with reductions in µ. However, since
this substitution is also possible in the future, the intertemporal cost of default is also reduced. The
opposite occurs when µ rises: the instantaneous benefits are higher and, also, the intertemporal
costs of default are higher, since substitutability between the two goods becomes weak and a bad
tradable output shock hurts more at all times. Notice, in Table 2.8(a), that the intertemporal eﬀect
dominates for lower values (µ ≤ 0.5) and, as µ increases, the borrowing constraint, d, becomes less
stringent. For µ ≥ 0.5, on the other hand, the benefits of default increase faster than the costs,
and external investors have to reduce the credit limit to avoid default.
The borrowing constraint as a percentage of the average GDP is monotonically increasing with
µ, even when the borrowing constraint becomes more stringent. Again, the reason for this is a
sharp real depreciation that follows the increase in µ, which causes the GDP in units of tradable
goods to fall more than proportionally to the fall in d. This real depreciation is a consequence
of the fact that non-tradable consumption is constant in equilibrium and the two goods tend to
become complements, as µ increases. With low values of µ and higher substitution between the
two goods, given that non-tradable output and consumption are constant, the relative scarcity of
tradable goods is reduced, which requires a lower price of tradables relative to non-tradables (that
is, p has to rise); the opposite (i.e., real depreciation; a fall in p) happens for high values of µ.
As the value of µ rises, the level of the average debt increases initially and falls afterwards (this
information is not displayed in Table 2.9(a)). For µ ≤ 1.0, the debt level rises by 6.2% (from 110.7
to 117.6) as µ goes from −0.75 to 1.0. For values of µ that are higher than 1.0, the level of debt
falls by 93.3% (from 117.6 to 7.9) as µ goes from 1.0 to 5.0. This result is a consequence of the
eﬀect that µ has on the borrowing constraint, d. While µ is still low, and the borrowing constraint
becomes less stringent as µ rises, agents that are risk-averse and fear being credit constrained will
save less, because d is too high. Actually, this explains why the constraint does not bind at low
values of µ and, also, why the constrained and unconstrained economies are virtually the same for
values of µ that are lower than 1.0 (the constraint is so loose that, numerically, the two economies
behave almost the same). However, as µ increases and the constraint becomes more stringent, the
risk of being credit constrained increases and agents will tend to start saving more, reducing their
debt.
In terms of the debt-to-output ratio, the initial increase is due both to the rise in the average
level of debt and to the reduction in the value of total GDP in units of tradables that follows the
real depreciation. The fall observed for µ ≥ 2.0 is explained by the fact that the level of debt
decreases more than proportionally to the fall in the value of GDP.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper presented empirical evidence of higher relative consumption volatility (to output volatil-
ity) experienced by emerging economies compared with developed small open economies. The data
indicate that emerging economies have 30% more relative consumption volatility than small open
developed economies, and this diﬀerence is statistically significant. Using a dynamic-general equi-
librium model of an endowment, two-goods, small open economy subject to an endogenous borrow-
ing constraint, the paper suggests that the constraint alone, although having limited explanatory
power on the relative consumption volatility diﬀerential, is able to increase the relative consump-
tion volatility by 16.3%, which corresponds to more than 55% of the gap observed in the data from
emerging (likely to be constrained) and small developed open economies.
The model does relatively well, quantitatively, in explaining the empirical evidence discussed
here and, qualitatively, in a number of dimensions such as the pro-cyclical movements of consump-
tion and real exchange rate, as mentioned in the previous section. However, the model does not
perform well in other aspects. For example, it is not able to reproduce actual levels of absolute
output and consumption volatilities, nor is it capable of explaining the fact that consumption is
consistently more volatile than output in emerging economies. Also, since there is no investment
or production in the model, any positive production shock translates into an amelioration of the
current account, since only the consumption-smoothing mechanism is at work and the investment
motive does not exist. Future extensions of this paper intend to address those matters.
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2.6 Appendix
Tables 2.7(b), 2.8(b), and 2.9(b) display information about the sensitivity analysis of the model for
the unconstrained economy.
Table 2.7(b)
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in γ
γ σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP )
0.50 2.59 1.44 0.556 34.95
1.00 2.59 1.44 0.556 34.93
*1.50 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
2.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.89
2.50 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.88
3.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.87
4.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.83
Table 2.8(b)
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in ω
ω σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP )
0.0100 1.88 1.71 0.910 6.86
*0.0659 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
0.1000 2.97 1.33 0.448 46.51
0.2500 4.02 1.02 0.254 75.75
0.5000 4.82 0.79 0.164 95.86
0.7500 5.22 0.68 0.130 105.22
0.9900 5.44 0.61 0.112 110.41
Table 2.9(b)
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in µ
µ σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP )
-0.750 0.31 0.17 0.548 3.89
-0.250 0.66 0.47 0.712 6.17
0.010 0.86 0.62 0.721 7.81
0.250 1.06 0.75 0.708 9.67
0.500 1.26 0.88 0.698 12.02
1.000 1.71 1.13 0.661 18.27
1.500 2.20 1.33 0.605 26.86
*1.875 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
2.000 2.73 1.47 0.539 37.86
3.000 3.80 1.51 0.397 63.92
4.000 4.65 1.30 0.280 86.65
5.000 5.13 1.04 0.203 100.37
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper is a quantitative study of the welfare implications of adjustment programs supported by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More specifically, it investigates whether IMF-supported
programs may help countries improve their access to international capital markets and quantifies
the associated welfare gains.
It is fair to say that IMF programs have been partially responsible for much of the economic
policy carried out around the transition and/or emerging economies in the sense that, in some
periods, they can be seen as “the critical element in macroeconomic policy” [Fischer (1997), p. 23].
The question of whether IMF programs actually help the countries that seek them, and to what
extent, is central to the evaluation of the Fund’s performance.
The literature on the evaluation of IMF-supported programs is relatively extensive and biased
towards empirical work based on reduced-form econometric models applied to cross-country samples
[for surveys, see Haque and Khan (1998), Barro and Lee (2002), Mody and Saravia (2003), Joyce
(2003), and Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004)]. In general, these cross-country studies look at
estimated coeﬃcients from the regressions of selected macroeconomic variables (current account,
overall balance of payments, inflation, growth, private capital flows, etc.) interacted with an IMF
program dummy. This maybe not the appropriate metric to evaluate the success of these programs,
since there is no clear mapping between welfare measures and the regression coeﬃcients.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach to evaluating IMF programs, by considering a model in
the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984), where an endogenous borrowing
constraint limits the ability of a small open economy to smooth consumption. Countries optimally
decide if they will repay or default on their external debt. The benefit of default (a higher level
of consumption today) is balanced against the costs (an output loss associated with indirect costs
of default plus the exclusion from international capital markets in the future). Foreign lenders
impose a debt ceiling such that the country never chooses to default. As shown elsewhere [Resende
(2005)], this type of borrowing constraint helps explain part of the excess consumption volatility
(normalized by output volatility) experienced by emerging economies in comparison with more
developed ones. Any increase in the relative benefits of default vis-à-vis repayment induces the
lenders to lower the level of the borrowing constraint, generating even more consumption volatility.
In this context, IMF programs can be welfare improving if they help ease the constraint and reduce
volatility.
Agents derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, which can be
consumed both as private or public goods. The economy can borrow abroad from private agents
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or from the IMF, upon formaly signing an adjustment program. The decision of joining an IMF
program is endogenous. The immediate cost of joining an agreement is driven by IMF conditionality
- the country must satisfy some restrictions on the level of consumption of public goods in order
to borrow from the IMF. The benefits are two-fold: 1) the interest rate on IMF loans is lower than
that charged by private agents, and 2) there may be additional consumption smoothing if IMF
lending positively aﬀects the total amount of available funds for the country to borrow.
In the model, the borrowing constraints related to the two components of total external debt
(private lenders and the IMF) are set up diﬀerently. While IMF loans are subject to an exogenous
institutional limit, there is an endogenous constraint on the borrowing from private agents given
the ceiling for IMF loans. The IMF can relax the borrowing constraint on total debt in two ways.
First, there is the direct eﬀect of a higher level of IMF lending for a given level of (maximal) debt
from private lenders. Second, IMF-supported programs may have an indirect, general-equilibrium
positive catalytic eﬀect on private lending, by inducing a relaxation of the endogenous borrowing
constraint and the displacement of the private lenders’ supply of funds. The main driving force
behind positive catalysis of private lending is the reduction of the likelihood of default induced by
the incentives and punishments associated with IMF programs. If they reduce the ex-ante relative
incentives to default, then private lenders may relax their borrowing constraint.
The likelihood of default is aﬀected by IMF programs when they induce a higher ex-ante propen-
sity to save through conditionality. Its is shown numerically that this mechanism does not work
when the consumption of public goods is optimally chosen. The reason is that, when conditionality
is too strong, the economy does not save more because it stays out of IMF programs, since the
forced savings are too costly in terms of suboptimal levels of consumption of public goods. When
conditionality is less strict, then IMF program participation is positive, but there is no additional
savings because the economy is already optimizing at a level of public goods consumption that is
lower than that required by conditionality.
In an alternative set up, the economy cannot commit to a low level of consumption of public
goods unless it signs an IMF program. In this case, when the IMF acts as a “commitment device”,
conditionality can simultaneously force a higher propensity to save while driving the economy closer
to the optimal level of consumption of public goods. As a result, IMF program participation is
positive and there is positive catalysis of private lending.
The model is calibrated to the Brazilian economy. Two relevant questions for the literature
on IMF-supported programs can be answered based on the results from the simulations. First,
can conditionality, in the form of restrictions to domestic absorption, help relax the borrowing
constraint imposed by private foreign lenders? That is, can it produce a positive catalytic eﬀect
on the country’s access to international private capital markets? Second, for reasonable values of
the structural parameters, what are the welfare gains associated with a less stringent borrowing
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constraint?
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes some real aspects of IMF
programs and discusses their eﬀects on the borrowing economies as measured in the empirical
literature. The theoretical model is discussed in Section 3. Then, the calibration procedure and
a quantitative exercise are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectivelly. Section 6 oﬀers some
conclusions.
3.2 On IMF Programs
This section briefly describes the actual process of setting up an agreement between a country-
member and the IMF. In addition, it provides a summary of the literature about evaluations of
IMF-supported adjustment programs.
3.2.1 Setting Up an IMF Program
The Fund has a mandate to oﬀer financial and technical assistance to members experiencing exter-
nal account imbalances on the condition that the recipient country agrees on implementing specific
economic policy measures intended to improve the country’s overall economic situation and reduce
its vulnerabilities. These agreed upon policy actions are known as IMF conditionality and usu-
ally include intermediate goals that must be undertaken as a condition for the country to receive
subsequent tranches over the duration of the program, usually one to three years. These targets
are often related to fiscal and monetary austerity measures, aiming at the reduction of domestic
absorption. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a rationale of the IMF’s
behaviour, one possible reason for this observed reaction is the Fund’s primary goal of improving
the external payments position of its members, as stated in its articles of agreement.1 In that sense,
these policies may be understood as a way of forcing borrowing countries to save more in order to
improve their current account balances.
On the roadmap for an agreement, a country that wishes to withdraw funds up to 25% of
its own quota within the IMF (in the so-called first credit tranche programs) can do so almost
automatically, with only minimal requirements and no discussion or commitment with specific
economic policy measures. In order to use the Fund’s resources beyond that threshold, countries
must almost always sign a formal agreement and accept conditionality. Mussa and Savastano
(1999) detail the underlying process for the signing of an IMF-supported program, as consisting
of six broadly defined phases. First, in the inception phase, a country member explicitly requests
the Fund’s assistance. Then a blueprint is prepared by the Fund’s staﬀ to be used as basis for
the negotiation process. After an agreement is reached, a letter of intent summarizes the outcome
of the negotiations and all aspects of the program. The letter of intent is sent to the Executive
1Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.>
62
Board for approval. Disbursements of the credit tranches follow automatically if the agreed-upon
performance clauses are met as assessed by the Fund’s monitoring of the country’s situation. This
phase lasts until the completion of the program.2
3.2.2 Evaluating IMF Programs
Many studies have tried to evaluate IMF programs using reduced-form econometric models, applied
to cross-country samples. The two most common methodological problems in evaluating the IMF’s
performance based on cross-country econometric studies are both the diﬃculty in finding a good
counterfactual against which to compare IMF programs, and the need to control for selection bias
due to self-selection of countries that seek a program.. The counterfactual issue arises because the
proper standard for measuring program eﬀects, in terms of key variables, should be the comparison
of the macroeconomic outcomes under a program, with the outcomes that would have emerged
in the absence of a program, which is unobservable and must be approximated. Unfortunately,
as pointed out by Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler (2000), results are very sensitive to the
diﬀerent techniques used to approximate the counterfactual.
In terms of the selection bias problem, since countries self-select to IMF programs, the actual
outcome observed after a program is likely to be a consequence of both the initial conditions and
the program itself. These pre-program conditions would probably be very diﬀerent in a country
that actually ended up seeking IMF assistance, compared to the (counterfactual) situation in which
the same country would stay out of an IMF program. If the two eﬀects cannot be disentangled,
the results will be biased.3
These cross-country reduced-form econometric studies provide some “stylized facts” regarding
IMF-supported stabilization programs. For convenience, a summary of the results found in the
literature is presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, regarding the pre-program characteristics of coun-
tries which seek the IMF’s assistance, the eﬀects of IMF programs on some selected macroeconomic
variables4 and the catalytic eﬀect, respectively. They suggest the following:
1. Countries which seek the IMF’s assistance have diﬀerent initial, pre-program, conditions than
those which do not seek the Fund’s help;
2. IMF programs seem to help countries improve their external payments positions;
2Edwards (1989) summarizes the steps leading to the final design of an IMF program, starting with the evaluation
of the country’s situation, defining the target variables and envisaging the course of policy actions.
3The preferred approach in current econometric studies to approximate the counterfactual is the so-called General-
ized Evaluation Estimator (GEE), first suggested by Goldstein and Montiel (1986), and further popularized by Khan
(1990), Conway (1994) and Hutchison (2001), among others. Although not without criticism [see Dicks-Mireaux,
Mecagni and Schadler (2000) and Barro and Lee (2002)], the GEE approach also tries to control for the potential
selection bias problem.
4Table 2 is a modified and updated version of Table 1 presented in Haque and Khan (1998).
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3. Inflation rates are not aﬀected by the implementation of an IMF program, while the evidence
is mixed for growth;
4. There is no strong evidence that IMF lending acts as a “catalyst” to other (private) capital
flows, but there is good indirect evidence that IMF programs can help countries improve their
access to international private capital markets.
Regarding the first point, evidence that program countries diﬀer from non-program countries in
terms of initial conditions can be found in Joyce (1992), Edwards and Santaella (1993), Santaella
(1995), Bird (1996) and Knight and Santella (1997), among others. Table 3.1 displays a summary
of pre-program characteristics of countries that seek the IMF’s financial assistance according to 12
independent econometric studies. Note that 7 out of 8 studies found that a worse current account
position increases the likelihood of a country joining an IMF program (4 out of 5 studies, in terms of
the overall balance of payments). In general, prior to entering a program, IMF borrowers experience
- besides worse external payments positions - higher external debt, lower reserves, more overvalued
currencies and lower levels of both GDP per capita and/or GDP growth rates. IMF borrowers also
tend to follow more expansionary economic policies.
Table 3.1 
Pre-Program Characteristics of Countries that Seek the IMF’s Financial Assistance 
    Effects on the likelihood of an IMF program 
 No. of No. of Sample          Past 
Study Progs Countries Period BoP CA R d* π e G M y IMF 
              
GM (1986) 68 58 1974 – 81 – * – * … … + * … … … – * … 
ES (1992) 48 31 1954 – 71 … – – * … … + + * + * – * … 
Joyce (1992) 72 45 1980 – 84 … – * – * – + … + * + * – * … 
Conway (1994) 217 73 1976 – 86 … + * – * + * … … … … – * + * 
Santaella (1995) 324 78 1973 – 91 – * – * – * + * + * – * + * 0 – * … 
Bird (1996) … … … – … – ? … + … … – + 
KS (1997) … 91 1973 – 91 + – * – * + * – + * + * + * – * + * 
PV (2000) 678 135 1951 – 90 – * … – * + * … … + * … … + 
Edwards (2000) … 106 1979 – 95 … … – * … – * … – + * – * … 
Hutchison (2001) 461 67 1975 – 97 … – … … + … + + – * … 
BL (2002) … 80 1975 – 99 … … – * … … … … … + / – * … 
BHJ (2004) 371 90 1980 – 96 … – * – * + * 0 … – * 0 – * … 
Expected sign: – – – + + + + + – + 
Right sign: 4/5 7/8 10/10 5/7 4/7 3/4 6/8 5/7 11/11 4/4 
Significant and right sign: 3/5 5/8 9/10 5/7 2/7 1/4 5/8 4/7 10/11 2/4 
Note: (*) = results are statistically significant at standard levels; (?) = results are inconclusive; and (0) = no effect. 
 
Legend: 
 
BoP = Balance of Payments; CA = Current Account; R = reserves; d* = total external debt; π = inflation; e = exchange rate 
(increase = depreciation); G = government spending or deficit; M = money or credit creation; y = per capita GDP or GDP growth. 
 
GM =  Goldstein and Montiel (1986); ES = Edwards and Santaella (1993); KS = Knight and Santaella (1997); 
PV = Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); BL = Barro and Lee (2002); BHJ = Bird, Hussain and Joyce (2004) 
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The second item in the list is the strongest empirical regularity found in the cross-country
studies. Both the current account and the balance of payments seem to improve following an
agreement with the Fund, which seems to be consistent with the idea that improving the borrower
country’s external payments situation would be the Fund’s principal objective and the focus of
its analytical approach.5 According to Table 3.2, the balance of payments improved in 7 out of 9
studies and the current account, in 8 out of 11.
Table 3.2 
Effects of IMF Programs on Selected MacroeconomicVariables 
    Effects of IMF program on: 
 No. of No. of Sample       
Study Progs Countries Period BoP CA π G M y 
Before - After          
RS (1978) 79 … 1963 – 72 0 … 0 … – *    + 
Connors (1979) 31 23 1973 – 77 … + 0 0 … 0 
Pastor (1987) … 18 1965 – 81 + * 0 + * … … 0 
Edwards (1989) 34 34 1983 … + + 0 – – / + 
Schadler et al. (1993) … 19 1983 – 93 + – – – ? + 
KMM (1995) … 16 1979 – 85 + * + * – *    – – – / + 
With - Without          
Donovan (1981) 12 12 1970 – 76 … … – … … + 
Donovan (1982) 78 44 1971 – 80 + + – … … – 
Gylfason (1987) 32 14 1977 – 79 + * … 0 … 0 (– * ) 0 
ES (1992) 48 31 1954 – 71 + * + * – … – – / + 
      Generalized Evaluation         
GM (1986) 68 58 1974 – 81 – – + … … – 
Khan (1990) 259 69 1973 – 88 + * + * – … … – *    
Conway (1994) 217 73 1976 – 86 … + * – – *    + – / + * 
PV (2000) 678 135 1951 – 90 … … … … … – *    
D-MMS (2000) … 61 1986 – 91 … … – … … + * 
Hutchison (2001) 461 67 1975 – 97 … … … … … – *    
IV Estimation          
BL (2002) … 80 1975 – 99 … … … … … 0 / –* 
Easterly (2005) … … 1980 – 99 … … … … … + 
      Other          
BMO (2004) … 29 1980 – 02 … + * – *    … … + * 
Right sign: (+)  7/9 (+) 8/11 (–) 9/15 (–)  3/5 (–) 5/7 (+) 10/19 
Significant and right sign: 5/9 5/11 2/15 1/5 2/7 3/19 
Note: (*) = results are statistically significant at standard levels; (?) = inconclusive results; and (0) = no effect. 
 
Legend:  
 
BoP = Balance of Payments; CA = Current Account; π = inflation; G = government spending or government deficit; M = 
money or credit creation; y = per capita GDP or GDP growth. 
 
RS = Reichmann and Stllson (1978); KMM = Killick, Malik and Manuel (1995); ES = Edwards and Santaella (1993);  
GM =  Goldstein and Montiel (1986); PV = Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); D-MMS = Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000);  
BL = Barro and Lee (2002); BMO = Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004). 
In the case of the eﬀects on inflation, only 2 out of 15 studies managed to find a negative and
significant eﬀect of IMF programs on inflation, while one study found a significant positive eﬀect.
Several studies indicate a negative eﬀect, but regression coeﬃcients are generally not statistically
significant at standard levels. In terms of the growth eﬀects of IMF programs, results are mixed
5See Mussa and Savastano (1999) and Mody and Saravia (2003).
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and not robust to the methodology, period covered and types of countries and programs being
analyzed. Although 10 out of 19 studies found positive eﬀects of IMF programs on growth and/or
per capita GDP, only 3 studies reported statistically significant eﬀects (see Table 3.2).
The last point, regarding the catalytic eﬀect of IMF programs, is more directly related to this
paper. In the literature, this expression is used to broadly characterize the ability of the IMF to
facilitate the access to international capital markets [See Cottarelli and Giannini (2002), pp. 5-7].
The Fund claims that positive catalysis is a very important feature of its lending, since it provides
only a small portion of a country’s external financing requirements and the attached conditionality
clauses help to reassure investors and the oﬃcial community, acting as an important lever, or
catalyst, for attracting other funds.6
Table 3.3 
Evidence of the Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending 
 No. of No. of Sample   
Study Progs Countries Period Catalysis? Dependent Variable 
Emprirical      
Ozler (1978) … 26 1968 – 81 Negative * Spreads on bank loans 
KMM (1995) … 16 1979 – 85 Negative Net capital flows 
Rodrik (1996) … … 1970 – 93 Negative Net private capital flows 
BR-1 (1997) … 90 1974 – 89 Negative New lending commitments 
BMR (2000) 17 17 1970s – 1990s         ?  
Edwards (2000) … 106 1979 – 95 Negative, ? Net capital flows 
BR-2 (2002) … 117 1977 – 99 Negative, ? Net capital flows 
Marchesi (2003) … 87 1983 – 95 Positive * Commercial debt rescheduling 
MS (2003) 259 69 1973 – 88 Positive * Bond issuance and spreads 
BMO (2004) … 29 1980 – 02 Positive * Gross capital flows 
EKM (2005) 678 135 1991 – 02 Positive Bond spreads 
Theoretical      
CGR (2004)    possible  
M-Shin (2005)    possible  
Note: (*) = results are statistically significant at standard levels; (?) = inconclusive results. 
 
Legend: 
  
KMM = Killick, Malik and Manuel (1995); BR-1 = Bird and Rowlands (1997);  
BMR = Bird, Mori and Rowlands (2000); BR-2 = Bird and Rowlands (2002); MS = Mody and Saravia (2003); 
BMO = Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004); EKM = Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2005);  
CGR = Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2004); M-Shin = Morris and Shin (2005). 
 
Table 3.3 reports the results found in 11 empirical and 2 theoretical studies regarding the
catalytic eﬀect of IMF programs. Earlier studies such as Ozler (1993), Killick, Malik and Manuel
(1995), Bird and Rowlands (1997, 2001) and Edwards (2000) found no evidence of a strong positive
catalytic eﬀect. Overall, six studies, among which 5 tried to measure catalysis through the response
of net capital flows following IMF programs, found negative, often not significant, eﬀects. However,
more recent papers seem to be more successful in finding signs of positive catalysis by IMF programs,
in terms of facilitating private debt rescheduling [Marchesi (2003)], allowing more frequent and more
6See What Is The IMF?, at <http://www.imf.org>.
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favorable (lower spreads) bond debt issuance by sovereign countries [Mody and Saravia (2003)
and Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2005)] and keeping capital flows to the program countries
[Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004)]. Theoretical predictions by Morris and Shin (2005) and Corsetti,
Guimarães and Roubini (2004) suggest that although IMF programs cannot catalyze capital flows
to countries in severe distress, they can help countries in a vulnerable but not insolvent condition.
Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004) and Mody and Saravia (2003) empirically confirm these predictions.
3.3 The Model
This section presents a model in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984)
extended by an endogenous decision of joining an IMF program.
Consider a small open economy, where a central planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
of a representative agent. The agent enjoys utility from the consumption of both private and public
goods, summarized by the indices ct and gt, respectively. Formally, the planner’s objective function
is:
V0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βtu (ct, gt) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and the function u is strictly concave and strictly
increasing in both arguments, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions
with respect to both arguments.
Indices ct and gt are Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregators of the consumption
of tradable and non-tradable goods:
ct =
h
ωc
¡
cTt
¢−µc + (1− ωc) ¡cNt ¢−µci− 1µc , (2)
gt =
h
ωg
¡
gTt
¢−µg + (1− ωg) ¡gNt ¢−µgi− 1µg , (3)
where cTt and c
N
t denote private consumption of tradables and non-tradables, respectively, while
gTt and g
N
t have similar interpretations for public goods. Parameters µc and µg determine the
elasticities of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods within the indices ct and gt,
given by 1/ (1 + µi) > 0, i = c, g, respectively. The weights of tradables in the respective indices
are ωc and ωg, both in the [0, 1] interval.7
3.3.1 Endowments
The supply side of the economy is characterized by:
yNt = y
N , (4)
7 It is common to think of public goods as being mostly related to services, which are non-tradable goods. One
interpretation of (3) is that the planner buys both tradable and nontradable goods, uses them to produce gt according
to the CES technology and then allocates the “output” to the representative consumer.
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yTt = y
T + zt. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) represent the constant flow of non-tradable goods
¡
yN > 0
¢
and the
stochastic endowment of tradable goods
¡
yTt > 0
¢
, received by the representative agent, respectively.
The only source of uncertainty in the model is the shock to the tradable endowment, zt ∈ ΩZ , which
is assumed to follow a first-order Markov chain with transition probabilities given by π (zt|zt−1)
over the compact set ΩZ .
The introduction of tradable and non-tradable goods adds some interesting dynamics through
movements in the real exchange rate (pt) as defined by the relative price of non-tradables in terms
of tradables. In particular, the volatility of an aggregate variable Xt = xTt +ptx
N
t , for X = C,G, Y
and x = c, g, y, will depend not only on the exogenous underlying volatility associated with the
stochastic process for zt, but also on the endogenous volatility of pt.8
3.3.2 External Debt
International asset/capital markets are incomplete and no contingent contracts are signed.9 It is
assumed that the country can always borrow dt ∈ D ⊆ R, from private lenders (or “banks”). It
can also borrow ft ∈ F ⊆ R+ from the IMF only if it agrees to sign an adjustment program and
comply with the conditions imposed by the Fund, as discussed later on in the paper. Both types
of loans10 are expressed in units of the tradable good, and are contracted at time t− 1, to be paid
at time t. Loans from banks charge the constant interest rate, r, while Fund loans are signed at a
lower interest rate, r∗ < r.
As it will become clearer later on, the assumption of lower interest rates on IMF loans has
both theoretical and technical/computational implications. On one hand, it aﬀects the relative
incentives to default and, as a consequence, the possibility of positive catalysis of private loans by
IMF lending. On the other hand, it helps to substantially reduce the computational cost of the
model’s numerical solution,11 while being representative of actual IMF lending.12
The total external debt, d∗t ∈ D, observed at the end of every period t is:
d∗t = dt + IMFtft , (6)
8An interrelated reason for having tradable and non-tradable goods was pointed out by Arellano (2004). The
relative size of the tradable sector has a negative eﬀect on the probability of default, ceteris paribus.
9This diﬀers from Kehoe and Levine (1993), who discuss endogenous borrowing constraints with complete markets.
The assumption of incomplete markets used in this paper seems to better reproduce the evidence that countries tend
to default during “bad times.” With the insurance given by contingent assets, agents tend to leave the credit contract
(that is, to default) during “good times,” when they have to make payments as opposed to the bad times, when they
receive the insurance.
10We refer to loans, but the analysis is equaly valid for debt in form of bonds.
11For instance, when combined with a an upper limit on ft imposed by the IMF (see sub-section 3.5), the planner’s
problem is well defined and, since the economy will always borrow up to that limit when it decides to borrow from
the IMF, the state-space for ft can be discretized into only two points, consisting of zero and that upper limit.
12For instance, the average annual “rate of charge”, the interest rate on IMF loans, from 1981 to 2005 was about
5.3 per cent, while sovereign bond yields from IMF borrowing countries, such as Brazil, paid more than 12 per cent
a year.
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where the discrete choice variable IMFt takes the value of 1, if the country optimally decides to
join an IMF program, or 0, otherwise.
Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), there is no commitment technology that forces the coun-
try to repay its external debt. The choice between defaulting or repaying the debt is endogenous.
Should the planner optimally choose to default at time t, it is assumed that: (1) default would
occur in both types of loans (i.e. countries cannot default on IMF loans and repay private loans,
and vice versa); and (2) international lenders, both private banks and the IMF, would exclude the
country from intertemporal asset trading forever.13 That is, the country not only faces a discrete
choice of joining an IMF program or not, but must also choose between default (DEFt = 1) or
repayment (DEFt = 0). The discrete choices involving both IMFt and DEFt will be explained
later on in the paper.
3.3.3 Resource Constraints
The economy is subject to two resource constraints. For the non-tradable good, the constraint is:
cNt + g
N
t = DEFtλy
N + (1−DEFt) yN , (7)
where λ ∈ (0, 1).
The (1− λ) reduction in yN , when DEFt = 1, is a reduced-form way of introducing an “output
loss” due to indirect costs associated with the default state.14 The factor λ is eﬀective as long
as the economy remains in the default state. Given the assumption of permanent exclusion from
international capital markets in case of default, this cost is permanent.15
In terms of the tradable good, the resource constraint is:
cTt + g
T
t = DEFtλy
T
t + (1−DEFt)
£
yTt + d
∗
t − (1 + r) d∗t−1 + (r − r∗) IMFt−1ft−1
¤
. (8)
Notice that in case of full repayment the available resources for consumption, after servicing
the outstanding debt, come from the endowment and/or new loans. The last term in (8) accounts
for the fact that part of d∗t−1(i.e. IMFt−1ft−1) is contracted at the lower interest rate r
∗. In case
of default, the country does not pay the debt services, cannot contract d∗t , and must consume the
endowment reduced by the factor λ.
13 In reality, defaulting countries are able to borrow again after some renegotiation of their debts. In terms of the
model presented in this paper, the penalty for defaulting countries is higher than what actually occurs. Arellano
(2004) introduces an exogenous probability of leaving the default state at each period. Yue (2004) endogenizes the
renegotiation process as a Nash bargaining game between the sovereign and the creditors.
14These costs may include the disruption in the countries’ ability to engage international trade, sanctions imposed
by foreign creditors, or damages caused to the financial system [see Cole and Kehoe (1998)]. For instance, Chuhan
and Sturzenegger (2003) found that the percent contraction in output in Latin America, following the default episodes
in the 1990s, was about 2%.
15As in other empirical studies that rely on RBC models based on the Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981) framework [for
example, Arellano (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004)], λ is necessary for calibration purposes. For reasonable
values of the structural parameters, the threat of autarky alone cannot generate the debt-to-output ratios observed
in actual indebted economies.
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3.3.4 The Borrowing Constraint
The lack of commitment to repay the external debt introduces another imperfection to the inter-
national capital markets, in addition to the fact they are incomplete. The possibility of choosing
optimal default is reflected in the following endogenous borrowing constraint faced by the planner:
d∗t ≤ d
∗
t = min
ΩZ
n
d
∗
t (St) : V
R
t
³
d
∗
(St) , St
´
= V Dt (zt)
o
, (9)
where V Rt and V
D
t are the time-t values of the indirect utility obtained by the representative agent
in the states of repayment and default, respectively; and St = {zt, IMFt−1, ft−1} is a partition of
the state of the economy, given by
­
d∗t−1, St
®
.
The constraint (9) diﬀers from others used in the literature, often specified arbitrarily outside
economic models.16 It captures the notion that borrowers face credit limits that depend not only on
their characteristics, but also on their income streams and on the endogenous current state of the
economy. Notice that d
∗
t is the maximal amount of funds that the domestic economy can borrow,
including private and IMF loans, without triggering the strategy of optimal default. As implied by
the constraints (7) and (8), there are two costs associated with the default option. First, there is the
output loss given by (1− λ). Second, since it must stay in financial autarky forever once it chooses
to default, the country loses the ability to use international borrowing to smooth consumption in
the future. More volatile consumption is welfare-reducing, because of the concavity of the agent’s
utility function. On the other hand, the benefit of default is the possibility of higher consumption
at t. In terms of default, costs are intertemporal, benefits are immediate. The planner balances
the costs against the benefit to choose the value of DEFt and decides to default at t whenever
V Rt < V
D
t . Repayment takes place whenever V
R
t ≥ V Dt .
In order to force the country to pay back its debt in all possible dates and states, fully-informed
international lenders will set up and enforce the rule formally defined in (9), and will not lend any
amount of funds that makes the planner choose default over repayment. That is, lenders will define
the credit limit for the borrowing country, d
∗
t , such that its representative agent’s expected lifetime
utility from participating in the asset market is at least as high as that of staying in financial
autarky. The approach used for the identification of d
∗
t , proposed by Zhang (1997), is based on the
worst case scenario given by the minimal value of zt in ΩZ .
3.3.5 The IMF
Let θt ∈ Θ =
©
θ0, θ1
ª
be a set of restrictions on
­
DEFt, dt, ft, gNt , g
T
t
®
, that characterize the IMF
conditionality rule. The country must satisfy a diﬀerent rule depending on its choice to join an
16For example, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994). In the international macroeconomics
literature, examples include papers in the “sudden stop” literature, such as Mendoza (2001).
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IMF program or not. The collection Θ contains two types of conditionality sets as follows:
if IMFt = 0 : θt = θ0 =
©
DEFt ∈ {0, 1} ; dt ∈D; ft = 0; 0 ≤ git, i = T,N
ª
, (10)
if IMFt = 1 : θt = θ1 =
©
DEFt = 0; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f <∞; 0 ≤ git ≤ gi, i = T,N
ª
. (11)
IMF conditionality is “turned on” when the country chooses to sign an IMF program. Note that
whenever IMFt = 1, the economy is subject to θt = θ1, indicating additional restrictions regarding
the default choice, the level of debt from private banks and from the IMF, and the consumption of
public goods. For instance, embedded in the conditionality rules above, there are four assumptions
about the behaviour of the IMF:
(i) The IMF will not lend to a country that chooses to default or does not need borrowing;
(ii) There is an upper bound gi, for i = T,N , to the consumption of public goods when IMFt = 1;
(iii) Countries cannot lend to the IMF; and
(iv) The IMF does not have “deep pockets”, being limited to lend up to f .
The way the IMF is introduced in the model, as represented by assumptions (i) to (iv), is
exogenous and not a result of any optimizing behaviour by the Fund. From a positive perspective,
the Fund’s behaviour is modeled based on what seems to occur in actual IMF adjustment programs:
whenever a country requires financial assistance, the IMF follows its mandate to lend, conditional
upon the borrowing country accepting some (potentially) costly conditions in terms of economic
policy.
The initial portion of assumption (i), that requires DEFt = 0 whenever IMFt = 1, simply
re-states the previous assumption that once a country defaults, it cannot borrow abroad from t
onwards. The last portion is required to prevent a country from borrowing from the IMF at a
lower interest rate and lending to private banks at the market rate. This is consistent with the
Fund’s concern about only lending when there is a “balance-of-payments need” and when countries
“cannot find suﬃcient financing on aﬀordable terms to meet its net international payments.”17
Given its public nature as an international organization, it is hard to justify providing subsidized
loans to countries that are not in need.18
Assumption (ii) is motivated by the fact that restraint on central government expenditure (a
proxy for the consumption of public goods) is indeed a key element for the Fund to approve an
arrangement [see Mussa and Savastano (1999)]. Whenever the constraint git ≤ gi, i = T,N , is
17See the “factsheet” on IMF Lending at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.>
18Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2004) have a static model of IMF optimal lending in which the issue of no
subsidized loans by the IMF - when there is no expected gain in terms of improving a borrowing country’s external
payments position - is explicitly taken into account.
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binding, the consumption of public goods will be set at sub-optimal levels and IMF conditionality
will be a cost, at least in the short run.
There are at least two findings in the empirical literature indicating that restrictions on the
consumption of public goods are implemented by countries borrowing from the IMF, and that
those restrictions would not take place, or not at the same extent, without the Fund’s support:
(1) countries that seek the IMF’s assistance tend to follow more expansionary fiscal policies (see in
Table 3.1 that 6 out of 8 empirical studies found that government spending or government deficit
increase the likelihood that a country signs an IMF program), and (2) there is a negative relationship
between the adoption of an IMF program and the rate of growth of government consumption [see
Conway (1994), Killick, Malik and Manuel (1995) and Marchesi (2003)].19
Regarding assumption (iii), most resources for IMF loans are provided by member countries, pri-
marily through their quota payments, which is not the same as lending to the IMF. Although conces-
sionary lending and debt relief for low-income countries are financed through separate contribution-
based trust funds, this is not the case for the adjustment programs.20
Assumption (iv) implies an asymmetry in how private and IMF lending are limited by credit
suppliers. The latter is exogenously limited by f , while the former has the endogenous limit
dt = d
∗
t − f , as implied by (9). Because of the diﬀerence in interest rates charged in private and
Fund loans, an upper bound on ft is needed for a well defined problem. This is so because the lower
interest rate on IMF loans favors the substitution of debt from private agents to IMF loans and, if
there is no limit on on ft the economy can borrow a large (infinity) amount from the IMF and then
default on both types of debt.21 Indeed, this is true even if the overall eﬀect on the likelihood of
default is ambiguous, since the diﬀerent interest rates also imply a higher cost of default: defaulting
countries will not only be prevented from borrowing abroad in the future, but will also loose the
access to cheapear loans from the IMF. The first (substitution) eﬀect will force private lenders to
be more strict when they set up their borrowing constraint, while the second one (intertemporal)
will allow them to relax their borrowing constraint.
Ideally, one would like to explicitly model the behaviour of the IMF, as well as allow for sep-
arate decisions about defaulting only on IMF loans, but not on private loans, or vice-versa. This
would eliminate the asymmetry, by allowing an endogenous borrowing constraint for the IMF loans
similar to dt. However, this would considerably increase the state-space of the problem and, as a
19Political economy arguments may be used to explain why countries cannot commit with lower levels of government
spending, and how the signing of an IMF program can aﬀect the political game in a way that allows the implementation
of fiscal reforms. See Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2004) and Morris and Shin (2005).
20The assumption is really not necessary since the country would always prefer to lend to private banks, at a higher
interest rate. However, in terms of the numerical method used for the solution of the model, it is always convenient
to restrain the state-space for computational purposes.
21Thus, a natural upper bound on f would be the value such that private banks can avoid default by setting
d∗t − f > 0.
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consequence, the computational cost of the numerical solution.22 In order to keep things simple,
the approach used here fixes f such that dt is determined given (that is, as a function of) f and the
country never defaults 23. Nevertheless, if f is set too high, the country would end up by borrowing
only from the IMF.24
One way to interpret the exogenous and constant value of f is as an institutional rule that
ensures ft < ∞. For instance, countries usually cannot borrow in excess of 300% of their quotas
and, although exceptional access criteria do exist, they depend on country-level analysis by the
Fund and are ultimately limited by the Fund’s budget. The quota that each member of the IMF is
assigned to is based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. Quotas are reviewed at least
every five years, but revisions are not frequent,25 implying that f is country-specific and changes
slowly over time. In terms of the borrowing constraint, the private banks’ actions are taken given
the level of f .
Thus, the optimal choice in terms of joining an IMF program or not is based on the net eﬀect
of conditions (10) and (11). On one hand, the country has more options for borrowing, including
cheaper loans from the IMF, but must optimize subject to caps on the consumption of public goods.
On the other hand, the country loses the option of additional borrowing from the IMF, but may
freely choose the consumption allocations.
3.3.6 The Planner’s Problem
Formally, the planner’s problem is to maximize the objective function (1) subject to constraints (2)
to (11), by choosing the sequence {cTt , cNt , gTt , gNt , d∗t , dt, ft, IMFt,DEFt}∞t=0. The timing of events,
represented in Figure 3.1, is as follows. Once the state
­
d∗t−1, St
®
is known, the central planner
decides: (1) whether the outstanding debt (both from private banks and from the IMF) including
interest services is going to be repaid or defaulted, and (2) whether to sign an IMF program or not.
Then, international lenders set d
∗
t , given f . Finally, given expectations about the next realization
of the shock, and the endogenous borrowing constraint, the planner chooses the next period levels
of the endogenous state and control variables.
The planner’s problem admits a recursive formulation. Recall that, given the definitions of ct
and gt in (2) and (3), one can write the instantaneous utility function as u
¡
cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t , g
N
t
¢
. In
addition, let the time subscript t be excluded from the (indirect) utility functions so that V D and
V R represent time-invariant value functions.
22For the moment, we leave this for future research.
23Note that, because r∗ < r, it iwould be always in the interest of the economy to first default on the debt from
private lenders.
24This means that, by changing the value of f from zero to a value that is high enough, it is possible to generate
diﬀerent shares of IMf lending on the total debt in the [0, 1] interval. In the calibration exercise for the Brazilian
economy discussed in Section 3.4, f is calibrated to match a realistic f/d∗t ratio.
25For instance, in 1998 the quota review led to a 45 per cent increase in IMF quotas, but the review concluded in
January 2003 resulted in no change in quotas.
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Time t-1 Time t Time t+1
1−tIMF  is known 
*
1−td  is inherited 
tz  is realized 
Join the IMF? 
 
Default or repay? 
 
(*) 
         Planner decides 
 
*
td , td , tf , TtgNtcTtc ,,  and Ntg  
 
Private banks and 
the IMF set 
*
d  
 
(*) 
Fig. 3.1 - Sequence of Events
In the default case, the country cannot choose the IMF option, which implies IMFt = 0. The
planner has to choose optimal decision rules for cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t and g
N
t in order to solve the following
Bellman equation:
V D (zt) = maxhcTt ,cNt ,gTt ,gNt i
©
u
¡
cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t , g
N
t
¢
+ βEzV D (zt+1)
ª
,
subject to:
cTt + g
T
t = λ
¡
yT + zt
¢
;
cNt + g
N
t = λy
N .
When DEFt = 0, a set of decision rules for cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t , g
N
t , IMFt, ft and d
∗
t are required for the
solution of the following Bellman equation:
V R
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
≡ max
hcTt ,cNt ,gTt ,gNt ,d∗t ,IMFt,fti
©
u
¡
cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t , g
N
t
¢
+ βEzmax
£
V R (d∗t , St+1) , V
D (zt+1)
¤ª
,
where St = {zt, IMFt−1, ft−1}t , ft ∈F ⊆ R+ and d∗t ∈D ⊆ R‚
subject to:
cNt + g
N
t = y
N ;
cTt + g
T
t = y
T + zt + d∗t − (1 + r) d∗t−1 + (r − r∗) IMFt−1ft−1;
d∗t = dt + IMFtft;
d∗t ≤ d
∗
t = min
ΩZ
n
d
∗
(St) : V
R
³
d
∗
(St) , St
´
= V D (zt)
o
;
if IMFt = 0 : DEFt ∈ {0, 1} ; dt ∈D; ft = 0; 0 ≤ git, i = T,N ;
if IMFt = 1 : DEFt = 0; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f <∞; 0 ≤ git ≤ git, i = T,N.
The solution consists of three objects: (1) a set of state-contingent optimal decision rules for the
level of next-period debt with private lenders, for the IMF program indicator binary variable, and
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for the next-period debt with the IMF, d∗
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
, IMF
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
and f
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
; (2) two value
functions V D (zt) and V R
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
; and (3) the state-dependent level of the borrowing constraint,
d
∗
t = d
∗
(St). Given the solution, the underlying probability distribution function of the shock,
jointly with the decision rules, determine the transition and limiting distributions of all endogenous
variables in the model.
Note that, in this setup, whenever the country chooses IMFt = 1, it will always decide to
withdraw the totality of the resources made available by the Fund (i.e ft = f). This is because
there is substitution in borrowing from private banks, at interest rate r, and from the Fund, at
a lower (financial) cost. Once the country accepts the cost of conditionality, then it will always
borrow from the IMF up to the limit, at a lower interest rate, and then supplement its borrowing
needs from private banks. Also note that, although default is a possible choice for the planner, for
any given value of f , there will be no default at the optimum, since the enforcement of condition
(9) will force the planner to always choose DEFt = 0.
In the empirical application of the model we use a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA)
specification for instantaneous utility function, with a CES aggregator for ct and gt:
u (ct, gt) =
n£
δc−νt + (1− δ) g−νt
¤− 1νo1−γ − 1
1− γ , if γ 6= 1
= log
n£
δc−νt + (1− δ) g−νt
¤− 1νo , if γ = 1
where γ > 0 is the (reciprocal) of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the composite
CES consumption index (or the risk-aversion parameter), δ ∈ [0, 1] gives the weight of private
consumption in the aggregator and 1/ (1 + ν) > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption of private and public goods.
The first-order conditions of the planner’s problem imply the following optimal conditions:
pt =
(1− ωc)
ωc
µ
cTt
cNt
¶(1+µc)
, (12)
pt =
(1− ωg)
ωg
µ
gTt
gNt
¶(1+µg)
, if IMFt = 0 (13)
=
Ψt (1− ωg)
¡
gNt
¢−(1+µg) − qNt
Ψtωg
¡
gTt
¢−(1+µg) − qTt , if IMFt = 1,
PTt = β (1 + r) EtP
T
t+1, (14)
where pt ≡ PNt /PTt is the optimal level of the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative
(shadow) price of non-tradable with respect to tradable goods; PNt and P
T
t are the Lagrange
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multipliers associated with the non-tradable and tradable resource constraints, respectively; qNt
and qNt are the Lagrange multipliers for the conditionality rule g
i
t ≤ gi, i = T,N , and Ψt =
(1− δ) g(µg−ν)t
£
δc−νt + (1− δ) g−νt
¤(γ−ν−1)/ν . Notice that, when IMFt = 1 and the conditionality
rule is binding, there is a wedge between the optimal levels of consumption of public goods and
what would be otherwise. This wedge represents the potential cost of conditionality, preventing the
shadow prices PNt and P
T
t from being equal to the marginal utility of the consumption of public
goods as non-tradables and tradables, respectively.
3.4 Calibration
In this section, quantitative implications of the model are presented. The artificial economy was
calibrated for the Brazilian data. The calibration procedure took as reference a normalized, long-
run mean of the system, in which E(zt) = 0 and the values of the tradable endowment and the
real exchange rate are yT = p = 1. On this average path, the economy is assumed to participate
in an IMF program with frequency α. For instance, the frequency at which Brazil was under an
IMF program during the period of reference was 50 out of 98 quarters, which implies the calibrated
value α = 51.0%.
Table 3.4
Targeted Average Long-Run Ratios
“Big Ratios” Values
1. Share of tradables in total output kT = 0.4045
2. Debt-to-output ratio (private lenders) kd = 0.2597
3. Debt-to-output ratio (IMF loans) kf = 0.0136
4. Share of Gt = gTt + ptg
N
t in total output kg = 0.2057
5. Frequency of IMF programs α = 0.5102
Let Y = yT + pyN , d and f be the long-run average levels of the total endowment, private
and IMF loans, in units of tradable goods, respectively. In addition, denote gT and gN as the
long-run average values for the consumption of public goods in tradable and non-tradable goods,
respectively. Three types of long-run ratios were targeted: (1) the average share of the tradable
output in total output, kT = yT/Y ; (2) the average debt-to-output ratios from banks and Fund
loans, kd = d/Y and kf = f/Y , respectively; and (3) the ratio of government spending (as proxy
for total consumption of public goods) to total output, kg =
¡
gT + pgN
¢
/Y . The “big ratios”
implied from the data are shown in Table 3.4.26
26Data on GDP, tradable GDP (proxyied by the GDP excluded of the sum of before taxes GDP of services,
construction industry plus a financial dummy) and government spending were obtained at the Intituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The total net external debt (external debt minus international reserves) refers to the
period 1982:4-2004:2 and are available from the Banco Central do Brasil. IMF loans and country participation in
IMF programs were obtained at the IMF. In computing kd, “private loans” are simply all outstanding external debt
not contracted from the IMF and may include other sources than private banks, such as loans from the World Bank
and other multilateral agencies.
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The normalized values for yT and p, combined with kT , kd, kf and kg taken from the data, imply
the calibrated long-run averages Y = 1/kT = 2.4722, yN = 1/kT − 1 = 1.4722, d = kd/kT = 0.6420
and f = kf/kT = 0.0336. Under the additional assumption that the share of tradables in total
consumption of public goods is also equal to kT , then gT = kg = 0.2057 and gN = kg (1/kT − 1) =
0.3028.
Exploring the recursive formulation of the central planner’s problem, a numerical solution was
obtained using the value function iteration method, with discretization of the state-space S =
[D ×ΩZ × F × {0, 1}], which is the support for the state
­
d∗t−1, St
®
, such that dt, d∗t ∈D ⊆ R, zt ∈
ΩZ , ft ∈F ⊆ R+ and IMFt ∈ {0, 1}. In the numerical solution, D, ΩZ and F are approximated
by the discrete sets eD, eΩZ and eF , respectively.
In order to capture the potential movements of the simulated series for the external debt, D is
approximated by eD = {d∗t : d∗min ≤ d∗t ≤ d∗max}, an evenly spaced d∗−grid (except for d∗t = 0 and
d∗t = d + f) with Nd = 602 points. Given the average Y , the limits d
∗
min = −1.0 and d∗max = 7.0
imply debt-to-output ratios approximately in the range [−0.4, 2.83], and were appropriately chosen
to include the ergodic space. Negative values represent assets instead of liabilities.
Table 3.5
Summary of the Calibration Procedure
Exogenous Variables Values Motivation
1. Interest rate (IMF loans) r∗ = 0.0081 U.S. bonds deflated by CPI
2. Interest rate (private loans) r = 0.0282 C bond spread over U.S. bonds
3. Average tradable output yT = 1.0000 normalization
4. Average real exchange rate p = 1.0000 normalization
5. Non-tradable output yN = 1.4722 kT = yT/
¡
yT + pyN
¢
Structural Parameters Values Motivation / Target
1. Risk aversion γ = 1.5000 Standard
2. Share of ct in CES aggregator δ = 0.9850 kg ∼=avg
£
Gt/
¡
yTt + pty
N¢¤
3. Subjective discount factor β = 0.9726 β (1 + r) = 1
4. Elasticity of substitution between c and g ν = 2.1500 1/ (1 + ν) = 0.3175
5. Elasticity of substitution between cT and cN µc = 4.6600 σy = 2.76%
6. Elasticity of substitution between gT and gN µg = 4.6600 symmetry with c
7. Weight of tradables in CES c aggregator ωc = 0.0893 p =
(1−ωc)
ωc
³
cT
cN
´(1+µc)
= 1
8. Weight of tradables in CES g aggregator ωg = 0.0893 symmetry with c
9. Autocorrelation for zt = ρzt−1 + εt ρ = 0.7188 OLS estimation
10. Std. dev. for zt = ρzt−1 + εt σε = 0.0229 OLS estimation
11. Conditionality rule on gi
¡
% yi
¢
, i = T,N gi = 20.9417 α = 51.02%
12. Standard IMF loan (% Y ) f = 2.6700 kf ∼=avg
£
ft/
¡
yTt + pty
N¢¤
13. Output loss in state of default λ = 0.9750 kd ∼=avg
£
dt/
¡
yTt + pty
N¢¤
Table 3.5 displays the values of the exogenous variables and structural parameters used in the
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calibration. For the exogenous stochastic process for the tradable endowment shock, we proceeded
as follows. First, we detrended the data on tradable output, by removing a smooth trend with
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and a smoothing parameter of 1600, for quarterly data. Then, we
estimated a first-order autoregressive process of the type zt = ρzt−1+ εt, with εt v N (0, σε), using
ordinary least squares (OLS) on the HP-detrended data against its one-period lagged value. The
autocorrelation (ρ) and the volatility (σε) parameters obtained from the regression were ρ = 0.7188.
and σε = 0.0229, respectively.27 Finally, the estimated stochastic process was discretized into
a 5-point Markov chain, using Tauchen’s (1986) procedure, resulting in an evenly spaced grideΩZ = {z1, ..., z5}, such that z3 = 0, z1 = −z5 = 0.0989 and z2 = −z4 = 0.0494,28 and in an
underlying probability transition matrix given by:
Π =


0.3423 0.5984 0.0591 0.0002 0.0000
0.0467 0.5669 0.3744 0.0120 0.0000
0.0016 0.1611 0.6746 0.1611 0.0016
0.0000 0.0120 0.3744 0.5669 0.0467
0.0000 0.0002 0.0591 0.5984 0.3423


As for the IMF loans, we used the set eF = ©0, fª, consisting of only two possible choices.
The economy gets ft = 0 when the planner chooses IMFt = 0. As previously mentioned, the
assumption that r > r∗ ensures ft = f whenever IMFt = 1, which allows eF to have only two
points and substantially reduces the dimension of the state-space and the computational cost of
the numerical solution discussed below. The IMF standard loan, f , was calibrated to match the
average value of IMF loans as a proportion of the GDP, given by kf . Notice that, since the country
will participate in an IMF program with frequency α, the long-run average IMF loan, f , has to be
equal to αf . Given the values of α and f defined above, f was set to 0.0659, which corresponds to
approximately 2.7% of the targeted average total output, Y .29
Accordingly, the caps gi, i = T,N , to be satisfied as conditionality rule when IMFt = 1, were
calibrated to approximate the frequency at which Brazil participates in an IMF program, α. They
were set to gT = 0.2094 and gN = 0.3087, which correspond to about 21% of the endowments.
Following the traditional hypothesis used in the small open economy literature, in order to
avoid a unit root in the current account, the subjective discount factor must satisfy β (1 + r) = 1
27Using data on tradable output

gdpT

, the following regression was estimated:

gdpTt −HPgdpTt

= α0 + ρ

gdpTt−1 −HPgdpTt−1

+ εt
with R2 = 0.5227 and estimated parameters (p-values in parentheses) eα0 = −0.0272 (0.9073), eρ = 0.7188 (0.000) and
eσε = 0.0229.
28 In the OLS estimation, we normalized the data on tradable output

gdpT

such that the sample average was
equal to 1. Although, the points z1, ..., z5 cannot be interpreted as percentage deviations of the trend, they are such
that yTt > 0 at all times, since we impose yT = 1. The use of log

gdpT

in the OLS estimations produced similar
results in terms of percentage deviations of the HP-trend.
29This calibrated value satisfies the condition d∗t − f > 0 as discussed in footnote 20.
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and, thus, was set to β = 0.9713. It is worth mentioning that this value of β is consistent with
estimations by Issler and Piqueira (2000), using the same utility function as here, for the Brazilian
economy.
The value for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity substitution (or, equivalently, for the
CRRA case, the risk-aversion parameter) was set to γ = 1.5, which is standard.30 The exogenous
interest rate was set at the average level that the Brazilian government pays on its sovereign debt,
as represented by the Federative Republic of Brazil’s C-Bonds. Here, the idiosyncratic market
interest rate, r, is considered to be the quarterly equivalent of the average real annual rate on the
U.S. Government Bonds (r∗ = 4.% per year, or 0.81% per quarter, using the U.S. CPI inflation
rate) plus the average spread paid on the C-Bonds (803.4 basis points, or ζ ' 8% per year).31 The
result is r = r∗ + ζ = 2.82% per quarter. In addition, the parameter ν was set to 2.15, which is
inside the range of values usually observed in empirical studies [see Bouakez and Rebei (2003)], and
implies an elasticity of substitution between c and g equal to 0.3175.
The share of private consumption goods in the CES composite consumption index, was cali-
brated to δ = 0.9850 in order to match the average of total government consumption as a proportion
of the GDP, represented by kg. The parameter governing the output loss observed in default states
was set to λ = 0.9750, which implies output losses of 2.50% during default episodes and helps to
approximate the target kd. This value is (roughly) in line with the empirical findings by Chuhan
and Sturzenegger (2003).
For known values of kT , kd and kg, the normalized version of condition (12), computed at
the long-run average target path, implies a one-to-one relationship between ωc and µc.
32 Among
the diﬀerent possible combinations of ωc and µc that satisfy that relationship, ωc = 0.0893 and
µc = 4.66 (which imply an elasticity of substitution between c
T and cN equal to 0.1767) were chosen
30For instance, the value used here is the mid-range value of two very common alternatives, γ = 1.001 or γ = 2,
used by Greenwood et al (1988) and Mendoza (1991), for example. Issler and Piqueira (2000) estimated γ = 1.7,
using Brazilian data and the same type utility function used in this paper. The results of the simulation of the model
are virtually the same if one uses this value instead of γ = 1.5.
31For the average risk-free real interest rate, the 10-year-maturity U.S. Government Bond was used, since its
maturity is comparable to that of the C bonds. Because of data limitations, the average spread for the C bonds refer
to the period 1995:1-2004:2.
32Because of the non-linear nature of the model, which in principle should induce agents to react asymmetrically
to positive and negative shocks, a “deterministic steady state” may not be relevant to reflect the long run average
state of the system. Ideally, in this case, a more precise method of calibration should be carried out through the
solution of the whole model for a given set of parameters (all of them) and successive improvements should be made
until the target average values were obtained. However, this non-linearity did not seem to be important here and
the calibration procedure used, based on a deterministic steady state, was able to generate the target averages quite
accurately.
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in order to match the total output volatility σy = 2.76% observed in the Brazilian data.33’34. The
corresponding parameters for gT and gN were set to µg = µc, and ωg = ωc, by symmetry.
The algorithm used in the numeric solution is the following. For each iteration j of the algo-
rithm, given the discretized state-space eS = h eD × eΩZ × eF × {0, 1}i and an initial guess for the
borrowing constraint, d
∗(j)
, the unconstrained model (with no borrowing constraint) is solved and
value functions V D(j) (zt) and V R(j)
³
d∗t−1, bSt´, as well as the decision rule d∗(j) ¡d∗t−1, St¢, are com-
puted through iteration on the Bellman equation.35 During this step, the borrowing constraint is
imposed, meaning that whenever d∗(j)
¡
d∗t−1, St
¢
is such that d∗(j) > d
∗(j)
, then we set d∗(j) = d
∗(j)
.
Updates of the borrowing constraint are obtained using:
d
∗(j+1)
= min
hΩZ
n
d
∗
(St) : V
R(j)
³
d
∗
(St) , St
´
= V D(j) (zt)
o
.
The procedure is implemented until convergence when d
∗(j+1) ≈ d∗(j).
3.5 Results
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the average results of 500 simulations of a time series of size 98, cor-
responding to the 1980Q1−2004Q2 period. The actual Brazilian series for private consumption,
government consumption and total GDP, expressed in per capita values at average prices of 1991Q1,
came from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA), available at www.ipeadata.gov.br
. They are consistent with data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics when they happen to overlap. Data on external debt and GDP in US dollars, used to
compute debt-to-GDP ratios, came from the Central Bank of Brazil. Both the actual and simulated
series for consumption and GDP were transformed previously to the computation of their second
moment statistics, as follows. First, all the variables were expressed in logarithms. Second, for the
actual series, a seasonal adjustment on the log-variables was implemented using the multiplicative
ratio-to-moving-average method. Finally, a smooth trend was subtracted by using the HP filter
with smoothing parameter of 1600.
33 In principle, both parameters, ωc and µc, are important to the volatility of the real exchange rate p. However,
since the business cycle statistics are usually computed on the log variables in order to control for scale eﬀects, only µc
will have an impact on the volatility of (the log of) p. For instance, by taking the logarithm on both sides of equation
(12), it is easy to see that V AR (log pt) = (1 + µc)
2 V AR

log cTt

, implying that the ratio between the volatilities of
(the logs of) pt and cTt , as measured by their standard deviations, must be constant and equal to (1 + µc). Because
of its eﬀect on the volatility of p, the parameter µc has an influence on the volatilities of total output, Y Tt + ptY N ,
total consumption of private

Ct = cTt + ptcNt

and public goods

Gt = gTt + ptgNt

.
34At the long-run average, given the two resource constraints and the normalized version of condition (12), the
implied relationship between ωc and µc is:
ωc ≈
+
1 +

(1− kT ) (1− kg)
kT (1− kg)− rkd − r∗kf
(1+µc),−1
.
35This step itself requires initial guesses for the value functions and the iterations on the Bellman equation are
undertaken until convergence.
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In general, the baseline model of a borrowing constrained economy with the option of seeking the
IMF’s assistance performs well. Note that the model is able to replicate the debt-to-output ratios,
both from private lenders and from the IMF, the consumption of public goods as a proportion of
the GDP, as well as Brazil’s participation in IMF programs.
Table 3.6
Results (I)
Data Model
Variable Brazil Unconstrained Constrained
(%) (1980Q1−2004Q2) NO IMF IMF NO IMF
σc 3.63 1.53 1.99 2.02
σy 2.76 2.41 2.76 2.79
G/Y 20.60 20.76 20.79 20.78
d∗/Y 27.33 33.42 27.52 27.38
d/Y 25.97 33.42 26.17 27.38
f/Y 1.36 − 1.34 −
α 51.02 − 56.27 −
In Table 3.6, σc and σy represent the volatility of (the log of) total consumption of private
goods and total GDP, in units of tradable goods, as given by Ct = cTt + ptc
N
t and Yt = y
T
t + pty
N ,
respectively. Note that the comparison between the constrained and unconstrained economies shows
that the borrowing constraint has the eﬀect of increasing consumption and GDP volatility from
1.53% and 2.41%, respectively, in the unconstrained economy (with no IMF), to 1.99% and 2.76%
in a constrained economy when the Fund is present, and to 2.02% and 2.79% when it is not. That
is, given that the economy faces a borrowing constraint, the IMF means less volatility.
On the down side, although it generates a higher relative consumption volatility (1.99/2.76 =
72.1%) in comparison with the unconstrained economy without the IMF option (63.5%), the model
cannot reproduce the absolute level of consumption volatility observed in the data. This is a
shortcoming of this analysis since consumption is more volatile than output in emerging economies
[see Resende (2005)], meaning that other sources of consumption volatility may be missing here,
such as interest rate shocks or permanent shocks to the growth rate of productivity [see, respectively,
Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004)].
The comparison between the constrained economies with and without the IMF seems to suggest
that IMF loans crowd out private loans, having a negative catalytic eﬀect. In Table 3.6, note
that, despite the small increase in total debt when the IMF is present, the amount of private
loans is higher when there is no IMF, and the diﬀerence is almost totally accounted for by Fund
loans. Nevertheless, even though private loans behave as substitutes to Fund loans (rather than
as complements), the country’s access to international capital markets is indeed facilitated by the
Fund because the direct eﬀect of IMF lending makes the borrowing constraint on total debt less
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stringent.
Potentially, the increase in available funds for the country to borrow may come from two sources.
First, there is the direct increase due to the possibility of borrowing from the Fund, given the
maximum amount of private loans. Second, there is the possibility that the borrowing constraint
d
∗
t may be positively aﬀected by a general-equilibrium eﬀect of the country’s decision of joining
an IMF program, when this decision reduces the likelihood of default on the external debt. If the
borrowing constraint on private loans, d
∗
t −f , turns out to be higher than it would be in the absence
of the IMF, then there is positive catalysis of private capital flows by IMF lending. In the above
exercise, the opposite situation was observed.
Table 3.7
Results (II)
ft−1 gi d
∗
t d
∗
t − f Binding d
∗
t
Model IMFt−1 (% GDP )
¡
% yi
¢
(% GDP ) (% GDP ) (%)
Constrained
NO IMF − 0.0 ∞ 77.79 77.79 0.63
Constrained 0 0.0 ∞ 77.89 75.30 0.58
IMF 1 2.59 20.94 79.07 76.48
Observe in Table 3.7 that, considering the triplet
¡
IMFt−1, ft−1, gi
¢
, there is no diﬀerence in d
∗
t
between the model without the IMF and the model with the IMF when IMFt−1 = 0.36 However,
the borrowing constraint on total debt is less stringent when IMFt−1 = 1. Given the country’s
participation in IMF programs reported in Table 3.6, this means that almost 60% of the time the
economy has more room for consumption smoothing than would be the case if it did not have the
option of seeking the Fund’s assistance. The lower volatility associated with the presence of the
IMF, in the constrained economies as shown in Table 3.6, is a result of this less stringent borrowing
constraint. This also explains why the frequency at which the borrowing constraint binds is lower
in the IMF case (see Table 3.7).37
Figure 3.2, below, shows how the baseline model changes when the conditionality rule on gi
becomes less stringent. In all four graphs, from left to right, the caps gi, i = T,N , imposed by
the IMF are relaxed. Notice that, as conditionality is just slightly stronger (i.e. gi is less than
0.012% of the GDP lower) than our baseline case, IMF participation and IMF lending (upper-left
corner) are null. As we move to the right, and conditionality is relaxed, IMF participation and IMF
lending increase, reducing the volatilities of C and Y (upper-right corner), as well as the frequency
36 In percentage of the GDP, the small diﬀerence (77.89%− 77.79%) is due to eﬀects of the real exchange rate on
the total GDP. The levels of d∗t are the same in both cases.
37Notice also that the level of the debt limit as a proportion of the simulated average GDP, both with and without
the IMF, was such that it corresponds to more than the lower bound of 47.02%, given by the maximal level for the
debt-output ratio observed in Brazil, in the period 1980:1-2004.4.
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at which the borrowing constraint binds (lower-left corner). The negative catalysis of IMF lending
can be seen in the lower-right corner of Figure 3.1: since d
∗
t is not aﬀected, as f increases, the
private borrowing constraint d
∗
t − f is reduced and dt is crowded out by ft.
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Fig. 3.2 - Eﬀects of Changes in gi
It is important to understand why IMF lending does not catalyze private loans in this set up.
In general, positive catalysis of private lending occurs when there is a reduction in the likelihood
of default induced by the IMF programs. If they can reduce the incentives of default, foreign
lenders may relax their borrowing constraint. Strictly in terms of IMF lending, abstracting from
the conditionality aspect of adjustment programs, its eﬀect on the likelihood of default is ambiguous
because of the lower interest rate charged on IMF loans, as explained in Section 3.
As for the eﬀect of IMF conditionality on positive catalysis, it depends on how much it increases
the economy’s ex-ante propension to save. To the extent that highly indebted economies can benefit
more, instantaneously, from the higher current consumption that can be achieved in case of default,
higher propension to save and lower demand for debt means less incentives to default. Figure 3.3
ilustrates how the ability of IMF conditionality in stimulating savings and program participation
depends on the structural parameters.
To better understand this point, first note that consumption of private and public goods are
strategic complements (substitutes) whenever 1+ν is higher (lower) than γ. That is, if the elasticity
of substitution between c and g is lower than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, then the
marginal utility of cit is increasing in g
i
t, for i = T,N , implying that the consumption of public
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and private goods must change in the same direction. Given the calibration discussed above, the
relevant case is that of complementarity between c and g.
 
 
 
 
 
High gc,ε , δ  and low 1, +ttε : 
 
• c and g are strategic substitutes and/or g is 
not very important for overall utility; 
• Lower cost of sub-optimal gi; 
• More incentives to sign an IMF program; 
• Small ex-ante increase in savings;  
• Small reduction on the likelihood of default; 
• IMF lending is likely to take place, but with 
NO Catalytic Effect. 
Low gc,ε , δ  and high 1, +ttε : 
 
• c and g are strategic complements and/or g is 
important in overall utility; 
• Higher cost of sub-optimal gi; 
• Less incentives to sign an IMF program; 
• Higher ex-ante increase in savings;  
• Higher reduction on the likelihood of default;
• IMF lending not very likely (prohibitive
costs); Catalytic effect may be unobservable.
IMF Conditionality and Structural Parameters 
 
Elasticity of Substitution between c and g: νε += 11,gc  
Intertemporal Elasticity of substitution between c and g: γε 11, =+tt  
Share of ct in CES aggregator:δ  
Fig. 3.3 - IMF Conditionality, Forced Savings and the Catalytic Eﬀect
Second, let giNO IMF
¡
d∗t−1, zt
¢
, i = T,N , be the decision rule that would determine the optimal
consumption of public goods in the case the IMF did not exist. If the IMF actually imposes
caps gi such that giNO IMF
¡
d∗t−1, zt
¢
> gi, then conditionality is too harsh relatively to the first
best and there is a welfare cost of satisfying the IMF conditionality rule, since compliance implies
sub-optimal git. Agents can always substitute the (forced) reduction in his consumption of g
i
t by
consuming more cit, but there is an misallocation cost. On one hand, when private and public goods
are substitutes, this cost is low and the relative incentives to sign an IMF program are larger, but
conditionality is not likely to increase savings and, as a consequence, the catalitic eﬀect is not likely
to occur. This is also true if the weight of gt in the CES consumption aggregator is small.
On the other hand, complementarity between c and g implies that the lower level of git, compared
to the case of no IMF, must be followed by a corresponding lower level of cit. If the resulting
oversaving is too costly for the country, it tends not to go to the IMF for assistance. Observe that
(see Figure 3.1) the country always chooses IMFt = 0 when gi is set too low. Obviously, in the
case there is no IMF program participation there is no catalytic eﬀect.
84
Now, consider the opposite situation, such that giNO IMF
¡
d∗t−1, zt
¢
< gi. Conditionality is
“soft” and IMF participation will be positive for some gi, since the constraint git ≤ gi will not be
binding and, at the same time, the country still can enjoy the benefits of cheaper IMF loans in
case of need. In this situation, conditionality is not a real cost for the country because optimal git
is always achieved without violating the IMF conditionality. However, the country is not forced to
save more (than it would do freely) and, as a consequence, for each realization of the shock there
is no reduction in the likelihood of default and no positive catalytic eﬀect takes place. On the
contrary, the cheaper IMF lending compared to the private banks, combined with a non-binding
conditionality rule, will induce the economy to consume more of both private and public goods. In
particular, this is true for tradable goods, which leads to higher demand for external debt, forces
private banks to be even more strict in their lending and explains the negative catalytic eﬀect on
private lending reported above.
3.5.1 IMF Programs as Commitment Devices
Now, consider a diﬀerent model in which the planner does not choose git optimally. Instead, con-
sumption of public goods is exogenous and such that git ∈
©
giL, g
i
H
ª
, where giL < g
i
H . Furthermore,
assume that the country cannot commit with the low level of consumption of public goods, giL,
even if it would be better for the representative agent to do so, but IMF programs can act as a
commitment device [see See Marchesi and Thomas (1999) and Morris and Shin (2005)]. That is,
assume that the support of the IMF can aﬀect the domestic political game in such way that allows
the country to commit with spending giL. Formally, in this modified model, the planner’s problem
is identical to the original, as presented in the previous section, except for the conditionality rules
(10) and (11). Given the new assumptions, those rules change into:
if IMFt = 0 : θt = θ0 =
©
DEFt ∈ {0, 1} ; dt ∈D; ft = 0; git = giH < yit, i = T,N
ª
, (15)
if IMFt = 1 : θt = θ1 =
©
DEFt = 0; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f <∞; git = giL < giH , i = T,N
ª
.(16)
Note that, if we consider the situation where giNO IMF
¡
d∗t−1, zt
¢
< giL < g
i
H , then the reduction
from giH to g
i
L as part of IMF rules will actually force the country to save more and, at the same
time, push the country closer to what would be the optimal levels of git. In this case, the catalytic
eﬀect follows through as can be seen in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. These tables display similar information
to Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively, but for the results from the modified model proposed above.
The new set of results were obtained using the same basic calibration discussed previously, in the
context of the original model. All parameters are the same, with the only diﬀerence that, instead
of calibrated values for the caps gi, i = T,N , now we have to calibrate values for the exogenous
levels giH and g
i
L. For that, we proceed as follows.
Let kjg be the average ratio of consumption of public goods to GDP when IMF = j, for j = 0, 1.
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In addition, let κ be the average reduction in the consumption of public goods as a percentage
of the GDP required by IMF programs, implying k0g = k
1
g + κ > k1g . According to Killick, Malik
and Manuel (1995), the average reduction in government spending in IMF borrowers, comparing
situations before and after an IMF program, is approximately 1% of the GDP. Given κ = 1%,
we calibrated k0g in order to approximate the target α = 51.02% for program participation. The
resulting calibrated values for the exogenous consumption of public goods are giH = k
0
gy
i = 0.2131,
when IMFt = 0, and giL = k
1
gy
i = 0.2031, when IMFt = 1, for i = T,N .
Table 3.8
Alternative Model:.Results (I)
calibration: giH/y
i = 21.3%; giL/y
i = 20.3%
Data Model
Variable Brazil Constrained
(%) (1980.1 - 2004.2) IMF NO IMF
σc 3.63 2.39 2.57
σy 2.76 3.14 3.21
G/Y 20.60 20.81 21.32
d∗/Y 27.33 28.81 22.25
d/Y 25.97 27.32 22.25
f/Y 1.36 1.49 −
α 51.02 51.23 −
Observe in Table 3.8 that, compared to the model with no IMF, the presence of the Fund
implies: (1) a lower ratio of consumption of public goods to GDP, as required by IMF conditionality;
(2) a higher total external debt as a percentage of the GDP, as in the original model; (3) lower
volatilities σc and σy; and, most importantly; (4) a higher level of private loans as a proportion of
the GDP, suggesting a positive catalytic eﬀect of IMF lending that improves the country’s access
to international private loans (not only to total loans).
The evidence of a positive catalytic eﬀect of IMF lending, in this modified model, can also be
seen in Table 3.9. Note that, not only is the borrowing constraint for the total external debt higher
when the IMF exists, but so is the borrowing constraint on private loans, d
∗
t − f . Again, as a
consequence, the borrowing constraint binds with less frequency for the model with the IMF.
Table 3.9
Alternative Model:.Results (II)
ft−1 gi d
∗
t d
∗
t − f Binding d
∗
t
Model IMFt−1 (% GDP )
¡
% yi
¢
(% GDP ) (% GDP ) (%)
Constrained
NO IMF − 0.0 21.3% 79.56 79.56 0.36
Constrained 0 0.0 21.3% 83.96 81.33 0.31
IMF 1 2.63 20.3% 85.95 83.33
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The mechanism through which the positive catalysis takes place is based on the increase in the
country’s external payments position due to IMF conditionality that forces the country to adjust
(reduce) its level of consumption of public goods from giH to g
i
L. Since the consumption of private
and public goods are not perfect substitutes, and given that agents care about their future levels
of consumption, the reduction in gt actually forces the country to save more. By locking countries
into a program of reform that ultimately improves their external payments position, conditionality
provides external investors and private banks with a high degree of assurance about the country’s
decision to repay past debt instead of defaulting. Thus, ceteris paribus, the reduced likelihood of
default allows private banks to relax the borrowing constraint.
To summarize the results so far:
1. IMF lending helps relax the borrowing constraint on total debt and, as a consequence, reduces
the volatility of private consumption and GDP.
2. When countries optimally choose their allocations of public goods, then IMF conditionality
based on restraining the consumption of public goods does not catalyze private capital flows.
The reason is that when conditionality imposes a real cost in terms of sub-optimal higher
savings, countries choose not to sign IMF programs; and when conditionality is not binding,
countries will sign IMF programs but will not be forced to save more.
3. When countries use the IMF as a commitment device to reduce their spending on public goods,
then IMF conditionality forces a higher level of savings, reduces the likelihood of default, and
allows private banks to be less strict in their lending, which produces the positive catalytic
eﬀect on private loans, as the Fund claims.
The remaining question is: by how much does a less stringent borrowing constraint, due to the
direct eﬀect of IMF lending and/or to a positive catalytic eﬀect induced by conditionality, improve
welfare?
3.5.2 Welfare Analysis
In terms of the welfare implications of IMF programs, there are two forces at play here. The
potential cost of joining a program is having to adjust the country’s domestic absorption to the
conditionality clauses, meaning that the country has to face the constraint (11) and set gTt and g
N
t
at potentially suboptimal levels - or rule (16), in the case of the alternative model. The benefits,
besides the lower interest on IMF loans, are related to the additional amount of external funds
available for borrowing, on top of dt, which will allow a higher degree of consumption smoothing.
To assess the welfare eﬀects of IMF-supported programs, the consumption equivalent approach is
used. In particular, we computed the per cent increase in consumption across dates and states, such
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that the representative agent would receive the same utility, considering worlds with and without
the IMF. Let ϑ be this equivalent variation in consumption allocations and let the superscripts
IMF and NO IMF indicate the utility functions and value functions for the equilibrium values of
consumption in worlds with and without the IMF, respectively. The value of ϑ can be computed
from: Z
S
E0
∞X
t=0
βtuIMF
¡
qcTt , qc
N
t , qg
T
t , qg
N
t
¢
dφ =
Z
S0
V NO IMF0 dφ
0, (17)
where:
V NO IMF0 = E0
P∞
t=0 β
tuNO IMF
¡
cTt , c
N
t , g
T
t , g
N
t
¢
is the value function obtained under the as-
sumption that there is no IMF in the world, and q = 1+ ϑ. The set S0 = [D ×ΩZ ] is the support
for the state of the economy in a world with no IMF. Note that the IMF is welfare improving in
the case that q < 1, meaning that the consumption in a world with the option of joining an IMF
program has to be decreased by ϑ in order to generate the same level of welfare as that of a world
without an institution as the IMF.
In the quantitative exercise, using the original model presented in Section 5 to compare two
economies that are identical except for the fact that one operates in a world with the IMF and the
other in a world without the IMF, q was found to be equal to 0.9903. That is, in order to match
the same welfare obtained in a world where there is no option of seeking the IMF’s assistance, the
consumption sequence observed in a world with the IMF has to be decreased by 0.97%. In the
alternative model, with no optimal choice of consumption of public goods, we found q = 0.9958,
implying a 0.42% reduction in consumption required to compensate for the lower welfare observed
in the same economy if it did not have the option of seeking the IMF’s assistance. Therefore, results
suggest that the IMF has an overall small positive eﬀect on welfare.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper presented a dynamic model of an endowment, two-good, small open economy subject
to an endogenous borrowing constraint, where the planner can optimally choose to join an IMF-
supported adjustment program. The quantitative exercise consisted of a comparison between one
economy that has the option of seeking the IMF’s assistance with another, identical in all aspects
to the first one except that there is no IMF in the world (the counterfactual). The paper provides
answers to two questions. First, can IMF conditionality, focused on the reduction of domestic
absorption and control of the consumption of public goods, generate a positive catalytic eﬀect, as
the Fund claims? Second, what is welfare gain associated with IMF programs?
In terms of the numeric results, the answer to the first question depends on whether IMF condi-
tionality can force the country to save more while oﬀering enough compensation for this additional
sub-optimal savings such that the country can actually decide to sign an IMF program. If the con-
sumption of public goods is chosen optimally by the central planner, whenever the conditionality
rule is too strict (relative to the optimal level for the no-IMF case) the country will not participate
in IMF programs. The oversaving implied by conditionality is too costly for the economy.
On the other hand, when conditionality clauses are redundant (because the country optimally
consumes less of public goods than the level determined by conditionality), not forcing the economy
to save, then IMF participation is positive, but there is no improvement in the prospective of
repayment of the external debt by the borrowing country. On the contrary, since conditionality
is not a real cost and the country can still borrow at a lower interest rate from the IMF, private
banks must be more strict in order to avoid default. This, in turn, generates a negative catalytic
eﬀect of IMF lending on private capital flows, although the borrowing constraint on total external
debt may be relaxed.
Only by increasing a country’s external payments position may the Fund help the country
signal to foreign private lenders that the opportunity cost of defaulting has become higher, and
the likelihood of debt repudiation has been reduced. That situation is possible when the planner
does not optimally choose the allocations of consumption of public goods. In that case, under the
assumption that the IMF can act as a commitment device that allows the economy to operate
with a lower level of consumption of public goods than it would otherwise, IMF conditionality
produces a positive catalytic eﬀect on private capital flows. Catalysis occurs because the reduction
in consumption forces the country to save more and, at the same time, pushes the economy closer
to what would be the optimal allocation. As a result, the likelihood of default is reduced and
international private creditors can relax their borrowing constraints. Both the direct (additional
source of loans) and indirect (positive catalysis on private loans) eﬀects of IMF lending imply a less
stringent borrowing constraint that allows more room for consumption smoothing.
However, a less stringent borrowing constraint, either resulting from direct lending or (also from)
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positive catalysis of private flows, is not a measure of “success” or “failure” of IMF programs. The
welfare eﬀects associated with IMF lending by the Fund do not seem to be very quantitatively
important. It is true that the less stringent borrowing constraint allows the country easier access to
international capital markets and, as such, improves the country’s consumption smoothing oppor-
tunities. The reduction in volatility does produce welfare improvements. For the set of parameters
used in the calibration exercise, which were set to approximate the Brazilian economy during the
1980-2004 period, IMF lending generates improvements in welfare equivalent to less than 1% in
additional consumption.
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Conclusion 
 
Conclusion
Dans le premier chapitre, j’ai étudié comment les politiques fiscale et monétaire interagissent pour
déterminer le niveau des prix, avec un modèle simple d’une économie monétaire à l’horizon infini. Le
comportement du gouvernement est caractérisé par une règle de politique fiscale selon laquelle une
fraction de la dette courante a comme contrepartie la valeur présente escomptée du surplus primaire,
courant et future. La partie restante est financée par la création de monnaie, au présent et/ou dans
le future, avec les recettes de seigniorage associées. Une économie peut, donc, être indexée par la
fraction de la dette courante financée par l’autorité fiscale. J’ai démontré que seulement dans le
cas extrême d’un régime fiscal Ricardien, quand la totalité de la dette est (intertemporellement)
financée par la politique fiscale, le niveau de prix est déterminé par le stock de monnaie. De façon
général, la proportion de la dette financée par la création de monnaie a le même rôle que la monnaie
elle-même pour la détermination du niveau des prix. Avec des techniques économétriques standards
de racines unitaires et cointegration, en utilisant des donnés de consommation, de base monétaire
et de dette du gouvernement, le paramètre qui indexe le régime de politique a pu être estimé pour
les pays de l’OCDE. Les résultats suggèrent que le régime fiscal Ricardien est une approximation
raisonnable pour ces pays. Ceci implique que: (i) l’autorité fiscale est l’ultime responsable du
financement total de la dette, et (ii) la dette joue un rôle mineur dans la détermination du niveau
des prix.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, j’ai étudié la diﬀérence entre la volatilité relative de la consommation
par rapport à l’output existant entre les économies émergentes et les petites économies ouvertes
et développées. Les donnés indiquent que la volatilité relative de la consommation est 30 pour-
cent plus grande dans les économies émergentes par rapport aux économies développées. De plus,
cette diﬀérence est statistiquement significative. Avec un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique à
deux biens, appliqué à une petite économie ouverte qui fait face à une contrainte d’endettement
endogène, j’ai démontré qur l’eﬀet de la contrainte est suﬃsant pour augmenter la volatilité relative
de la consommation de 16.3 pour cent. Cela explique plus de 50 pourcent de la diﬀérence observée
dans les donnés des économies émergentes (contraintes) et les économies plus développés (non con-
traintes). Le modèle fonctionne relativement bien soit du point de vue quantitative, pour expliquer
l’évidence empirique mentionnée, soit du point de vue qualitative, dans certaines dimensions (e.g.
les mouvements pro cycliques de la consommation et du taux de change réel).
Dans le troisième chapitre, avec un modèle similaire à celui mentionné dans le paragraphe précé-
dant, j’ai étudié les programmes d’ajustement du Fond Monétaire International (FMI). L’élément
nouveau est la decision optimale du planificateur central entre signer ou ne pas signer un pro-
gramme avec le FMI, de façon à ce que l’économie puisse emprunter des banques privées et/ou du
FMI (à un taux d’intérêt plus faible). La comparaison entre les résultats du modèle simulé dans
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une économie qui a l’option d’avoir l’aide financière du FMI et les résultats obtenus dans le cas
où le FMI n’existe pas (counterfactual analysis) permet de répondre à deus questions. D’abord,
est-ce que les clauses de conditionnalité des prêts du FMI, basées sur la réduction et le contrôle du
montant de consommation des biens publiques, sont capables de générer un eﬀet catalytique positif
sur des flous de capitaux privés, comme le FMI l’aﬃrme? Deuxièmement, quels sont les gains de
bien-etre associés aux programmes du FMI?
Je démontre que une réponse aﬃrmative à la premiere question dépend des clauses de condi-
tionnalité (si elles peuvent forcer le pays à épargner plus en même temps que le programme du FMI
oﬀre des compensations au pays pour cette épargne sous-optimale). Si la consommation de biens
publiques est choisie de façon optimale, alors les règles de conditionnalité sont trop strictes (en
comparaison avec le first best pour le cas où le FMI n’existe pas) et le pays décide de ne pas par-
ticiper dans un programme du FMI. Ceci s’explique par le fait que l’épargne additionnelle entraînée
par la règle de conditionnalité est trop coûteuse en termes de bien-être.
Par contre, lorsque la conditionnalité est redondante (dans le cas où le pays décide de façon
optimale à consommer une quantité de biens publiques qui est plus faible que le montant défini par
la règle de conditionnalité), alors l’économie n’est pas forcée à épargner plus, et la participation
aux programmes du FMI est positive. Dans ce cas, il est à noter que la probabilité de défaut par
le pays emprunteur n’est pas de réduite. Au contraire, la conditionnalité n’etant pas un coût, et
puisque les prêts du FMI sont faits à un taux d’intérêt plus faible, les banques privées ont besoins
d’être plus strictes dans leurs prêts afin d’éviter le défaut. Ceci produit un eﬀet catalytique négatif
des prêts du FMI sur des prêts des banques privées, même si la contrainte d’endettement sur la
dette totale (FMI plus banques) devient moins contraignante.
Par ailleurs, le FMI peut aider à augmenter le coût d’opportunité de faire un défaut seulement
si ses programmes d’ajustement sont capables d’améliorer la situation de paiement ex-ante d’une
économie. Cela est possible lorsque le planificateur central ne choisi pas de façon optimale les
allocations de consommation de biens publiques. Se basant sur l’hypothèse selon laquelle le FMI
peut jouer le rôle d’un commitment device (qui permet à l’économie de s’engager avec un niveau de
consommation de biens publiques plus faible que celui qui aurait eu lieu en l’absence du FMI), j’ai
démontré que la conditionnalité peut générer un eﬀet catalytique positif sur les flous de capitaux
privés. La catalyse a lieu puisque que la réduction de la consommation force le pays à épargner
plus et, au même temps, pousse l’économie vers une allocation plus proche du point optimal. Ceci
réduit la probabilité de défaut et les banques privées peuvent relaxer la contrainte d’endettement
imposée au pays. Les eﬀets direct (une source additionnelle de prêts) et indirect (la catalyse des
prêts privés) des prêts du FMI entraînent une contrainte d’endettement moins stricte et permettent
une lissage de la consommation plus facile.
Cependant, une contrainte moins stricte n’implique pas nécessairement le “succès” des pro-
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grammes du FMI. Les eﬀets sur le bien-être obtenus d’après la simulation du modèle ne semblent
pas être très importants. Une économie moins contrainte a un accès plus facile aux marchés inter-
nationaux de capitaux et peut lisser davantage sa consommation. Cette réduction de la volatilité
génère des gains de bien être. D’après l’exercice de calibration du modèle pour l’économie du Brésil,
pour la période 1980−2004, les prêts du FMI produisent des gains de bien-être équivalents à moins
de 1 pourcent en termes de consommation additionnelle.
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